JOINT CENTER FOR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

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

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As directed, JCOA collects, aggregates, analyzes, and disseminates joint lessons learned and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities.

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Message From the Director

BG John M. Murray, USA
Director, JCOA

With the upcoming disestablishment of the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), this will be the final issue of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Journal. Hopefully, a similar publication will be produced at a future date by the new organization that replaces JCOA. I want to thank all those who have supported JCOA and the Journal over the past eight years; your support has been key to providing current information to war fighters.

In this Journal we present two of JCOA's "case studies" from our work in Iraq. First, we look at the ***Comprehensive Approach Iraq*** (CAI) study, headed by Ms. Jeanne Burington, which was requested by General Petraeus to capture data on integrated counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts begun in 2007. This study focused heavily on civil-military engagement from strategic to tactical levels and how effective these efforts were in abating insurgent activity in Iraq.

The second study, ***Transition to Stability Operations***, produced by a team headed by LTC Brad Davis, was a follow on study to the CAI effort mentioned above. This case study begins in 2009 when the Security Agreement was signed and ends in August 2010 with the completion of combat operations. It examines the best practices, successes, and challenges encountered with moving from combat operations to stability operations in Iraq. This study, in conjunction with the CAI study, provides insights on how an interagency approach and a flexible, adaptive, learning military organization can achieve success in a complex environment. Both of these studies have been well-received and the lessons gathered have been integrated into preparing forces to better understand this complex shift in focus.

In the next article, by Mr. Sam Epstein, ***Combating Endemic Corruption and Influencing Attitudes***, he examines the problem of endemic corruption in Afghanistan and efforts to stem this activity at both the national and local levels through policies and guidance from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and humanitarian missions. Although corruption will always be present to some extent, these combined efforts can mitigate a large portion of its occurrence over time.

Learning the Hard Way: Lessons from Complex Operations is the fourth article in this Journal, and was submitted by Mr. Michael Miklaucic. This article provides insight into the complex environment of modern day civilian-military operations, and how bureaucratic culture and a poorly defined approach impede learning. He argues for a more disciplined and systematic approach to these complex operations.

The struggles in creating a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse democratic nation are discussed in ***Sri Lanka—Past and Future Lessons***, also authored by Mr. Epstein. Since the name change from Ceylon to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in 1972, and adoption of a Constitution in 1978, ethnic struggles and terrorism have occurred between various factions in the country. The author looks at lessons learned, re-learned, and validated during this struggle.

The sixth article examines the expansion of Chinese immigrants into the Russian Far East and possible political effects of this historical area of contention between the two nations. With the declining Russian population and increasing Chinese immigration into this area, it could develop into an area of potential conflict in the future. In ***Chinese Expansion into the Russian Far East: Mythical Threat of Emerging Reality***, Mr. Njdeh Asisian gives the reader a basis for thought into this historically volatile arena.

The final article by Mr. Phil Wirtz, ***Senior Enlisted Leadership in the Joint Operating Environment***, looks at best practices for using senior enlisted leaders to enhance the enlisted force capabilities in a command.

John M. Murray
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis

JCOA UPDATE

This will be the last edition of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Journal. It will not, however, be the end to the important work this organization does. The significance and relevancy of the mission has been recognized as an important and enduring function despite the disestablishment of the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

The existing JCOA organization will be scaled down from about 80 people to 60 people. This scale down will include the termination of the JCOA Journal. As important a role as the journal has played in the transfer of vital relevant warfighting issues, we have been forced to cut back and the journal is part of that cutback. As of 1 May 2011, we will no longer be called JCOA but will have a new name, which has not yet been approved. 1 May 2011 is initial operational capability (IOC) date for the stand up of the new Joint and Coalition Warfighting (JCW) organization as part of the Joint Staff J7. Lessons learned and operational analysis will be a branch within the JCW. Overall, the JCOA mission will remain the same but will be scaled down slightly to where we might not be able to do as many studies, or perhaps engage at the levels we have in the past. The vision is for some of the engagement functions to be shifted into other parts of the new JCW. Final operational capability (FOC) for JCW stand up is 31 August 2011, at which time the USJFCOM flag is folded and the new command and control (C2) relationships are established. Between 1 May and 31 August we will function as the new organization but remain under the current USJFCOM leadership. To our customers, other than referring to us by a different name, the transfer should be somewhat transparent. The tasking process may change a little and, as mentioned before, some of the faces/names that have done our engagement over the years will be different.

In the mean time, we are in the roll out phase of two recently completed major studies, and in the collection phase of a third study. The Transition to Stability Operations (TSO) study and the Adaptive Learning Afghanistan (ALA) studies are complete and roll out is in progress. The TSO study, assigned by GEN Odierno in December 2009, is a two phase study. Phase I was completed in May 2010 and phase II this past fall. The purpose of the study is to capture those key insights, best practices, and challenges as the force transitioned to a stability operations focused mission from January 2009 through August 2010. Out-brief to GEN Odierno is complete with direction to brief at the National Security Council level. The ALA study and out-brief to GEN Petraeus in also complete. The study identifies best practices and challenges impacting unit preparation and adaptation to emerging lessons, in order to validate ongoing civilian casualty (CIVCAS) reduction measures and provide doctrine, operations, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) recommendations for continued improvement. This study has a slightly different approach in that the focus is on process improvement and not so much on operational lessons and best practices.

I would like to reiterate to our current and future customers that you can expect the same, or very close to the same, level of support you have had in the past. Our commitment remains to deliver timely, quality, and relevant products while always looking for better ways to improve the warfighting capability of the joint force.

"We ought not to look back unless it is to derive useful lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dearly-bought experience." - George Washington

Mr. Bruce Beville
Deputy Director JCOA

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The Comprehensive Approach: An Iraq Case Study

Operation Iraqi Freedom, January 2007 to December 2008

Ms. Jeanne Burington, Military Analyst
JCOA

Background

In 2006, the Coalition military strategy in Iraq was two-fold. The main military effort was focused on transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In addition, since Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was part of the Global War on Terror, the military had a counter-terror mission to kill or capture terrorists and extremists. However, the transition strategy did not address conditions on the ground—and counterterrorism operations could not, in and of themselves, defeat the insurgency.

On 22 February 2006, Sunni al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) executed an attack on the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shia sites in the country. This attack, which destroyed the golden dome of the mosque, exacerbated an escalating cycle of sectarian violence spreading throughout Iraq.[1] By fall 2006, sectarian violence in Baghdad was out of control, with AQI conducting high-profile attacks on Shia targets, and Shia Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) conducting extrajudicial killings of Sunnis.

The ISF were not effective at stopping the escalating violence. Because of the existing Coalition strategy to place the ISF in the lead for security, Coalition forces drew back into forward operating bases, leaving to patrol for only hours a day. Areas cleared by Coalition forces were often not held effectively by the ISF, resulting in repeated efforts to clear the same areas. The local population was intimidated and, either actively or passively, supported the insurgents. The ISF were unable and/or unwilling to take the lead.

New Strategy Announced

On 10 January 2007, US President George W. Bush announced a change in strategy to focus our efforts on protecting and securing the Iraqi population, coupled with a concurrent surge of civilian and military resources to accomplish the strategy.[2] The President also announced changes in US senior leadership in Iraq, nominating General (GEN) David Petraeus as the Commanding General of Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Ambassador (AMB) Ryan Crocker as the US Chief of Mission in Baghdad.

General Petraeus, who assumed command of MNF-I in February 2007, Lieutenant General (LTG) Raymond Odierno, who assumed command of Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) in December 2006, and AMB Ryan Crocker, who became the US Ambassador to Iraq in March 2007, subsequently vowed to unite the civilian and military efforts in a comprehensive approach to

Left: AMB Crocker and LTG Ray Odierno

Above: GEN Petraeus and LTG Odierno

protect the population, attack insurgent networks, and build the legitimacy of the government of Iraq (GOI).

The new approach implemented in 2007-2008 was based on several "big ideas"[3] that, together, addressed the root causes of the lack of progress in security and Iraqi governance capacity. Experience, preparation, and historical lessons provided the foundation for these ideas. Although most of these big ideas were fully envisioned as the new strategy was put into place in early 2007, some were realized and institutionalized as knowledge of the environment increased and as opportunities presented themselves. These ideas were not just top-down directives; many were a fusion of top-down guidance and lower echelon experience.

Unifying Efforts

One of the key "big ideas" was the alignment of civilian and military efforts in a coordinated approach to combating the insurgency. The improved civil-military partnership brought all elements of national power to the tasks of protecting the population, attacking insurgent networks, and building the legitimacy of the GOI.

Senior Leader Insistence on Civil-Military Teaming. In 2007, both AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus approached their tasks with the knowledge that success in Iraq could only be achieved through intense and pervasive civil-military cooperation, not only between themselves but also among military and civilians up and down the chain of command.

Senior leadership was a forcing function for civil-military integration. While previous civilian and military senior leaders in Iraq had demonstrated personal cooperation, this cooperation and integration did not necessarily extend to their respective staffs. AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus determined from the beginning that they would lead an integrated effort in Iraq and that they would expect civil-military integration at MNF-I and the Embassy to be accepted as the standard.[4] AMB Crocker described this deliberate effort: "[W]e both knew at the outset that coordination—and the relationship we were able to forge—would set the tone for both of our organizations, top to bottom. We worked on getting that in synch literally from the beginning."[5] GEN Petraeus similarly described their determination to establish civil-military cooperation that would permeate the respective organizations: "Cooperation was not optional. We were going to work together. Ryan Crocker and I sat down and committed to that and whenever anybody tried not to do that, it was made known that was unacceptable."[6]

Senior leadership worked to present a united front whenever possible. For example, AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus met jointly with the US National Security Council, the White House Situation Room, US Congressional delegations, the media, and GOI officials. These jointly conducted meetings promoted the two senior leaders' partnership, helping them to be fully informed of each other's efforts, and avoiding the exploitation of potential seams between them. Subordinate leaders followed their example by making joint appearances and public statements, enabling a coordinated position on both political and security issues.

The integration of civilian and military staffs could not be achieved simply by setting a policy and assuming that integration would take place. Because the staffs had markedly different cultures and approaches, relationships between the staffs sometimes showed obvious tension. Integration therefore took an active and constant effort to ensure that organizational frictions were overcome. Senior leaders provided their guidance through formal and informal means, both written and oral. For example, counterinsurgency (COIN)

US Army COL Philip Battaglia, Commander 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, greets the US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and his staff in As Samawah, Iraq, Jan. 10, 2009 (U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Brendan Stephens/ Released)

guidance issued by MNC-I on 15 June 2007, directed forces to "integrate civilian and military efforts—this is an interagency, combined arms fight. This requires fully integrating our civilian partners into all aspects of our operations—from inception through execution."[7]

AMB Crocker, GEN Petraeus, and LTG Odierno regularly went "out and about," making use of battlefield circulation to observe operations in different areas and to visit provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in order to see what approaches were working and glean insights from personnel on the ground. These visits were opportunities to provide guidance and direction to—and to solicit ideas and suggestions from—lower echelon leaders. The improved situational awareness gained from battlefield circulation led to increased opportunities, as local successes were folded into the Coalition's overall strategic approach.

Civil-Military Partnering at All Levels. In addition to making cooperation a matter of personal leadership, AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus also demonstrated a willingness to combine resources and take on supporting roles, when appropriate. Cooperative partnering took on many forms, including a joint planning process, the establishment of integrated civil-military organizations to address specific COIN requirements, and improved information and intelligence sharing between civilian and military organizations. Partnering occurred at all levels from senior leaders down to brigade combat team (BCT) and PRT personnel. Through this close coordination, the elements of US national power were aligned at all levels to achieve a common purpose.

The joint planning process helped integrate civil-military efforts. In 2007, the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, composed of a diverse group of approximately 20 military and civilian advisors, developed an assessment of challenges in Iraq and possible approaches for dealing with those challenges. The recommended approach became the nucleus of the joint campaign plan (JCP). The fact that the planning process was initiated out of an integrated civil-military effort helped set the tone for further collaboration between a broader set of civilian and military staffs. It was also another way to reinforce senior leadership expectations of civil-military cooperation. The result was a shared plan that articulated the current situation, provided a set of well-defined campaign milestones, and described ways in which to accomplish these milestones as a team.

At the tactical level, BCTs and their embedded or partnered PRTs also conducted integrated planning. Nested within the context of the JCP, they developed unified common plans (UCP) with agreed-upon objectives and tasks for their local environments.[8]

While well-integrated at the strategic and tactical levels, at the operational level the corps and divisions did not always have a civilian counterpart with whom to partner because the civilian organizations were flatter in nature. Several work-arounds were developed to mitigate this gap. In 2008, MNC-I and the Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs developed their own UCP detailing objectives and responsibilities at the operational level. Additionally, liaison officers and political advisors helped inject civilian input at the corps and divisions.

Organizational structures, both formal and ad hoc, were adapted to meet emerging requirements and facilitate improved cooperation. Often, organizations and positions were created or modified for unique and specific needs. The force strategic engagement cell (FSEC), which worked to identify reconciliation opportunities and conduct strategic engagement, was an example of an organization created to meet emerging COIN requirements. The ministerial engagement coordination cell (MECC) facilitated civil-military cooperation by coordinating ministerial engagements and increasing civil-military synergy in advising the GOI ministries. A third example, the medical fusion cell, was formed as part of an effort to "thicken" limited Embassy resources; MNF-I provided military personnel to augment the US Embassy's Health Attaché in order to support efforts to improve health care in Iraq.

While cooperation and integration between the military and the US Embassy improved, there were still challenges. Institutional barriers that impeded partnering between civilian and military agencies and departments included differing tour lengths, challenges staffing nonstandard organizational structures, manning shortages of civilian agencies, cumbersome funding policies, and differing organizational cultures. Despite these institutional barriers, the civil-military team in Iraq in 2007-2008 worked to overcome friction and build strong personal relationships.

Key imperatives were identified:

- Know the respective cultures of the players on the team
- Embrace all team members

- Be inclusive (east the net widely, whenever possible)
- Be complementary versus competitive (focus on each others' strengths)[9]

Soldier and interpreter meeting Iraqi citizens

Focusing on the Population

As he arrived in Iraq, GEN Petraeus stated that his primary "big idea" was to secure the population: "The shift in focus was going to be on securing and serving the population with an explicit recognition that you can only serve the population if you live with it."[10]

Protecting the Population. Measures to protect the population were implemented rapidly, including establishing of joint security stations (JSS) and combat outposts (COP) among the population, use of T-walls to protect markets and neighborhoods, construction of a biometric database to identify individuals, and use of checkpoints to screen for movement of "accelerants of violence" such as car bombs. The capabilities of the ISF were increased through partnership with Coalition units. The use of neighborhood watches manned by security volunteers and concerned local citizens (CLC), later called Sons of Iraq (SOI), proved critical in holding the ground and maintaining security in cleared areas.

Supporting Economic Efforts. However, it was not sufficient to just secure the population; it was necessary to address the root causes that allowed the insurgency to thrive. Security became the foundation that allowed improvements in other areas such as the provision of essential services and the restoration of a functioning economy. As security was established, the top concern of the population became jobs. Thus, the guidance issued by MNF-I was to use "money as a weapon system." Coalition units and PRTs applied commander's emergency response program (CERP) funds to local projects to help sustain security gains through the creation of jobs. In addition to sustaining gains in one local area, funds were used as a means to incentivize the population in nearby areas to stop supporting the insurgency.

Reconciliation Efforts. Concurrently, Coalition forces decided to reconcile with as many insurgents as possible in order to splinter the insurgency and isolate the remaining hard-core "irreconcilables." A policy of reconciliation and accommodation was adopted and aggressively pursued, as described in MNF-I's COIN guidance:

> "Promote reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables."[11]

The approach taken with the Sunni population was a bottom-up effort. Prior attempts at bottom-up reconciliation demonstrated the opportunity that reconciliation presented, but were limited in time, area, and resources. In the summer and fall of 2006, a Sunni grassroots movement began in Ramadi in al-Anbar province. AQI had attempted to gain control of the region through a murder and intimidation campaign, but local sheikhs formed a tribal alliance and began to attack insurgent foreign fighters and radicals operating in their province. The sheikhs decided that cooperation with the Coalition provided a better path toward achieving their goals, and Coalition forces, recognizing an opportunity, positioned themselves to take advantage of it.

At this time, LTG Odierno, then the Commanding General of MNC-I, was informed by lower-echelon commanders of a nascent change in attitude among the Sunni population in various areas of Iraq. He made the decision to allow Coalition forces to "reach out to some of these people and see if we can help them come

aeross and put their arms down and, instead of pointing weapons at us, point weapons at al-Qaeda. So we started to work that—a bottom-up approaeh."[12] The suecess in Ramadi spread to other areas of al Anbar provinee, and Coalition higher headquarters (divisions, corps, and foree) set the poliey and provided the resourees that faeilitated the spread of related best practices to additional areas in Iraq.

MNC-I also realized that eaeh region would require a tailored approaeh and that the loeal eommanders, who knew the area best, would need the flexibility to determine what would work for their area. However, general guidanee had to elearly define the "left and right limits," specifying what was and was not permissible. In June and July 2007, MNC-I developed poliey and issued fragmentary orders to lowereehelon eommanders with speeifie reeoneiliation guidanee. Commanders down to the eompany level were eneouraged to engage with insurgent groups, loeal government, tribal, and ISF leaders. A "toolbox" was developed to assist with negotiations and ineluded "tools" sueh as CERP funding and authorities to release certain detainees.

While the eorps, divisions, brigades, and PRTs facilitated the bottom-up efforts at reeoneiliation, MNF-I realized that it needed to work the top-down efforts with the GOI and conduct strategie reconciliation engagements. As reconciliation efforts expanded, the size and complexity of the situation required a formal organization dedieated to the effort. The FSEC,

Soldier meeting with local townspeople

led by a United Kingdom two-star general and a US Department of State foreign service offieer, was ereated in May 2007 to "faeilitate and eatalyze Government of Iraq reeoneiliation with entities involved in armed opposition outside the mainstream political proeess through diserete strategie engagement."[13]

The reconciliation efforts generated a very strong response from the Sunni population. The Sons of Iraq grew in number to 103,000 individuals, most of whom were Sunni. Through key leader engagements, the Coalition and US Embassy worked to mitigate the Shia-led government leaders' concerns and influence them to reach out to the Sunni groups willing to become part of the political process.

Shia reeoneiliation efforts were a bit more nuanced. The GOI was eager to reconcile with many of the Shia militias, but did not neeessarily know how best to do so. This uncertainty allowed the Coalition an opportunity to influence the situation. Coalition efforts included attempts to splinter the Shia militias, separating the extremists from the more moderate elements. As security improved, the population became less dependent upon militias for protection. Additionally, by focusing on speeifie areas for aid and development, the Coalition and GOI began offering the Shia population a better alternative to the militias. A good example of this was the reeonstruction and development work done in Sadr City following the spring 2008 fighting.

Detention Operations: COIN Inside the Wire. In 2007, MNF-I and Task Foree (TF)-134, which operated Coalition detention operations in Iraq, transformed detention operations, ineorporating rehabilitation and reeoneiliation options.[14] In previous years, time spent in detention often added numbers to the insurgeney as radieal elements in the detainee population actively reeruited more moderate detainees. "COIN Inside the Wire" sought to identify reconcilable detainees (both Sunni and Shia), reinforce moderate tendencies, provide educational opportunities, and enable suecessful reintegration into soeiety.

Strategie Communieation. Prior to 2007, much of the information domain had been eeded to the insurgents. The Coalition made changes to its strategie communieation strategy to become first with the truth and relentlessly fight the information war, using strategie communication to inform the general population and to drive wedges between the population and the extremists.

As part of the enhanced communication strategy, all echelons of the Coalition publicly emphasized positive trends and worked to mitigate negative events as they occurred. Often the Iraqi populace would expect improvements more quickly than was possible, so the Coalition also worked to manage Iraqi expectations. By consistently promulgating truthful messages, and by matching actions with words, the Coalition built trust with the population. Extremist activities and atrocities against cultural norms were also highlighted. The MNF-I "Counterinsurgency Guidance" advised: "Turn our enemies' bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them."[15]

While the Coalition told the truth in order to build trust with the populace, the extremists frequently did not. The enemy would purposefully circulate an untrue story to play upon the population's fears or discontent and to make the GOI and Coalition look bad. This misinformation had to be aggressively challenged. Speed of response was important in order to try to keep that misinformation from settling in people's minds and then spreading widely by means of the "rumor mill." The Coalition could best counter the enemy's lies by "beating them to the punch" with truthful and timely accounts of events.

A variety of spokespeople and venues were used in order to most effectively communicate the Coalition message. As stated by GEN Odierno, now Commanding General of MNF-I, "We are very sophisticated now in conducting information operations and understanding how we can utilize the various tools available to us in order to influence ... from a strategic standpoint, an operational standpoint, and a tactical standpoint."[16] The brigades, being close to the population, were often able to determine what message medium had the best results for their area, recognizing that face-to-face engagements between the Iraqi population and Coalition representatives produced effective results. Iraqis speaking to Iraqis on behalf of the GOI and the Coalition was the ultimate goal. Therefore, the Coalition and Embassy worked with Iraqi spokespeople to develop their strategic communication capabilities. Press briefings and engagements would often be conducted jointly with Iraqi and Coalition representatives.

In 2007, subordinate commanders were given greater authority to develop and pass messages. To get an accurate message out quickly, streamlined procedures were needed, as well as close coordination among the different entities operating in the area.



Changing strategy to support the surge

Attacking Insurgent Networks

Another "big idea" in Iraq was focusing on improving coordination between the counter-terror mission (primarily conducted by Coalition special operations forces) and the COIN mission (primarily conducted by general purpose forces and civilians). To accomplish this improved coordination, targeting processes and procedures needed to be reviewed in the context of the broader mission.

Persistent Pressure. By 2007, leaders in Iraq had come to understand that success would be dependent upon the application of persistent pressure on insurgents and

their networks. This knowledge was born, in part, from experiences gained in 2004-2006, when the Coalition had not consistently applied pressure on insurgents, affording them the opportunity to create sanctuaries within the population.

As LTG Odierno assumed command in late 2006, MNC-I began to develop and implement a new offensive strategy. The goal of the strategy was to "take the fight to the enemy and defeat its will," by applying persistent pressure.[17] As a result of this shift in mind-set, Coalition forces moved off the large bases where they had consolidated. Instead, they operated from JSSs and combat outposts (COP) located among the people. One commander noted, "We stopped commuting to the fight."[18] Additionally, MNC-I planned and executed a series of named operations (including FARDH AL-QANOON, PHANTOM THUNDER, PHANTOM STRIKE, and PHANTOM PHOENIX) to aggressively pursue the enemy and deny them sanctuary in the areas surrounding Baghdad (the "Baghdad belts").

A key aspect of this new 2007 strategy was the surge of needed resources, including forces on the ground. Based on an understanding of the threat, the decision was made to place the equivalent of three surge brigades in Baghdad to help secure the population, and to place the remaining equivalent of two brigades in the Baghdad belts to prevent the movement of "accelerants of violence" into the city.[19] The surge of forces allowed the Coalition to employ an "oil spot" approach, where one area was brought under control, and when it was stabilized and could be entrusted to the ISF, Coalition forces would move to the next area, thus gradually expanding areas of stability. Simultaneous offensive operations in the surrounding areas kept pressure on the enemy, putting them off balance and limiting their freedom of movement to and from the city.[20]

Understanding the Environment. The information needed to effectively target in a COIN environment is more temporal, more complex, and more difficult to collect than the information needed for purely counter-terror missions. While understanding the threat was still important, a threat-focused approach was insufficient to understand how the insurgent network was intrinsically tied into the general population. Military forces thus changed from a threat-focused approach to one in which they sought a broader understanding that included the population and associated factors such as economic conditions, social and tribal relationships, and political issues. This understanding was necessary to provide security, pursue reconciliation, mentor and vet community leaders, influence the population to reduce its support for insurgents, and identify and target insurgent networks.

A detailed understanding of the environment was promoted through the use of fusion cells–cells that were designed to establish dialogue between the disparate intelligence organizations and to partner them with operators who provided real time insights and operational requirements. Fusion cells were established at multiple echelons, from brigade up to MNF-I, and crossed civil-military boundaries to facilitate information sharing and collaboration between different organizations.

Coordination of Effort. Forces conducting counter-terror operations and those conducting COIN missions had to work together closely to prevent interference and counterproductive actions.

In 2007-2008, there was a more coordinated effort between special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) in targeting insurgents and their networks. Senior leaders emphasized the team effort required and the need for everyone to contribute to the counterinsurgency mission. Fusion cells allowed a synergy to develop between SOF and GPF, where each was focused on different elements of insurgent networks, thus contributing to the other's targeting



Anaconda planning factors

efforts. The overall result was "two elements going after the whole network together, but with each employing his unique capabilities... that's a big lesson learned for high-end counter-terror forces that used to be fairly separated and kept in a narrow sphere."[21]

To help coordinate their efforts, SOF and GPF began holding routine video teleconferences and assigned liaison officers to each other's organizations. As more cross-talk occurred, people realized the operational value of integrating efforts. A former high-placed staff member of MNF-I described the synergistic effect of counter-terror targeting combined with counterinsurgency efforts to deny safe havens:

> "What we learned in 2007-2008 is that it was impossible to destroy a terrorist network that had created a safe haven for itself with pinpoint strikes. You can never get enough of them. It cannot be done. But when you put conventional forces in those areas and you deny the enemy the safe haven that he enjoyed, it forces the terrorist to move and communicate. When they move and communicate they can then be targeted and killed. So the synergy you see with conventional forces getting out of the forward operating bases, more conventional forces coming in, standing up more Iraqi forces and denying the safe havens—that is what happened and that is the synergy you need."[22]

A More Comprehensive Approach to Targeting. In a counterinsurgency, targets can be friendly, hostile, neutral, or unknown—and the targeting operation can be lethal or non-lethal. Because of these complexities, a more comprehensive approach to targeting was needed and developed.[23] Targeting of high-value individuals became closely integrated with targeting of the broader facilitation networks (i.e., finance, recruitment, training, logistics, media, and command and control). This required an interagency approach, synchronizing kill/capture operations with initiatives by other US Government (USG) departments and agencies. The "Anaconda" approach provided a framework to describe all the actions that could be applied to defeat foreign terrorists and their facilitators.

Leaders at all levels placed increasing importance on disrupting enemy activities both inside and outside of Iraq's borders. As one officer noted, "There has to be a public diplomacy effort that makes the cultural attitude in which jihad and that type of activity is revered—it's got to counter that. And right now, we've got some programs that are working towards that end."[24] Diplomatic engagement encouraged national governments in the region to work within their own countries to reduce the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The US Embassy Baghdad and Coalition leadership also encouraged GOI leaders to engage with other governments, emphasizing that terrorism posed a threat to all the governments in the region.

Threat financiers and networks were attacked using a variety of means. The US Department of Treasury was authorized, through a series of executive orders, to designate and block assets of individuals and companies that funded terrorist organizations.[25] Diplomatic engagement encouraged regional governments to crack down on financial facilitators operating from countries outside Iraq.

Within Iraq, it was often difficult to determine exactly how the insurgency was extracting funding from various enterprises, due to the nature of the cash economy and the complex interactions with corrupt officials and criminal networks. Operations to counter threat finance internal to Iraq included:

- Analyzing information and intelligence to try to identify key network nodes
- Obtaining and executing Iraqi arrest warrants on individuals identified as financial facilitators
- Encouraging anticorruption (including US Agency for International Development [USAID] efforts to promote better business practices)
- Protecting key officials willing to institute better business practices

Strategic communication, in conjunction with other activities, highlighted individuals and groups with a "flashlight effect." Leaflets, "most wanted" posters, handouts, text messages, and hotline tip numbers were used as "nonlethal area denial" to push insurgents out of an area or make it difficult for them to return once they did leave. Information activities were also used to expose individuals' bad actions. As an example, US Treasury designations were followed up with public disclosure to highlight the criminal nature of the designated organization's or individual's financial support to terrorism.

Building Government of Iraq Legitimacy

Counterinsurgency doctrine states that, "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government."[26] In the Joint Campaign Plan of 2007, the political line of operation was given primacy, with all other lines of operation supporting. The US Embassy Baghdad led the political, economic, and diplomatic lines of operation, with Coalition forces supporting their efforts and in the lead for the security line of operation. Together they worked to strengthen the GOI and establish it as the legitimate authority in Iraq.

In the comprehensive approach taken in 2007-2008, security, governance, and economic efforts were balanced depending on the operational environment. The appropriate balance changed over time and by location, depending on the nature of that operating environment. Additionally, as host nation governance capacity improved, more emphasis was placed on supporting the host nation as they took the lead in providing security, conducting reconstruction, and developing the economy.

Security as a Foundation. In 2007, the change in strategy to focus on securing the population was intended to buy time for Iraqi political and economic progress. Improved security created a more stable environment that facilitated Iraqi reconciliation, opened communication between the people and the government, allowed for training and mentoring at provincial and local levels, accelerated reconstruction progress, increased attractiveness for foreign investment, encouraged the return of displaced persons (including professionals who had fled the violence), and accelerated growth and training of the ISF. Economic and social progress, which was enabled by security gains, reinforced both security and GOI legitimacy. LTG Odierno stated,

> "Generally speaking, when security conditions improve, a narrow focus on survival opens up and makes room for hope. Hope provides an opportunity to pursue improvements in quality of life. Along these lines, the surge helped set the stage for progress in governance and economic development. In a very real way, and at the local level, this subtle shift in attitude reinforced our security gains—allowing Coalition and Iraqi forces to hold the hard-earned ground we had wrested from the enemy while continuing to pursue extremists as they struggled to regroup elsewhere."[27]

Coalition forces continued to partner with and develop the Iraqi security forces, encouraging them to take the lead when able. Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) continued to man, train, and equip the Iraqi forces, while MNC-I and subordinate commands partnered with and mentored Iraqi

US and Iraqi officers

units, providing them with valuable operational experience. Coalition and Iraqi units lived, worked, and fought together in a combined effort to protect the population. Using a teach-coach-mentor approach, partnered units, together with US transition teams, enforced ISF standards, enabled performance, and monitored for abuses and inefficiencies.

When capable, ISF units began to take the lead in operations—with enabling capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and aviation provided by the Coalition. ISF-led operations conducted in spring 2008, including Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS in Basra, greatly increased confidence in ISF tactical capabilities, both within the ISF and in the eyes of the population. Increasingly over time, Coalition operations were conducted "by, with, and through" the ISF.[28]

Governance Initiatives. Coalition and Embassy assistance was provided to all levels of government, from national to provincial and local. At the national level, regular engagements with senior GOI leadership built relationships and encouraged adoption of policies consistent with Coalition goals. Advisors were provided to the various Iraqi ministries to mentor the staff and assist in the development of a functional Iraqi bureaucracy. For example, USAID's Tatweer Project employed a train-the-trainer approach and worked with ministries to set up and improve their internal civil service training programs.

Coalition and US Embassy personnel recognized that their initiatives needed the support of the Iraqi government in order to be sustainable; thus, Iraqi representatives were actively engaged to determine priorities and integrate efforts. As Iraqi governance capabilities improved, Coalition and US Embassy personnel gradually began to shift their focus to assist Iraqi officials in doing what had previously been done by the Coalition.



US soldiers and officials meeting with local Iraqi officials

Extensive efforts were made to assist the GOI in expending its budget and to strengthen ties between the national government and provincial entities. In July 2008, the Public Finance Management Action Group (PFMAG) was formed with US Treasury and military personnel to provide an integrated and focused financial advisory service with the goal of improving the Iraqi budgetary process across all levels of government. The PFMAG helped the ministries and provinces learn how the GOI budget process worked. The head of the PFMAG stated, "I do think we are helping to build a better government because we are helping make it more efficient and timely in the distribution of resources to spending units."[29]

Through key leader engagement, Coalition leaders also attempted to foster an environment with reduced sectarianism, corruption, and malign influences. The JCP recognized that:

> "Transparent, effective, and uncorrupted governance is necessary to sustain confidence in and respect for the rule of law. Accordingly, [the plan] focuses ongoing anticorruption and other efforts at the national level to improve the overall governance and specific lawmaking abilities of GOI institutions." [30]

Anticorruption efforts were promoted within the provinces as political and security conditions permitted. Special emphasis was given to "investigation and prosecution of corrupt government officials, members of organized crime syndicates, and other malign actors who use revenue acquired through oil theft, smuggling, black market fuel sales, and other corruption schemes, to fund attacks against the Coalition, legitimate GOI officials, and civilians."[31]

In addition to work with the various ministries, US Embassy and Coalition personnel engaged with members of the Council of Representatives to encourage passage of key legislation. While legislative progress was slow, several important laws were passed in 2008, including the Accountability and Justice Law, 2008 Budget, Amnesty Law, and Provincial Powers Law.

The PRTs and brigades similarly engaged with and mentored provincial and local government entities. USAID's Local Governance Program provided training for a variety of local officials and staff, civil service organizations, business leaders, and nongovernmental organizations.

Economic Development Initiatives. Embassy and Coalition representatives worked with the GOI to further economic progress for the country while PRTs and lower-echelon Coalition forces worked micro-economic initiatives to improve conditions in their local

Meeting at an Iraqi bank

areas. Investment in economic progress reinforced both security and GOI legitimacy.

The effective provision of essential services was a key factor in how the population viewed the legitimacy of its political leadership. Coalition organizations such as the energy fusion cell and the joint reconstruction operations center synchronized military and civilian efforts to assist the GOI in providing essential services in a fair and balanced manner to the population, fostering their confidence and establishing credibility.

Economic development was further addressed through job creation programs, small business development efforts, foreign and domestic investment, improved access to credit and banking services, and creation of economic development zones. Both near- and long-term employment opportunities were pursued in concert with the GOI to counter the insurgency and generate economic growth in local areas.

Conclusion

By the end of 2008, a combination of strategy, leadership, and unprecedented civil-military partnership had created dramatic progress in Iraq. Insurgent attack levels were the lowest since the summer of 2003, the ISF were increasingly effective and less sectarian, and the Iraqi government had taken significant steps toward legitimacy. Iraq was still a fragile state, with its ultimate success dependent upon the will and competence of the government and its people, but remarkable progress had been made to provide an opportunity for success that was simply not there in 2006.

US Soldiers providing a microgrant to an Iraqi shop owner

The comprehensive approach undertaken by GEN Petraeus, GEN Odierno, AMB Crocker, their staffs and subordinate organizations (divisions, brigades, and PRTs) validated the established principles of COIN through their successful application to the Iraq counterinsurgency.[32] These principles include the requirement to:

- Secure the population as the foundation for success. A "clear, hold, and build" approach is key to achieving public rejection of an insurgency.
- Use money as a means to sustain tactical security gains. Balance long-term development plans with efforts to support short-term security needs.
- Understand the environment. All aspects of the operational environment must be considered in decision-making. All plans must be tailored accordingly.
- Build the civil-military team. Aggressively recruit highly-qualified professionals (the "A-team").
- Emphasize a comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation to establish unity of effort. Civil-military partnering brings together organizations with complementary strengths, enhancing all lines of operation.
- Empower subordinates and incorporate local success back into higher-level approaches and policies.
- Maintain an offensive mind-set within a COIN framework. Both kinetic and non-kinetic targeting of insurgents must be placed into an overall comprehensive COIN approach.
- Strengthen host-nation government legitimacy and capacity through mentoring, partnering, and providing key enablers. These efforts set the conditions for the host nation to be able to operate in the lead.
- Foster reconciliation and accommodation. This splinters an insurgency, thickens security forces, and improves available intelligence.
- Fight the information war. Effective strategic communication contributes to driving a wedge between the population and the insurgents, often providing a "spotlight" effect on insurgents.

This article is a summary of the best practices and lessons learned from the *Comprehensive Approach in Iraq* study. While the specific lessons learned and best practices observed and detailed in this study may

not apply "lock, stock, and barrel" to other situations, they could very well serve as a framework for future comprehensive approaches to COIN.

About the Author:

Ms. Burington has been a deployable analyst with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) since July 2006. She has deployed to Iraq four times: from April-August 2007 as part of the JCOA Forward Team and embedded at Multinational Force-Iraq's Assessments Office; from August-December 2008 as the JCOA Forward Team Lead; and in January-February and August 2010 as part of the Transition to Stability Operations study collection team. She was the study lead for the Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study looking at the 2007-2008 timeframe, and has contributed to other JCOA studies on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Prior to coming to JCOA, she worked as an analyst at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Panama City, FL. She has a bachelor's degree in Mathematics and a master's degree in Systems Engineering, both from the University of Virginia.

Endnotes:

[1] The attack on the al-Askari Mosque and destruction of its golden dome further galvanized sectarian strife that had been brewing, in part, as a result of the 2005 Iraq elections

[2] In his "Address to the Nation" on 10 January 2007, President George Bush announced the new strategy for Iraq and stated: "Our troops [the five brigades to be deployed to Baghdad] will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs." This mission, as well as others referenced in his address, required the application of the principles of COIN.

[3] GEN Petraeus used the term "big ideas" to refer to the key concepts employed in the new approach to the conflict in Iraq in 2007-2008

[4] This same determination continued when GEN Odierno replaced GEN Petraeus as Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq in September 2008

[5] JCOA interview with AMB Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq, conducted 11 January 2009

[6] JCOA interview with GEN David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, conducted 28 January 2009

[7] Multi-National Corps-Iraq, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," 15 June 2007

[8] Unified Common Plans were plans developed between brigades or divisions and PRTs to define specific tasks and objectives that would be performed in their local operating area. The UCPs were nested with the strategic Joint Campaign Plan, but were tailored to support the specific local environment.

[9] JCOA interview with Multi-National Force-Iraq Chief of Staff, conducted 14 January 2009

[10] JCOA interview with GEN David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, conducted 28 January 2009

[11] Multi-National Force-Iraq, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," 21 June 2008

[12] JCOA interview with GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 6 December 2008

[13] JCOA interview with Chief of Staff, Force Strategic Engagement Cell, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 10 November 2008

[14] Task Force 134, "Detention Operations Information Booklet," 2008

[15] Multi-National Force-Iraq, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," 21 June 2008

[16] JCOA interview with GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 6 December 2008

[17] JCOA interview with former Senior Intelligence Advisor to Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 22 January 2009

[18] JCOA interview with former Commander, 1/1 Armor Division Brigade Combat Team, conducted 21 January 2009

[19] While the surge of forces announced by President Bush in January 2007 was the equivalent of five brigades-worth of combat power, the physical movement of forces was accomplished by the addition of individual battalions. The movement of battalions resulted in an increase in combat power equivalent to three brigades in Baghdad and two brigades in the surrounding belts.

[20] Multi-National Corps-Iraq/III Corps briefing, "Operation Iraqi Freedom December 2006-February 2008," 3 April 2008

[21] JCOA interview with LTG Stanley McChrystal, conducted 22 February 2009

[22] JCOA interview with a highly-placed staff member of Multinational Force-Iraq, conducted 30 January 2009

[23] "Targeting" refers to a broad spectrum of activities ranging from kinetic kill/capture operations against enemies to nonkinetic activities focused on influencing and informing the general population

[24] JCOA interview with Multi-National Force-Iraq CJ3 Joint Interagency Task Force, Foreign Terrorists and Facilitators Team Lead, conducted 4 November 2008

[25] Under the authorities of Executive Order 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 23 September 2001 and Executive Order 13438, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq, 17 July 2007

[26] US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006

[27] The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lectures, "The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later," LTG Raymond T. Odierno, delivered 5 March 2008, published 13 March 2008

[28] "The development of a foreign security force (FSF) improves its capacity to meet its own country's national security objectives founded on a 'rule of law.' As we assist other nations, adopting a 'by, with, and through' strategy enables a FSF to generate and sustain capabilities institutionally and operationally. We can achieve this by doing the work for them, in concert with the supported nation, and through development of the supported nation and its security forces so they can do it themselves," Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Tri-fold, 4 November 2009

[29] JCOA interview with Treasury Attache, US Embassy Baghdad, conducted 4 December 2008

[30] Multinational Force-Iraq and US Embassy Baghdad, "Joint Campaign Plan Update," 27 November 2007

[31] Ibid

[32] The principles of COIN are described in multiple documents. Principally, we refer to US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006

10/05/2008 - From left, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, a tribal sheikh, Ma'Moun Sami Rasheed Al Awani, the governor of the Al Anbar province, and US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker pose for a group photo after a meeting at the Provincial Government Center in Ramadi, Iraq, 5 October 2008.

Transition to Stability Operations in Iraq: Case Study One

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Introduction

This ease study looks at how US Forees–Iraq (USF-I) transitioned from eounterinsurgeney (COIN) to stability operations during the period 1 January 2009 (signing of the Security Agreement) through 31 August 2010 (end of eombat operations).[1] While there were many faetors that complieated the transition, sueeess was predieated upon the USF-I and eivilian-military organizations beeoming adaptive learning teams and leaders leading ehange—all while drawing down in size by approximately 100,000 troops.

The stability operations mission undertaken by USF-I eonsisted of three primary tasks: advising and assisting the Iraqi seeurity forees (ISF), building Iraqi eivil eapaeity, and eonduеting partnered eounterterrorism (CT) operations. US forees foeused on setting the eonditions for the ISF to aehieve minimum essential eapabilities prior to the end of 2011, while supporting US Embassy efforts to build Iraqi eivil eapaeity at loeal through national levels. Partnered CT operations enabled the transition by maintaining pressure on insurgent and terrorist networks. A detailed look at USF-I's efforts in aeeomplishing each of these three tasks follows.

Primary Tasks for Stability Operations

Task 1: *Advising and Assisting the Iraqi Security Forces*

Resourees for manning, training, and equipping the ISF were prioritized based on operational assessments. The analysis and planning proeess employed by the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG A&T) projeeted where ISF capability would be by the end of 2011 and identified where shortfalls were likely to oeeur. This allowed USF-I to prioritize and alloeate available resources to enable ISF to achieve minimum essential eapabilities. In support of this, US divisions were able to redireet and target their resources to help the ISF in speeifie needed areas.

> *"We've got two years to get the Iraqis to the point of minimum essential capabilities for internal security and lay the foundational capabilities for defense against external threats ... what do we need to do, what can we do, and where do we put our resources to get us there? So we went through a pretty rigorous analysis to identify what those capabilities are and then what the Iraqis needed to have as far as training, equipping, skills."*[2]

ISF development ineluded both internal seeurity eapabilities and a foundation for defense against external threats. US forees' strong partnerships with the ISF, aeeurate assessments of eapabilities, and realistie eapability projeetions all helped ereate and sustain a eoherent effort in ISF development.

US Army LTG Michael D. Barbero, DCG A&T, participates in an M1A1 tank roll-out ceremony at the Iraqi Defense Ministry Headquarters on Camp Iraqi Heroes in Baghdad, 14 October 2010. Many US and Iraqi military leaders attended the event in which the Iraqi Army received 35 of 140 M1A1 tanks that Iraq is purchasing from the US. (US Army photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel Yarnall)

The US approach to partnering with the ISF evolved and had to be redefined over time, based on the capabilities of the ISF, the changing operational environment, and the implementation of the security agreement. In the first years of COIN, US forces were in the lead, teaching combat skills and instilling confidence. As the ISF's capability and the operational environment improved, the ISF began to take the lead, with US forces providing support and enablers. As the operational focus moved toward and into stability operations, the partnership continued to evolve as US forces took an increasing advisory and assistance role.

> *"As we looked at the Security Agreement and picked it apart, it became clear to us that in order to continue to operate 'full spectrum,' we were going to have to redefine partnering. So we committed ourselves to the notion that our ultimate success would be defined by the quality of our partnering with ISF. It's inconvenient, it's hard, it's manpower intensive, everything takes longer, there are cultural issues and professional issues, but the thing I am proudest of most is how every leader ... committed to it, and I think it made all the difference."* [3]

Over time, the example of US forces, through the combination of mentoring and partnered operations, began to change ISF operational paradigms. Partnered operations were doing much more than just building capabilities; they were also beginning to create some major shifts within the Iraqi military culture. LTG Barbero stated that the areas of most notable change included the noncommissioned officer corps, demand-driven logistics, democratic policing, and evidence-based warrant processes.

Task 2: *Building Civil Capacity*

In 2009, USF-I's *Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability* directed US forces to synchronize their efforts with interagency partners to strengthen Iraqi political, economic, diplomatic, and rule of law institutions while avoiding temporary "quick fixes" that could undermine long-term institutional viability.[4] Working with US Embassy Baghdad, USF-I embedded personnel at the US Embassy to reinforce planning capacity where it was critically needed. The subordinate commands and civilian organizations such as Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) and US divisions worked with the US Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), while the divisions and brigades worked with the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). This helped to ensure unity of effort in developing coherent and achievable goals and synchronizing short- and long-term civil capacity development.

US forces worked to expand the reach and reinforce the capacity of the PRTs. The division-brigade-PRT civil-military team helped the Iraqi provincial governments, local governments, and ISF connect with the population to better understand local issues and concerns. Efforts included facilitating and building relationships amongst the Iraqis themselves (government officials, ISF, and the people). In addition, the US forces' security and logistics assets provided transportation for PRT members to participate in numerous regional, provincial, and local government meetings and conferences.[5] These efforts to build "connective tissue" served as catalysts for further demands for good governance:

> *"[We are] creating a demand in the population for good governance. That demand from the population, if we get this right, will be a continuing influence that years of future Iraqi governments, both local and national, is going to have to contend with. So what they are doing is creating an expectation in the people of Iraq for what a government does. And long after we are gone, if we can get this right, governments of Iraq are going to have to satisfy that demand."*[6]

By working to develop Iraqi processes, the PRTs helped increase the capacity of provincial governance, enabling enhanced public services and economic opportunities for the population. There were numerous examples where division and brigade specific expertise (engineering, legal, medical, etc.) were used to reinforce PRTs and enhance civil capacity building. One technique that worked well involved demonstration projects such as green houses, center-pivot and drip irrigation, and grain silos to allow the Iraqis to see for themselves the advantages of certain concepts and technologies.

In addition, US forces aligned their efforts with interagency, international, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) efforts. With the US Embassy in the lead, USF-I supported and reinforced civil capacity assessment and planning efforts. The Joint Campaign Plan (US Mission–Iraq [USM-I] and USF-I) and the Unified Common Plans (PRT and brigade or division) facilitated a "whole of government" approach and unity of effort among the interagency organizations involved. In addition, USF-I provided critical logistics, security,

and movement of United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) personnel, enabling humanitarian, reconstruction, development, human rights, and political assistance missions.

US Army MG Terry Wolff, Commander, 1st Armored Division, meets with Baghdad Governor Hussein Al Tahhan and the Dean of the Abu Ghraib Agricultural College, Baghdad, 1 April 2010. (US Army photo by Spc. Venessa Hernandez)

Task 3: *Conducting Partnered Counterterrorism Operations*

Partnered CT operations supported and enabled the successful transition to stability operations in Iraq. These operations maintained pressure on the violent extremist networks (VEN), providing the time and space necessary for continued political maturation, civil capacity development, and the growth and maturation of ISF capabilities.

The development of an Iraqi CT enterprise was integral to the success of the partnered operations. The CT enterprise included those institutional functions and capacities that "kept terrorists off the streets," and thus involved the legal, judicial, and correctional systems, as well as police and investigative systems related to CT operations.

During the transition period, the Government of Iraq (GOI) continued to gain confidence and exert its sovereign authority, necessitating continuous US innovation and adaptation to sustain pressure on the terror networks. Successful partnered CT operations were achieved through extensive collaboration and information sharing at all levels.[7]

> *"In 2004, ISOF [Iraqi Special Operations Forces] was assisting US Special Forces [USSF] prosecute the war against insurgents and violent extremists in Iraq; by 2009, roles had reversed, USSF were now assisting ISOF ... As the US mission in Iraq evolved over the years, so too have the capabilities of ISOF. ISOF is poise to become a self-sustaining, national counterterrorist command that can independently and successfully plan, prepare, and execute counterterrorist operations in a synchronized and coordinated effort."*[8]

Understanding and Shaping the Operational Environment

In order to successfully accomplish the three stability operations tasks described above, USF-I had to continue to fully understand and shape the operational environment. This required USF-I to:

Maintain Situational Awareness (SA): Innovative approaches were used to maintain situational awareness despite reduced resources and decreasing access resulting from the drawdown in US forces.

Retain Influence with the Iraqis: Partnerships and personal relationships were crucial to retaining necessary influence and enabling continued progress in building ISF and civil capacity.

Execute Non-lethal Targeting: Non-lethal targeting was used to solve complex problems encountered in the operational environment and affect drivers of instability.[9]

Conduct Mission Preparation: Mission preparation focused on training and changing the mindset of US personnel who were returning to Iraq as part of an Advisory and Assistance Brigade (AAB) conducting stability operations (as opposed to previous missions conducting major combat or COIN operations). Through a combination of home station training, joint and Service training, and in-theater training, units were mentally and physically prepared to conduct stability operations.

Master Transitions: Mastering transitions proved critically important to the civil-military teams in Iraq as they continuously planned, executed, assessed, and adjusted to the changing, complex operational environment.

A discussion of each of the aspects of understanding and shaping the operational environment follows.

Maintain Situational Awareness

US forces developed innovative approaches to better understand the constantly changing political, military, economic, cultural, and social environment. It was through this holistic understanding that US forces were better able to identify, assess, and develop solutions that mitigated the drivers of instability within their areas of operation. Partnerships and relationships with a wide range of organizations and entities were used. Additionally, media monitoring, polling, and information fusion were important capabilities that US forces used to keep informed of immediate news events, gauge atmospherics, and bring together multisource information for analysis.

Partnership with ISF coordination centers, headquarters, operational commands, and command and control (C2) nodes enhanced situational awareness. Furthermore, a more accurate understanding of the Iraqi perspective was gained through routine interaction with Iraqi counterparts. Using US resources to support Iraqi priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and other shared priorities increased information sharing and situational awareness as well as continuing to build trust.

Division staffs combined information from many sources to develop operational environment assessments and to support the targeting process. For example, in US Division–Center (USD-C), the Environmental Effects Cell integrated PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) information from various sources, including ISF, PRT, and command staff. The Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) was used by US forces throughout Iraq to allow ready access to data and tools for analysis and presentation. CIDNE continued to evolve to support the mission, increasingly incorporating access to information like key leader engagement (KLE) reports.

Retain Influence with the Iraqis

The challenge for military and civilian leadership was in retaining the level of influence necessary to help shape and sustain progress, while tactfully "backing off" and allowing the Iraqis to increase their capacity by doing more themselves. During the transition from COIN to stability operations, the level of influence retained was derived directly from the strength of partnerships and relationships. Built on cultural knowledge and respect, these personal relationships allowed development of the trust, transparency, and confidence that were crucial to influencing and enabling continued ISF and civil capacity progress. USF-I, the US Embassy, and their subordinate organizations worked as a team, enhancing each other's relationships with their respective Iraqi military and civilian counterparts.

> *"Now we have to retain influence not with the number of tanks and airplanes, but with the contributions to civil capacity and governance and finishing the job of buttressing the legitimacy of the GOI, and deterring nefarious, aggressive neighbors."*[10]

The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) was fundamental to achieving success. The SFA established seven areas of cooperation including political, defense and security, cultural, economic and energy, health and environment, information technology and communications, and judicial. With these agreed upon areas of cooperation, USF-I and the US Embassy were able to retain access with key Iraqi ministries. Over time, this access resulted in the GOI recognizing the genuine desire by the US to support continued Iraqi development.

At the local level, the AABs' emphasis on partnership enabled strong relationships and influence. The AAB structure, coupled with mission focus and augmented with the stability transition teams (STT), allowed unity of effort in partnering with ISF units. This greatly facilitated multiple touchpoints and growing trust with the ISF. Providing regular secure transport for the PRT, the AAB had frequent engagements with the local and provincial leaders, helping build trust and relationships. Brigade leadership indicated that the relationship with their ISF counterpart was the primary "pacing item" for enabling ISF progress.

"Every principal on the staff, every commander, every sergeant major, every company commander, they all had a partnered unit, a partnered person. There was a 10th Iraqi Army G3 and there was a Maysan Operations Center G3, so those two staff colonels were my partners. You have to spend a lot of time getting to know them personally and trying to help them professionally, which can be difficult."[11]

Finally, as US forces drew down, the importance of "information activities" (e.g., key leader engagement and information operations [IO]) became even more crucial to extending influence and shaping perceptions across various audiences. Information activities helped shift perceptions in desired directions and counter malign influences. As part of the partnering process, US forces assisted their ISF counterparts in recognizing the importance of information on the battlefield and in developing their own practices and capabilities. In commenting on the importance of information as part of the transition plan, GEN Odierno stated:

"I would argue that as we reduce the size of our force in Iraq, the importance of IO grows. Again, because we want to influence and we want to have a strategic communications plan that talks about why we are drawing down. We need an influence operations campaign that says al-Qaida is still bad, and you need to reject Iranian influence ... IO will continue to play a big role. All of our statistics tell us that we have been very successful in changing mindset ... it is almost counter-intuitive, but as we reduce our forces we'll need more ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] *and we'll need more IO. It is a cheaper way for us to mitigate our risks as we draw down our forces and turn over responsibility to the GOI."*[12]

Further reinforcing the importance of strategic communications and the critical role played by senior leaders, BG Rossi, J33, USF-I, commented:

"You are in an influence game here, that is what our role is ... The most potent weapon system we have is the number of stars on a guy's shoulders that go into a meeting to convince a leader 'cause the Iraqi's operate on instructions from higher, so you have got to hit them at all levels on the totem pole. A lot of times, the lower level guys [Iraqi ISF] will agree with you, but they will not act until they are told to... The way you move anything forward here is with KLE."[13]

Members of a HTAT [Human Terrain Analysis Team] survey Iraqi civilians in Basra province, Iraq, 7 July 2010. The HTAT, Iraqi police, and US Soldiers with 354th Military Police Company, in support of 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, conducted surveys of the population and culture in villages in the region. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Lynn Friant)

Execute Non-lethal Targeting

US forces adapted their targeting processes, often employing non-lethal means to solve complex problems and affect drivers of instability. Non-lethal targeting involved determining the drivers of instability or, as GEN Odierno described, "Understanding the why."

"And then, lethal versus non-lethal ... One of the things that I've been trying to stress (and it's combat, but it's more reflected in stability operations) is first you have to understand why there is a problem. You have to answer that question, 'Why?' Once you know why, you know what tools are available for you to fix it. Most of the tools now are non-lethal tools."[14]

To understand "why" required a profound knowledge of the operational environment, often developed from strong relationships among US forces, the interagency, and their Iraqi counterparts. These relationships were used to influence and leverage key Iraqi decision makers in solving problems through non-lethal approaches. It was critical that Iraqi decision makers were brought into the process of addressing and solving these problem sets, thereby creating "buy-in."

"There is no problem [here] that you will tackle that is strictly a military problem. They are all interagency problems ... Everything is convoluted and tied together. It's a matter of creating that combined, joint, interagency cabal of people. It does involve Iraqis ... My job ... was to bring people together to solve a very complex problem."[15]

Key to effectively addressing the drivers of instability was getting the right people around the table to discuss and understand the problems and tools available to help solve them. In that regard, information activities such as KLE and IO proved to be useful tools for non-lethal targeting and affecting the drivers of instability.

US Army LTG Bob Cone, center, Deputy Commanding General of Operations for USF-I and commander of III Corps, accompanied by MG Anthony Cucolo, left, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, visit US and Iraqi military leaders following a senior working group meeting in Arbil, Iraq, 19 October 2010. The officials held the meeting to discuss the security situation in Iraq. (US Army photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel Yarnall)

Conduct Mission Preparation

"This is an army that changes every year and passes brigade areas of operations to new brigades, divisions to new divisions, and Corps to new Corps. This is unbelievable what is going on here and people wouldn't understand it unless they saw and lived it. How a unit, for over a year, will prepare itself for this mission and develop its capacities and its intellectual understanding of the battlefield, and will seamlessly transition from one organization to the next. It's an Olympic handoff, and no other army in the world could do it. Every now and then, we ought to remind ourselves of that."[16]

Home station training gave commanders the opportunity and flexibility to tailor their pre-deployment training based on unit needs and specific areas of operation. Commanders leveraged non-traditional training partners to assist in training stability operations tasks. Local universities, city resources, border patrol agents, and the Foreign Service Institute were used to educate staffs in understanding the breadth and complexity of civil-military operations. At the same time, units began "battle tracking" from home station months in advance of the deployment. Pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) provided opportunities to incorporate the most current operating conditions into the home station training plan and strengthened communications between incoming and outgoing units.

Exploiting electronic connectivity, commanders were able to collaborate and "battle track" with their in-theater counterparts in preparation for relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). As an example, MG Wolfe, as the incoming Commanding General for USD-C, had Command Post of the Future (CPOF) on his desk, viewing the same common operating picture as his counterpart in Iraq. The ability to access the in-theater unit's portal and listen to briefings and meetings contributed significantly to units' pre-deployment preparation.

The combat training centers (CTC) placed an emphasis on remaining current and integrating lessons learned into rotational training. This was achieved through extensive dialogue with deployed units, routine video-teleconferences (VTC) with senior commanders, deploying teams to Iraq to observe the environment first hand, and placing a premium on bringing in observer trainers (O/T) with recent combat experience. These efforts enabled the CTCs to shape training and scenarios to more closely reflect the current operating environment. Integration of role players, to include Iraqi Army commanders, local Iraqi leaders, and Western and Arabic media, further enhanced the realism and complexity of the training environment.[17]

"I'm trying to look back to the MRX [Mission Rehearsal Exercise] and what we've learned in

the first 30 days in theater to see if there's anything substantially different. I ask that question all the time to the battalion and brigade commanders. 'What did you have to do differently or adjust dramatically once you got here that you didn't practice or train on when you were on your MRX?' And surprisingly, I haven't found anybody who has told me they didn't train on the tasks that they needed to train on to be ready, capable, and competent to do what they're doing right now."[18]



Finally, the in-theater training by the COIN and Stability Operations Center (COINSOC) provided units with regionally-focused training, to include dialects and cultural nuances, as well as functional training such as rule of law. Commander driven, the COINSOC experience also served as a civil-military team-building event between the AABs and their respective PRTs and STTs, providing a forum for standard operating procedure (SOP) development and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned. This forum also provided the opportunity to receive guidance directly from senior leaders of both USF-I and the US Embassy, promoting a better understanding of the commander's intent and increased potential for unity of effort.

US Army COL Peter A. Newell, commander of 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, visits Sheik Ali at Ali's home in Dhi Qar, Iraq, 13 June 2009. (US Army photo by Staff Sgt. Brendan Stephens)

Master the Transitions

From the beginning of the implementation of the Security Agreement on 1 January 2009 through the end of combat operations on 31 August 2010, there were multiple critical transitions taking place simultaneously and sequentially. These transitions were related to the evolving mission, the ever-changing operational environment, bilateral agreements between the US and Iraq, normal rotational unit RIP/TOA events, redeployment of a significant portion of the force, consolidation of headquarters staffs, and the election and seating of new GOI officials. While many of the transitions were time-based, USF-I worked diligently to create the conditions required to make the transitions seamless.

The conditions and drivers of instability differed from region to region necessitating varying transition timelines. Deciding when to initiate transition was as much an art as a science, as the timing in one region was not necessarily optimal in another. Further complicating this was the need to project second- and third-order effects arising from implementation—as these effects would shape subsequent timeline decisions. This challenge required detailed yet flexible planning by the civil-military team.

USF-I strategic guidance and operational orders established transition priorities. Planning documents and orders highlighted transition tasks with leaders prioritizing efforts and focusing resources to attain the desired

outcomes. Military staffs, working jointly with the US Embassy, ensured detailed plans were fluid enough to be adjusted in the midst of the evolving strategic environment. Each line of operation in the Joint Campaign Plan was analyzed, and the civil-military team determined whether each task, program, project, or relationship would be terminated, completed, transitioned to the GOI, or transformed into a US Embassy responsibility. These efforts identified over 1,500 functions/activities for transfer to other entities.

Conclusion

The transition from COIN to stability operations in Iraq was a success story. Whether the result is an enduring success still remains to be seen. While there were many factors that complicated the transition, success was predicated upon the USF-I and civilian-military organizations becoming adaptive learning teams with leaders leading change.

Shortly before departing Iraq, GEN Odierno reflected on the transition journey:

> *"... One of the things that's been most gratifying to me has been the performance of our forces, how our forces have adapted and learned, how our leaders have adapted and learned and adjusted to very difficult situations. And I'm pretty proud of that, of the young men and women who've been able to do that."*[19]

As the transition period came to a close, USF-I's success could best be summarized by a 22 August 2010 interview with LTG Cone, who quoted the head of the Iraqi Federal Police as saying:

> *"'My God, we have no idea how you went from over 100,000 to 50,000 [forces]—we never saw it, we never felt it ...'"*

Questions for Consideration

1. Maintaining situational awareness was the most significant challenge that confronted USF-I during the drawdown of forces and the transition to stability operations. As forces withdrew from the cities and brigades were drawn down, the number of US "touchpoints" with the population was greatly reduced, impacting SA. What approaches can be implemented to overcome this challenge?

2. Units, preparing to rotate into Iraq for their third or fourth tour, found it challenging to adapt their mind-set to the vastly changed conditions. Additionally, the skill sets and understanding required for stability operations were not emphasized in traditional military training. What efforts could be taken to mentally prepare forces to successfully operate in the stability operations environment?

3. Retaining influence was necessary for mission accomplishment but was increasingly difficult with the host nation's growing independence and the US's simultaneous drawdown of all elements of national power. Overlapping spheres of influence also added complexity, requiring caution to avoid influence fratricide. What efforts could be taken to retain necessary influence?

4. "Transition" refers to both the transfer of authority from an intervening nation to the host nation, as well as the handover from indigenous military forces to local civilian authority. What are the challenges and considerations in determining the transition process, its sequence, and pace?

5. The strategic communications environment is extremely complex and multi-layered. Because of this, the narrative had to be managed very carefully. What are the considerations and techniques in managing the narrative?

6. Forces had to understand and take action to mitigate complex drivers of instability that related not just to security, but also to political, economic, and legal elements. How are these drivers of instability identified and what possible actions can be taken to mitigate their impact?

7. Building a counterterrorism enterprise, which is rooted in the host nation's rule of law, was a challenging aspect of the transition to stability. How do you strike a balance between the pursuit of intelligence-based CT operations with supporting the host nation's development of an enduring, fair, and legal-based CT enterprise?

8. Forces had to continually adapt in consideration of Security Agreement constraints, increasing host nation capability, the level of insurgent activity, and decreasing US resources. What are the

considerations in continuing to advise ISF, partner with the PRT to build Iraqi civil capacity, and target drivers of instability, while simultaneously drawing down forces?

US Army GEN Odierno, CG, USF-I, walks with Iraqi Army LTG Hassan Karim, CG, Ninawa Operations Command, from Mosul Airfield to the Ninawa Operations Command Center upon Odierno's arrival in Mosul, Iraq, 12 June 2010. Odierno was in Mosul to meet with US Army, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi Police leadership to discuss future plans for the Ninawa Province of Iraq. (US Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Guadalupe M. Deanda III)

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LTC Brad Davis is currently assigned as a C4ISR operational analyst with USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Suffolk, Virginia. In 1993, he received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Signal Corps from the University of Pittsburgh, after graduating from Carnegie Mellon University with a Bachelor's of Science in Civil Engineering. He also holds a Master of Arts in Nation Security Studies from American Military University. His military education includes graduation from the Signal Officer Basic and Advance Courses, the Defense Language Institute's Chinese Mandarin course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Joint Forces Staff College. His previous assignments include three tours in South Korea, two tours in Germany, and a tour in the Defense Attaché Office, US Embassy, Singapore. His previous assignment was as a battalion XO in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

Brad Baylor retired from the US Navy in 2002 and during his naval career Brad logged more than 2,400 hours as a Naval Flight Officer in a variety of patrol and tactical aircraft. He is a graduate of the US Naval Test Pilot School and earned an Master of Business Administration degree from Jacksonville University. Brad was selected for the Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer program, and in that capacity he led numerous naval aviation test and evaluation projects and was also the program manager for the high-speed anti-radiation (HARM) missile. As a DOD civilian, Brad has been an operations research analyst in USJFCOM since 2002 and has been employed in JCOA since 2008. He has deployed to Iraq on numerous occasions to support USF-I and has participated in several high priority COCOM studies, including the recent TSO study. Just recently, Brad volunteered and accepted a 12-month position as Deputy Chief of Assessments for CJTF-101 in Afghanistan and he deployed in February 2011.

Ms. Burington has been a deployable analyst with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis since July 2006. She has deployed to Iraq four times: from April-August 2007 as part of the JCOA Forward Team and embedded at Multinational Force-Iraq's Assessments Office; from August-December 2008 as the JCOA Forward Team Lead; and in January-February and August 2010 as part of the Transition to Stability Operations study collection team. She was the study lead for the Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study looking at the 2007-2008 timeframe, and has contributed to other JCOA studies on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Prior to coming to JCOA, she worked as an analyst at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Panama City, FL. She has a bachelor's degree in Mathematics and a master's degree in Systems Engineering, both from the University of Virginia.

Russ Gochring is a retired US Army officer. Since retirement he has served in a wide variety of positions within DOD and the corporate sector. He also served as an operations officer for the emergency response team-advance for FEMA Region II.

Endnotes:

[1] In October 2009, GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I, later to

become USF-I), requested that US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conduct a study on the transition from counter-insurgency operations (COIN) to stability operations (TSO) in Iraq to focus on the following:

• How the US forces and the civilian-military team in Iraq adjusted to the shift in the operational environment, and

• How significant challenges impacting the transition were overcome or mitigated.

In response to this request, the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) developed a phased data collection plan that included multiple study team deployments and a comprehensive continental US (CONUS) collection effort. Over 150 interviews were conducted with the key leaders in Iraq from USF-I, US Embassy Baghdad, US Divisions (USD), Special Operations Forces (SOF) and selected Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AAB) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). In addition, over 70 CONUS interviews were conducted with key leaders from US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), National and Joint Readiness Training Centers, Combined Arms Center (CAC), national and theater SOF, Department of State (DOS) Near East Asia Iraq Desk, and various redeployed units. In all, over 200 interviews of key leaders were conducted, and their insights provide the foundation for this study.

[2] LTG Barbero, Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG A&T), USF-I, interview by JCOA, 12 February 2010.

[3] LTG Jacoby, Commander, I Corps (DCG-O, USF-I), interview by JCOA, 12 February 2010.

[4] GEN Odierno, Commanding General, MNF-I, "Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability," 3 May 2009.

[5] Ms Malzhan, North Baghdad ePRT Lead, interview by JCOA, 3 February 2010 and Mr. Escobar, PRT Lead, Kirkuk PRT, interview by JCOA, 4 February 2010.

[6] Deputy Director Political–Military Affairs Iraq Desk, Department of State, interview by JCOA, 9 July 2010.

[7] The intent for partnered CT operations was that there would no independent operations without GOI approval.

[8] "Iraqi Special Operations Force, An Overview," paper, April 2010, UNCLASSIFIED.

[9] Drivers of instability included: communal/factional struggle for power and resources, insufficient GOI capacity, violent extremist groups, and external interference.

[10] LTG Jacoby, DCG-O, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 12 February 2010.

[11] S3, 4/1 AD, interview by JCOA, 12 May 2010.

[12] GEN Odierno, Commanding General, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 23 June 2009.

[13] BG Rossi, J33, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 18 August 2010.

[14] GEN Odierno, Commanding General, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 21 August 2010.

[15] Commander, 4/1 AD, interview by JCOA, 11 May 2010.

[16] LTG Jacoby, Commander, I Corps (DCG-O, USF-I), interview by JCOA, 12 February 2010.

[17] Plans Chief, National Training Center, interview by JCOA, 2 February 2010.

[18] BG Ralph Baker, interview by JCOA, 2 February 2010.

[19] GEN Odierno, Commanding General, USF-I, DOD news brief from the Pentagon, 21 July 2010.

US Army 1st LT Ian Norwalk, left, with Bravo Company, 3rd Advise and Assist Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, teaches land navigation to Iraqi police officers with the Basra Special Weapons and Tactics team in Basra, Iraq, Oct. 6, 2010. (US Army photo by Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel/ Released)

Combating Endemic Corruption and Influencing Attitudes

Mr. Sam Epstein, Military Analyst
JCOA

> *"...Corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples."*[1]

> Corruption: a set of behaviors intended to leverage a public benefit for private gain.[2]

Introduction: Corruption in Context

Corruption is not vietimless. Aeeording to the World Bank, corruption costs about 3 pereent per year in annual growth for enterprises, and between 2 – 4 pereent per annum in a country's annual growth rate.[3] For eomparison, using Department of Commeree figures, the US Gross Domestie Produet grew an average of 2.5 pereent per year from 1990 – 2009.[4] Transpareney International, in its 2010 *Corruption Perceptions Index*, ranked 178 countries (with 178 as the most eorrupt), with the United States placing 22nd, Iraq 175th, and Afghanistan 176th (slightly above Myanmar and Somalia).[5]

Though norms and values vary aeross cultures, the abuse of power for personal gain and taking publie resourees for private gain remain largely unaeeeptable in all soeieties.[6] Corruption is often organized in networks, much like an insurgency.[7] Our enemies simultaneously exploit host nation eorruption to eommunieate their ease[8] and gain additional resourees.[9]

Similar to disease, eorruption exists everywhere, though it differs in its patterns and ineidenee. It inhabits private and publie seetors. Like sueeessful publie health eampaigns, effective anti-corruption efforts emphasize prevention. One method for assessing the risk of corruption is:

Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability[10]

In this distillation, monopoly is the ability of an organization or person to control a good or serviee, and diseretion is the ability to deeide who and in what quantity one reeeives the good or serviee. Aeeountability includes not only ehanees of detection, but also the eonsequenee of eorrupt actions. If one views corruption as an equation, then whatever changes one of the variables affeets the probability or likelihood—in a positive or negative direetion—of eorruption.

Afghans view eorruption as the third most important problem faeing their eountry, after seeurity and unemployment.[11] At a local level, a report for the US Agency for International Development notes that most Afghans eondemn bribe taking as eontrary to their faith.



Table 1: Afghan Views of Acceptable Corruption [Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption]

However:

> "[t]his general view is moderated however by a widespread understanding that survival strategies of low-level public officials require additional funds beyond their small salaries, and that poor, weak clients may have no alternative than to give a small bribe. Surveys show that both civil servants and the general public share these views – as well as sharp condemnation of grand

> corruption by higher-level officials, which was viewed as greedy and excessive."[12]

As bribery and corruption takes ever-increasing resources from local personnel, even low-level corruption amongst minor civil servants becomes unacceptable.[13]

Battling pervasive corruption requires national political will and large, symbolic moves. Often, an anti-corruption campaign starts with the prosecution of one or two powerful offenders (preferably with close connections to those in power), in order to set an example for others.[14] Not only do many high-level officials have little incentive to eliminate corruption,[15,16] this is a task beyond the scope and capabilities of most coalition operational units. However, leveraging a local inherent disgust with corruption, units at the brigade level and below may adapt success stories from other efforts to establish policies and procedures that disrupt the corruption equation.



Figure 1: "The Proper Way to do the Perp Walk" [Cleveland Leader]

Anti-corruption Activities

International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) succinctly surmises the role of anti-corruption activities in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment:

> "Our first priority if this counterinsurgency is to succeed is protecting the...people. This means not only protecting them from insurgent violence, or from damage we might cause to them or their property, but also from the harm that comes through the corruption of government officials we are seen to be partnering with."[17]

Corruption does not occur in a vacuum, nor does it occur without forethought. Though a country should implement all components of an anti-corruption program to improve the likelihood of success, its implementation may require a phased approach.[18]

Ultimately, every government is reliant upon the consent of its population. In Afghanistan (and many other societies), a leader's claim to authority comes from ties to family and tribes.[19] Government officials often perceive their power as dependent upon the support of family and relatives. "As long as officials and population continue to regard kinship as a natural and important feature of government, practices resembling nepotism will continue."[20] By extension, attempting to eliminate this aspect of practice, at least in the short run, will often fail. Just as important, this may antagonize local populations and drive them away from supporting the government.[21]

Local actions can occasionally deter corruption. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, simply changing the timing of payment stopped truck drivers from shaking down refugees for additional funds.[22] As noted in Table 1, this particular activity rates most unfavorable and likely did not interrupt existing power relationships. Likewise, standardizing, calibrating, documenting, and comparing delivery meters also decrease the opportunity and ease of corruption.[23]

Publicizing the cost of basic goods and services also deters corruption. In Seoul, South Korea, posting routine licensing transactions, processing times, and costs on the Internet removed discretionary powers of government officials (changing one part of the corruption equation) and reduced corruption.[24] Though many citizens in countries with high rates of corruption may not have Internet access, simply knowing the fixed price of routine government transactions can help foster an atmosphere of legitimacy.

Often, government employees, already with low salaries, need to pay supervisors for a job, either once or on a continuing basis. In some cases, Afghan soldiers and police received only 40 – 50 percent of their salary.[25] Simply changing employee or customs payment methods has helped cut down on corruption.[26] An electronic payment system helps workers avoid pay fraud and receive their pay in a timely manner. Balancing by-name muster reports with pay lists helps stem the collection of salaries for absent soldiers and also the ease at which absent soldiers bribed seniors in the chain-of-command to cover their absences. Another recommendation included allowing local soldiers to

grant family members access to their accounts – removing another reason/excuse to leave a unit.[27] Electronic customs payments similarly expedited shipments and reduced opportunities for corruption at the Iraq port of Umm Qsar.[28]

Instituting computerized systems and electronic banking cannot occur overnight or without infrastructure development. Stable electrical systems, changing the bureaucratic infrastructure, and training the workforce to use computers also must occur. However, fighting corruption cannot occur in a void of other development.

During one anti-corruption campaign, US service members and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) determined it was "easier to educate the youth instead of trying to change government and civilian officials who are the most corrupt." This was in a country where the president started an anti-corruption campaign, the nation lost NGO and foreign support due to corruption, and professed strong ministerial support for the program. The products included illustrations and cartoons,[29] important in a nation with a 28 percent literacy rate.[30]

Figure 2: Nigerian Anti-Corruption Poster [G.I. Jones Photographic Archive of South eastern Nigerian Art and Culture, Southern Illinois University]

When the team asked young people who viewed the products, they expressed an understanding of the message, even though they were afraid to raise their concerns to officials. Later, in a back-handed compliment to the effectiveness of the US efforts, unknown individuals defaced anti-corruption billboards, and the Ministry of Interior threatened the director of the national newspaper with job loss if he did not stop producing anti-corruption articles for the local papers.[31]

Though the anti-corruption efforts in the country noted in the previous paragraphs faced difficulties, another element – stressing national unity in a nation with multiple ethnic and religious divides – met with greater success. The US Embassy and the host nation used comedic troupes and dancers to spread the message, in a light-hearted way, to promote a sense of identity that extended beyond parochial relationships.

In another nation, a musician captured the public's imagination with his song *Nchi ya Kitu Kidogo* that exhorted his countrymen to reject corruption (*kitu kidogo* or "something small"). When he started singing the second verse, the stage lost power. The song was so popular the audience continued to sing it throughout the technical difficulties.[32]

Radio and television are important and trusted means (Table 2) of passing information to the Afghan populace, especially when one considers a national literacy rate of 28.1 percent and the multitude of languages in the country.[33] In September 2010, Afghanistan had 175 FM radio stations and more than 75 terrestrial television stations.[34] Many outlets remain connected to strongly sectarian segments of society, and report intimidation and pressure from many stakeholders and cases of self-censorship. However, NGOs, the United Nations, United States, and other coalition governments continue to expend time and resources to build a professional media/journalism corps, and also provide centers and working space from which to work.[35]

One cannot overemphasize the importance of personal relationships in fighting corruption. In Afghanistan's Kunar Province, the Department of State Rule of Law Coordinator assigned to a provincial reconstruction



Table 2: Afghan Perceptions of Corruption in Independent Public Agencies [adapted from Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption]

team (PRT) worked with local judges and prosecutors, and brought three cases to trial involving corruption and murder. Though it garnered little attention at first, the provincial governor attended the third trial – as a gallery observer (and a symbolic representation of the rule of law) – that was also televised.[36]

When our personnel appear to support corrupt officials, it angers the Afghan populace. Our interactions with host nation personnel set a tone – whether respectful or suspicious – and are noticed. Coalition military and civilian personnel must set an example for fair behavior, as others notice our standards. Small, positive steps, if visible and credible, can positively influence anti-corruption efforts.[37]

ISAF Guidance and Reducing Corruption

In Afghanistan, President Karzai blames the failure of the international community to account for billions of dollars in aid as engendering a corrupt environment.[38] Mr. Anthony Cordesman, who formerly served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, states "we are at least as much to blame for what has happened as the Afghans, and we have been grindingly slow to either admit our efforts or correct them."[39]

Recent ISAF guidance recognizes that contracting in Afghanistan represents an opportunity and a danger. Commanders are to hire Afghans, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity. At the same time, they are to guard against empowering inappropriate actors that divert money from its intended purposes.

> "[C]ontracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government and ISAF's campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan."[40]

The United States Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports that, previously, money flowed in Afghanistan with little transparency.[41] ISAF anti-corruption guidance calls for unit commanders to start close and publicize the terms and conditions of contracts to the community,[42] which supports Commander ISAF (COMISAF) contracting and COIN guidance that requires commanders to "ensure post-award oversight of contractors and their performance to get what we pay for and to ensure the contract supports the ISAF mission."[43]

ISAF guidance – and practices used by NGOs and other successful anti-corruption campaigns – recommends using local leaders to prioritize projects and vet potential contractors. Transparency, open competition, and contract monitoring often act as curbs on corruption.[44] In one country, simply implementing a public hearing and subsequent monitoring reduced the cost of waste collection by 35 percent.[45]

"You get what you inspect, not what you expect" is a common saying within many successful organizations. Therefore, if one uses spending to measure progress, then spending becomes the criteria for success.[46] New polices require commanders to:

> "Evaluate the success of a contract by the degree to which it supports the Afghan people and ISAF campaign objectives. Include operational criteria in decisions to award contracts such as the effect of the contract on security, local power dynamics, and the enemy."[47]

Humanitarian Missions

Natural disasters and conflicts often drive economies towards a precarious state. They also provide significant legitimate and illicit growth potential. International aid and military forces flood the local economy with (albeit temporary) resources. This can highlight income inequalities and expand opportunities for corruption.[48]

Because worrying about a few dollars while lives slip away seems foolish; relief agencies, NGOs, and government personnel often ignore corruption during humanitarian missions. OXFAM International (a confederation of 14 organizations that works in 99 countries to find solutions for poverty and injustice)[49] comments that, "no matter what levels of corruption, of difficulty with the government, and of other challenges, there is a humanitarian mandate that guides these NGOs to alleviate suffering, in whatever way and quantity possible."[50]

Though a valid and even admirable construct, this does not mean one should not implement anti-corruption measures that include transparency and openness. Nor should corrupt officials receive a "bye" for their inappropriate actions. The sheer volume of resources

quickly sent in response to disasters demands one to be on guard against waste and abuse.[51]

Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, corruption occurs during humanitarian relief and medical missions.[52] US leadership, throughout the agencies of government, needs to gain familiarity with the management standards of the host nation. During demining operations in one nation, military members noted family relationships with the presidency determined rank and positions. The leader of the demining team did not have any experience with the evolution.[53]

Responding to a humanitarian crisis requires planning forethought. In addition to ensuring transparency when disbursing resources,[54] NGOs or government agencies determine how to respond to the next disaster; some procedures should include:[55]

- Use a measurement other than "burn rate" to determine effectiveness.
- Allocate sufficient resources to field monitoring and contracting offices.
- Expand the scope of audits and after action reports to include transparency and how one met the objectives.
- Exercise interagency and NGO cooperation prior to responding to a crisis.
- Involve aid recipients in reconstruction efforts and monitoring. For example, providing food for work often improves aid distribution to women, children, and other vulnerable groups.[56]
- Use short-term "provisional contracts" in the initial phases, allowing offices additional time to consider and conduct background checks on current and other potential vendors.

Military and relief organizations must adopt, publicize, and enforce a "zero tolerance" stance with respect to corruption. Though many guidelines recommend empowering local organizations and effected personnel to handle relief and humanitarian distributions, leadership must remain open to reassuming control to fight corruption. During relief efforts at Guantanamo Bay in the 1990s, World Relief Corporation and the military intervened in distribution systems to reduce corruption and hoarding.[57]

Aid and relief agencies also reduce the risk of slipping into corruption through reducing the "taboo" about discussing corruption in humanitarian assistance.[58] Individuals exercising "responsibility for control over the management and allocation of the valuable resources involved in disaster response program[s] puts them and others involved in their delivery in a position of relative power over other people. Staff must be alert to the danger that this power may be corruptly or abusively exercised."[59] Establishing proper accounting and human resources systems from the start of a response also reduces the opportunity for corruption on both sides of the equation.

Concluding Thoughts

Often, one looks at corruption as an implacable plague. Or, that corruption is in the eye of the beholder. For the sinner or the saint, laws and policies make little difference. However, most people fall somewhere between these two extremes.

With sufficient political will, and the determination of the people, populations can successfully fight corruption. Rwanda, infamous for its ethnic strife, continues to make noticeable progress in fighting corruption. Its efforts help foster a period of greater foreign investment and growth.[60] In Kenya, an on-line reporting system shows some promise of improving corruption investigations. "While clearly an important channel for leads on grand corruption cases especially, the implementation experience illustrates how optimal use of technical solutions depends on a host of human, political, and institutional factors."[61]

Indonesia stands as another example of a large, multiethnic nation that continues to fight corruption. The Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia (KPK) successfully prosecuted cases against private business leaders, cabinet officials, members of parliament, the police forces, and those connected to the president's family (Table 3). This success came through its investigative and prosecutorial power in all branches of government (except the military), despite breaking some "rules" regarding the independence of its personnel.[62] A free press, local watchdog organizations, and widespread anger against petty and grand corruption fostered the KPK's success.[63]

When individuals and parties build political and financial fortunes upon corruption, it should not come as a surprise that some officials will fight anti-corruption prosecutions and policies. "A key reality that an anti-corruption agency faces: the more effective it becomes, the stronger will be the resistance of corrupt forces." However, fabricated charges brought against KPK commissioners brought protests from citizens



Table 3: KPK Performance (2004 - 2008) [An Exception to the Rule?]

from aeross the speetrum, and eompelled the government's support.[64]

Fighting eorruption starts locally – with the population, host nation eivil servants, NGOs, and the loeal representative of the foreign government. It may require the trial of a well-known eorrupt offieial, or stopping a local bureauerat from demanding bribes for routine proeesses. Simply dismissing these offieials, however, requires a careful balanee between their prestige and influenee[65] and ability to disrupt the unit's mission.

ISAF guidance implements many "best praetiees" proven sueeessful in fighting eorruption, and validates many reports and observations refereneed in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, available at www.jllis.mil and www.jllis.smil.mil. For decades, in eountries throughout the world, transparency, a free press, open knowledge of government rules, and eombating viee within one's sphere of influenee remain the best first steps against the eorruption plague. Every educated eitizen helps raise expeetations and adds an additional burden to the dishonest offieial. Though daunting, leaders must not allow perfeetion to beeome the enemy of progress. This is eritieal in a COIN environment, but also applies to humanitarian missions and everyday eontraeting.

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Learning the Hard Way: Lessons from Complex Operations

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Complex operations are the new face of war. Symptomatic of the emerging paradigm is the co-deployment of military and civilian personnel in the battle-space working shoulder to shoulder. That is because the nature of complex national security challenges is not military alone in the traditional sense; they are inherently multidimensional. Success in these operations requires much more than traditional military "kinetic" tools – it requires the coordinated application of the full range of national security resources, including economic, diplomatic, developmental, and information resources in addition to the military. Moreover, to be successful in this rapidly changing, high velocity battle-space we must be adaptable, quick learners. This essay examines a sample of issues related to bureaucratic culture and conceptual approach that impede the learning process, particularly but not exclusively for US civilians, in the complex operations space. It concludes by urging a more disciplined and systematic approach.

What are complex operations? There is no universally accepted formal definition. The US Congress defined them as "stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare."[1] Experience with such operations over the past decade – particularly in, but not limited to, Afghanistan and Iraq – has forced American practitioners to re-examine our knowledge with respect to the security environment of the 21st century, the nature of contemporary conflict, and our national capacity to articulate and protect our interests. At the strategic level, if we have learned anything, it is that the line between war and peace is blurred - if indeed there is any line at all; and that blurriness exemplifies complex operations. Disciples of von Clausewitz will inform us that this was foreseen two centuries ago. Others will cite Sun Tzu and say this lesson was learned millennia ago. Indeed many in the US have known this for quite a long time. However, our bureaucratic architecture remains structured as though war and peace were separable and independent processes, requiring separate and autonomous elements of national power. This "bureaucratic stove-piping" is true of both the executive branch as well as the legislative branch where separate committees of each house deal with the armed Services, foreign relations, and appropriations.

Even today, after nearly a decade facing the challenges of complex operations, we remain structured as though war requires military tools and the armed services, while peace requires civilian tools and agencies.[2] This disjunction between form and function has led the US belatedly toward adopting the so-called comprehensive approach or the whole of government approach. Sometimes it is referred to as the 3D approach, highlighting diplomacy, defense, and development. Civilian and military organizations have been forced to work together to an unprecedented degree. This has led civilians into "non-permissive" theaters, where there is no presumption of humanitarian or development space – where they are for all practical purposes working in zones of military conflict or active insurgency.

It has also led the US military into domains traditionally the preserve of civilian agencies, such as development, stabilization and reconstruction, in turn leading critics to caution against the militarization of US foreign policy. It is not clear that this is a serious issue beyond the individual bureaucracies involved. Even at the height of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the most critical US foreign policy decisions were driven by civilian leaders, and many were approved by the US Congress. That the views and guidance of military leaders are sought and given the utmost gravity in times of war should come as no surprise, nor should it be a cause for concern.

Today it might even be argued the more forceful vector has been the civilianization of the military. With the adoption of DOD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005, and even its watered down September 2009 version, the US military remains committed to, "maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief." This brings the US military into the world of, "rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for

such tasks."[3] Indeed the defense community has been an enthusiastic adapter and gone by far the furthest in terms of adopting the "whole of government" approach while it is in fact the civilian agencies who continue to lag.[4]

As we now approach the second decade of the 21st century, the likelihood of future complex operations appears no less. Though it is not likely the US will engage again soon in another full-scale operation like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, the multi-dimensional nature of national security threats is here to stay, and thus the evolving approaches must continue to progress. There has been great deliberation, debate, and discussion in the past decade of lessons learned in complex operations. Yet despite our intellectual prowess and educational attainment, we don't seem very good at identifying, validating, and institutionalizing actionable lessons that enable us to consistently improve our execution of complex operations – especially on the civilian side.

To evolve effectively, we must become better at learning from our experience. There has been great lamenting at the cost we've had to pay for forgetting the lessons of counterinsurgency learned long ago in Vietnam. Today, there is a lessons learned cottage industry. Unfortunately our persistently stove-piped and dysfunctional bureaucracies, compounded by lack of rigor and discipline in learning, have handicapped these efforts and resulted in the failure either to articulate clear, actionable lessons, or to disseminate what has been learned through hard experience to those who are on the ground executing complex operations.

Despite the desire and profound need to learn from experience in complex operations, no system has been developed to serve this purpose on the civilian side. The key civilian agencies involved in foreign policy in the US – the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Homeland Security, and Justice, and US Agency for International Development (USAID) – do not have robust institutional cultures of learning. Most learning is on the job. It is neither cumulative nor closely related to career development. It is not systematic and tends to be based on personal and anecdotal experience, and absorbing the institutional culture of the home organization. Unlike the military, civilians have no doctrine, no accepted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and no clear chain of command, so lessons learned are much more difficult to nest institutionally. Moreover, no civilian agency has complex operations as its core mission, so lessons from complex operations tend to get diluted and blended down into traditional diplomacy, development, and defense core missions.[5]

According to a senior foreign service officer at the State Department, "This is an issue for State--that there isn't any existing institutional architecture … although S/CRS (the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) is making some headway."[6] At USAID, the Center for Development Evaluation and Information (CDIE) was dismantled in 2005, effectively destroying the structured lessons learning function that linked field experience into a dissemination structure within USAID.[7] A key finding of a recent study of monitoring and evaluation practices in both State Department and USAID foreign assistance programs is that, "Evaluations do not contribute to community-wide knowledge. If 'learning' takes place, it is largely confined to the immediate operational unit that commissioned the evaluation rather than contributed to a larger body of knowledge on effective policies and programs."[8]

The US military by contrast has a mature and more disciplined approach to learning the lessons of experience embedded in an elaborate institutional system of professional education. Continuing professional education is now a requirement for advancement within the military services. The various military "schoolhouses" provide ongoing educational opportunities for all levels of soldier, seaman, airman, or marine. There is nothing comparable on the civilian side and thus no method or practice of joint civil military development of lessons. That in addition to very different learning cultures has made civilian-military joint learning problematic.

There are many obstacles to developing an interagency lessons learned function, not least of which is the persistent bureaucratic resistance to joint action within the civilian agencies. While the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required, and over time improved, cooperation and interoperability among the US armed Services, no similar dynamic has forced fusion of the civilian agencies, let alone between the civilian and military agencies. Some of the civilian agencies have restrictive rules concerning the sharing with other agencies of data collected from agency personnel regardless of the reason, protecting the identity of personnel who provide information. There are often competing claims within the agency to the ownership of the information itself. The more mature military processes long ago resolved these issues.[9]

There is resistance within US civilian agencies to participating in any process which might cast their efforts in a negative light. A recent study by professional foreign assistance program evaluators quotes a respondent as saying; "USAID doesn't want to know the facts or truth... Branding and success stories are the primary interests." Of the State Department, they write, "At the Department, the de facto decision has been to not evaluate (their foreign assistance programs)."[10] An unofficial military lexicon defines lessons learned as, "capitalizing on past errors in judgment, material failures, wrong timing, or other mistakes ultimately to improve a situation or system."[11] Such candid acknowledgement rarely takes place within the civilian agencies. Failure to accomplish objectives is routinely attributed to unforeseen or mitigating circumstances – never to errors in judgment or in timing. To concede failure is to invite budget cuts or worse yet a black mark against career advancement.

For just this reason, civilians tend to articulate their project, program, or other professional objectives such that failure is not really verifiable. A common example from foreign assistance project objectives is, "building local capacity." Building local capacity for development is a laudable activity – but as an objective there is no empirical method for determining whether it has or has not been achieved. Local capacity is not development. It is neither economic growth nor political liberalization. Until tested and proven, the capacity to accomplish such goals is unknown. A local capacity guarantees no particular outcome – it does not even necessarily increase the likelihood of any particular outcome. Lack of precision in identifying objectives leads inevitably to a lack of precision in measuring outcomes, making it difficult to determine the dynamics of the causal chain. It is precisely an understanding of these dynamics that will improve the likelihood of our successful adaptation to the challenges of complex operations.

Moreover – and very importantly – the civilian agencies to this date lack a system to circulate lessons identified, and disseminate them through training to ensure that they inform future effort. Perversely, there is no incentive within the civilian agencies for formal ongoing professional education and training. Indeed the opposite is true. Since promotion is not based on educational or training accomplishments, there is a distinct disadvantage to taking time for training that could be used for climbing the career ladder. Time invested in education and training is de facto time lost.

Affirmations

Civilian discussions, reports, or lists of lessons learned in complex operations typically include a heavy dose of such nostrums as: "we need to achieve unity of effort," or "unity of command." Or, "we need a better understanding of the human terrain and political context of complex operations." Another common lesson offered is, "no two complex operations are exactly the same." These lessons are truisms - too self-evident to require much elaboration, and well enough established to belie any new claims to discovery. While relevant, they are not lessons learned from complex operations, but rather from all conflict, or even from life itself. The principle of unity of command for example was articulated as a "Combat Principle" as early as 1914 in US Field Service Regulations and should be fully internalized by now.[12] It can hardly be considered a lesson learned from contemporary complex operations. It is more appropriate to consider it a lesson learned long ago that has been affirmed by our experience in contemporary complex operations. This of course begs the question, "If the lesson was learned, why has it not been applied?"

Other common examples of contemporary experience affirming lessons that should not require re-learning, yet which are frequently cited as lessons learned include, "We must think outside of the box," and, "always question assumptions." Again, these represent good advice in most situations. It doesn't hurt to reiterate these principles, but we should not dwell on them – we certainly shouldn't have had to lose over 5,000 Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan to relearn these lessons. There is no reason to boast of our rediscovery of the obvious – we need to move on.

Assumptions

Far more pernicious in their impact are assumptions dressed in "lessons learned clothing." Through widespread repetition certain assumptions have attained the status of "conventional wisdom." In these cases, repetition – often of something said by a senior official or highly esteemed expert, or of an article of faith important to a specific community – replaces corroboration by experience. For example, "the military is best suited to conduct kinetic warfare operations, while development or humanitarian relief is best left to development agencies or NGOs [nongovernmental agencies] which know these fields better and therefore get better results." How many times have we heard about schools built by soldiers in remote locations

in Iraq or Afghanistan where there are no teachers, or clinics abandoned because there are no doctors or no electricity?

To this valid criticism of military efforts in development and humanitarian relief, I will however submit that the developing world is littered with the detritus of well-intentioned projects designed and executed by development professionals. Indeed, there is a long litany of far more egregious and damaging projects wholly planned and executed by development professionals. Look, for example, at the case of the World Bank driven liberalization of the Mozambique cashew industry. In 1995, international economic development professionals from the World Bank insisted on liberalization measures which within three years resulted in closing 10 of Mozambique's 15 sizable cashew processing factories, and the layoff of over 5,000 workers.[13] Then, there is the case of the village mosquito net manufacturer in an impoverished west African country, who by producing 50 nets per month for local use was able to support himself and his extended family. He was put out of business by the free provision of hundreds of mosquito nets by a well-meaning humanitarian NGO.[14] Throughout the global south you will find abandoned schools, deteriorating roads, dilapidated clinics, and other failed development projects designed and implemented by the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), USAID, and countless other international organizations and NGOs. "Long-running aid programs have left many African countries mired in poverty. Arguing that the aid may even have retarded progress, some informed voices in poor countries are pleading for an end to the assistance."[15]

The point I wish to stress is that there is no empirical evidence to support the conclusion that the development agencies or NGOs achieve superior results than their military counterparts in development and humanitarian efforts. The superiority of developmental agencies and NGOs in development work is in fact an unproven assumption. Indeed, over the last decade the military has accumulated unparalleled experience in certain environments and sectors. The military has been providing development assistance, and in particular reconstruction and stabilization assistance in Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, Philippines, and some countries in the Horn of Africa in areas where civilian development agencies have been unable to reach due to security concerns. In the field of security sector reform and local law enforcement capacity development the US military has developed substantial experience. Moreover, much of this experience in non-permissive environments, in reconstruction and stabilization, security sector reform, and local law enforcement capacity development, is being captured within the military's disciplined lesson learning process to inform and improve future efforts.[16] It should not be forgotten that historically, the US military has been the primary agency in major reconstruction and stabilization efforts, such as in post-World War II Europe and Japan.

Another fundamental assumption in the complex operations field that has been elevated to the status of "conventional wisdom" and catalogued as a lesson learned without empirical validation, is that development is a remedy for conflict and will win "hearts and minds." The evidence just isn't there. There is evidence from Afghanistan today that suggests the opposite. "At a time when more aid money is being spent in Afghanistan than ever before, popular perceptions of aid are overwhelmingly negative."[17] As far back as the early 1960s the economist Mancur Olson warned that development, and particularly rapid economic growth, can be a profoundly destabilizing force.[18] And yet we continue to embrace the assumption that development is a remedy for conflict, a tonic for stabilization, and a tool for winning hearts and minds as though this represents an indisputable lesson learned.

An assumption that has recently developed a wide but cult-like following, is that the more institutional inclusion in the analysis, planning, and execution of a complex operation, the better. As discussed above, the concepts of "whole of government" or "comprehensive" approaches to complex operations have emerged and become orthodoxy in both development and military circles, widely proclaimed by secretaries of defense as well as secretaries of state and leaders in the development community. Moreover, if whole of government is good, whole of society must be even better. While these assertions may be true, they have not been corroborated persuasively. Analysis tends to begin from the assumption that the comprehensive approach is superior to other approaches, without analyzing the extent of corroboration of the superiority of this approach. A credible argument could be made that too many agents in a complex operation merely further complicates the operation. At the very least, the tension between the comprehensive approach and the desire to achieve unity of effort should be acknowledged and understood.

Awkward Epiphanies

There is a variety of lessons which I call awkward epiphanies – the lessons which, though they may have become clear, we just don't want to learn. As discussed above, the importance and desirability of unity of command or unity of effort is well-established. A lesson we should have learned in recent years though is that there is a potentially inverse relationship between the democratic accountability of our allied governments and their ability to support our efforts without the consent of their constituents. The Turkish government could not support US efforts in Iraq over the heads of Turkish legislators or beyond what the Turkish parliament would permit. As a result, the US was denied what was considered an extremely important launching platform for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. In 2004, the pro-American government of Jose Aznar in Spain was decisively defeated by the Socialist opposition which had pledged to defect from the US sponsored coalition of the willing in Iraq. This was followed by the rapid withdrawal of Spanish troops. The lesson here is that the democratic accountability that we advocate for all governments, forces those governments to put their constituents' interests first and ahead of any US interest. That implies an inherent degree of instability in coalitions of democratic states.

One might even go as far as to say that the real lesson we have learned – though we don't like the lesson – is that even when unity of command is achieved in a coalition, unity of effort is a bridge too far. In Afghanistan the coalition achieved unity of command when the various command authorities in-country were fused in the person of General Stanley McChrystal. However, even in the achievement of unity of command, the multiple caveats by which each national military contingent limits itself, also limits unity of effort. Yet this is likely close to a best case scenario where the fusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US military missions resulted in the most unified command possible among coalition partners. Even in this environment, General James Jones has alluded to national caveats as, "NATO's operational cancer," and "an impediment to success."[19] The lesson, awkward as it may be, is that unity of command, though desirable, does not guarantee unity of effort, or unity of commitment, which remain beyond reach so long as coalition partners perceive their national interests as binding.

Another awkward epiphany is that knowing the right thing to do doesn't mean that we can do it – regardless of any lessons we may have learned. We have long known for example the risks associated with holding elections early in a post-conflict environment. We knew in Iraq that early elections could be extremely divisive – and indeed they were as a result of the Sunni boycott. Yet, deferring national elections in Iraq was not an option due to the relentless pressure for early elections coming from Ayatollah Sistani and others.

Since the US government under then-president Richard Nixon began the long "war on drugs" in 1971, the US has tried a variety of strategies for reducing narcotic drug use and availability. A major element of the so-called "Plan Colombia," initiated during the Clinton administration, was and remains a military anti-narcotics offensive relying heavily on aerial eradication of coca plants. This is despite the 1988 publication by the RAND Corporation of "Scaling the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction." This extensive study, funded by the US Department of Defense, found that the use of the US military to interdict drugs en route to the US would be minimal or even negative. This confirmed the findings of seven previous studies, and was reaffirmed by a later RAND study on the same topic conducted in 1994. Fast forward to 2010 where the US military is engaged in a robust effort to destroy poppy production in Afghanistan which, since the invasion of 2001, has become by far the world's greatest opium poppy producer. This appears to be a very awkward epiphany – a lesson we just don't want to learn no matter what the cost of not learning it.

The Syntax of Lessons Learned

Unlike conventional war where the US has a successful history of military dominance, the record on complex operations – at least in recent decades is ambiguous. The infamous "Blackhawk down" experience in Somalia in 1993 was traumatic and singed American leaders, casting such a pall on the appetite for complex contingencies that a restrictive national policy was codified as Presidential Decision Directive – 25; Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25). This directive established a "vital national interests" test for engagement, and required a clear plan for terminating the engagement.[20] There was much wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth, but ultimately no US intervention to put a stop to the Rwanda genocide of 1994; partially as a result of this "vital national interests" bar.[21] Later US experiences in complex operations in the Balkans and East Timor were ambivalent, and the George W. Bush admin-

istration was from the outset decidedly opposed to involvement in complex operations, with all the main administration leaders on record opposing. Indeed the nullification by the incoming Bush administration of all the relevant presidential directives of the preceding administration reflected this bias.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 changed the disposition of the Bush administration toward complex operations. The invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 thrust the Bush administration into the two most challenging complex operations since Vietnam. And it was only when things in Iraq started to go wrong in 2004 that the lesson learning cycle began again. Yet as discussed above, even years later the civilian agencies still have no effective institutional architecture in place for joined lessons learned.

The institutional deficit is compounded by conceptual handicaps for some of the reasons discussed above. The focus on affirmations, dependence on un-validated assumptions, and reluctance to acknowledge awkward lessons impede the process. Lacking is an appropriate syntax for articulating lessons or a clear concept of what a complex operations lesson looks like. The official US military definition of a lesson learned is knowledge that, "results from an evaluation or observation of an implemented corrective action that contributed to improved performance or increased capability."[22] This definition would be stronger without the reference to "increased capability," for as argued above concerning capacity, capability untested cannot validate a lesson. Adapting the military definition of lessons learned to complex operations, we might say the purpose of lessons is to improve our performance in accomplishing foreign policy and national security objectives in complex operations. In this view, increasing wisdom or our appreciation of complexity is instrumental – potentially useful but only insofar as it improves performance. Not all knowledge has such a pragmatic and operational purpose; not all knowledge is adaptable to "lessons learned" functionality. In order to frame lessons effectively, I suggest a syntax based on the following principles: 1) lessons learned for complex operations should be refutable; 2) they should be actionable; and, 3) they should include an irreducible element of interdisciplinary or interagency content.

Lessons learned from complex operations should be firmly grounded in the logic of scientific discovery. Science moves forward via an iterative process of hypothesis and experiential corroboration or refutation. As long as the hypothesis is corroborated by experiment it retains the assumption of validity, but as soon as it is refuted in experiment or experience, that assumption is nullified. It is this iterative process that permits both incremental building of the scientific knowledge base, as well as paradigm shifts when the existing knowledge base is out of touch with reality. What is most critical and relevant to the lessons learned process is that a scientific hypothesis must be refutable – it must be subject to being proven false.[23] Likewise, a lesson learned must be refutable in theory. A lesson learned that cannot theoretically be refuted can likewise not be corroborated. The injunction to "think outside the box" may be good advice, but as a lesson learned it fails; that someone has "thought outside the box" cannot be corroborated or refuted. This advice lies outside the syntax of a lesson, and is meaningless in the lessons learned sense.

To serve the practitioner community in a meaningful way, a lesson should be actionable, and reveal specific causal dynamics in complex operations. The practitioner needs to know what impact his/her actions will have on a given situation or system. If the lesson proposed cannot be articulated in such a way that it at least in principle could help to improve outcomes, it has only marginal value at best. The oft repeated observation that civilians and soldiers have "different cultures" may be accurate, but it prescribes or guides no action. To be meaningful in a lessons learned sense, the syntax must be adjusted so that the lesson identifies causal dynamics of complex operations. It might be argued for example that the performance of civil-military teams in complex operations is enhanced if they are given the opportunity to train jointly pre-deployment and break down some of their respective cultural barriers. This is a plausible hypothesis that can be tested, validated, and refuted – and that if proven valid, can guide future action. As US Army instructions specify, a lesson learned should result in a prescribed change of behavior; "An observation or insight does NOT become a lesson learned until behavior has changed."[24] That is what I mean by actionable.

In order to avoid redundancy with the robust military lessons learned systems, complex operations lessons learned should have distinctive interagency or interdisciplinary elements that the standard military lessons learned process will not likely capture. Among the key challenges of complex operations is to apply

the diverse elements of national power optimally so as to achieve in complex operations the best results for national security. Overcoming interagency frictions, cultural barriers, respective unfamiliarity, and working jointly and effectively should be core elements of complex operations lessons learned. However, we should not interpret the comprehensive or the 3D approach to necessarily or exclusively refer to operations involving multiple agencies. In some cases, single agencies may be applying multiple elements of national power; the Department of Defense and the armed Services frequently are agents for humanitarian assistance and, increasingly, development assistance. Their application of both defense and development tools in the same space should be examined for lessons learned as well. The perspective of the lesson in any case should be a multiagency (or non agency-specific) perspective.

A Systematic Approach

We cannot afford to rely on processes that are random, coincidental, or episodic to learn lessons in complex operations. A methodical process should be established which can identify prospective areas for examination, effectively articulate proposed lessons in the appropriate syntax, validate lessons distinguishing true lessons from individual experiences, and disseminate them. The Army has developed a formal learning process and established the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to manage the process. The lesson learning cycle begins with observation that is followed by collection, analysis, validation, dissemination, and archiving.[25] This constitutes a rational and self-conscious method to learn from experience in a systematic fashion and ensure that what is learned becomes institutionalized so that others may benefit from it.

In developing a lesson learning process or system, the civilian agencies should establish an equally rigorous methodology. Typically raw information should be gleaned through after actions reports (AAR), post-assignment debriefings and interviews, and a variety of other sources. What is important at this initial stage is instituting these processes to insure that experience is documented. This might also be called "observation." The point is to require reflection on experience, and a self-conscious effort to capture information relating to specific challenges, behaviors, and outcomes. These procedures take time and resources and, above all, an institutional commitment, but if learning is to be systematic they are necessary.

As raw information is collected it must be "binned" or sorted to enable analysts to compare against similar categories of information. The processing and analysis steps are critical for recognizing patterns and determining potentially fruitful areas for discovery. Only when patterns have emerged from multiple sources is there a justifiable expectation of a credible lesson. Just because a claim is made, we cannot assume it represents a valid lesson. The lessons learned process must distinguish between interesting individual experiences and widely applicable lessons. That is not to say individuals can't or shouldn't learn from their own individual experiences (a perverse notion), but that an individual experience is less likely to indicate significant dynamics of a situation or system, than a pattern derived from multiple sources.

Once a pattern is observed, additional collection and analysis is required to articulate, validate, corroborate, or refute the potential lesson. This is not a simple process. It requires time and precision. Yet this is the core of the lessons learned process – the core of the scientific approach and of discovery. It is only through such a process that a lesson can be tested. The testing might be through actual field experience, or through simulations (desktop or other games or experiments), but until tested and corroborated, no claim can be made for the validity of the lesson. Bear in mind that even when validated – and even if repeatedly validated – no lesson can make the claim of absolute and permanent verification. In complex operations at least, but likely in all political-economic situations, many variables are in a state of continuous mutation, thus rendering all knowledge ultimately ephemeral. This is widely recognized even if not always acknowledged within the world of the hard sciences. Nevertheless, without corroboration a putative lesson is merely speculation.

The final critical element is dissemination. Lessons not disseminated to those who might benefit from them are lessons lost – and as Santayana said, "Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it." A proactive system for disseminating validated lessons from experience to those in need of that knowledge, and in a position to modify their behavior accordingly, is the only way to institutionalize knowledge. To send personnel, whether civilian or military, into a complex operation without the benefit of the learning that has

taken place previously is to send them unprepared. Given complex operations include reconstruction and stabilization operations, security and counterinsurgency operations, transition and irregular warfare, to be unprepared is to be in grave danger. This is not only morally unacceptable from the standpoint of the soldier or civilian working to achieve our national objectives in complex operations; it is also a formula for failure in protecting our national security.

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Endnotes:

[1] FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act

[2] "Interagency Paralysis: Stagnation in Bosnia and Kosovo," Vicki J. Rast and Dylan Lee Lehrke, in Case Studies Volume I, Project on National Security Reform, September 2008

[3] Department of Defense Instruction, Number 3000.05, September 16, 2009, and Department of Defense Directive, Number 3000.05, November 28, 2005

[4] In the period following the end of major combat operations in Iraq, US military offices deluged USAID with requests for guidance and training pertaining to governance, economic development, etc. To field those requests efficiently USAID had to create a new office in 2005, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA)

[5] "Building a Civilian Lessons Learned System," Melanne Civic and Bernard Carreau, PRISM, V.1, N.2, 03/2010

[6] Private communication with a senior State Department foreign service officer, 072110

[7] USAID's training and lesson learning function had been atrophying for over a decade when it was officially dismantled in 2005. An attempt to re-create or revive the lesson learning and dissemination function within USAID is currently underway

[8] "Beyond Success Stories: Monitoring and Evaluation for Foreign Assistance Results," Richard Blue, Cynthia Clapp-Wincek and Holly Benner, Mary 2009.

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[20] United States: Administration Policy On Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, May 1994, http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/courses/admin-perritt/pdd-25.html

[21] Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," The Atlantic Magazine, September 2001

[22] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction; Joint Lessons Learned Program, CJCSI 3150.25D, 10 October 2008. The definition goes on to include, "results from an evaluation or observation of a positive finding that did not necessarily require corrective action other than sustainment."

[23] Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1934

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Sri Lanka - Past and Future Lessons

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The United States welcomes the cessation of fighting in Sri Lanka and the apparent conclusion to its long-running conflict. This 26-year-old conflict has cost tens of thousands of Sinhalese and Tamil lives, uprooted countless Sri Lankans from their homes, left thousands maimed or wounded, and brutally divided the nation.[1]

Background

Sri Lanka is an independent republic of approximately 21 million people living on an island a little larger than West Virginia in the Bay of Bengal. Approximately 74 percent of its population is Sinhalese (primarily Buddhists), with 18 percent Tamils (primarily Hindus). Muslims make up a small minority of the population, and approximately 10 percent of the Sinhalese and Tamils are Christians.[2] Sinhala and Tamil are its official languages[3] and the country uses English translations for many purposes.[4]

Based on the 1978 Constitution, the public directly elects a president to a six-year term. The president appoints the heads of the cabinet and has a prime minister as deputy. The prime minister is the leader of the 225-member parliament's ruling party. The president may dissolve parliament, which has the power to make laws. Parliament may call a no-confidence vote for the cabinet, which requires an appointment of new ministers by the president.[5]

Descendents of the original Tamil residents, or "Sri Lanka" Tamils, tend to live in the north and eastern sections of the country. Later "Indian" Tamils, who arrived during the colonial period, primarily reside in the south-central tea growing region.[6] Both Sinhalese and Tamils have traditions of old monarchial states on the island, though the two groups often mixed and coexisted.[7] A unified entity did not exist on the island until consolidation under British rule in 1833.[8]

During the colonial period, Tamils (many from India) gained educational and civil service dominance. After independence, Sinhalese did not see themselves as a majority, but as "...a minority in a large Tamil sea that includes 60 million Tamils" twenty miles away in India.[9]



Figure 1: Sri Lanka [CIA The World Factbook]

Perhaps in response to this perception, or to capitalize on nationalistic feelings for political gain, the Sinhalese-dominated parliament enacted laws that alienated Tamil minorities. Almost immediately after independence, the Ceylon Citizenship Act (the country's name prior to 1972) denied citizenship to approximately 800,000 Tamils of Indian descent.[10] In 1972, the new Sri Lanka Constitution enshrined the "foremost place" of Buddhism amongst the country's religions.[11] This remains in place today, though the 1978 Constitution guarantees freedom of religion.[12] Sinhala became the official language in 1956,[13] and was embodied as such in the 1978 Sri Lanka Constitution[14] (Tamil became an official language in 1987 with the Thirteenth Amendment[15]).

The measures in the 1972 Constitution also required Tamils – many of whom gained civil service employment through their knowledge of English – to learn Sinhala in three years or face dismissal. The purging of English as a language of government, however, also appealed to many Sinhalese, who felt the ability to speak only their native tongue prevented them from gaining civil service positions and was a source of many of their socio-economic ills.[16]

Sinhalese parties gained a two-thirds majority in parliament, thereby allowing rule without any Tamil input.[17] By the mid-1970's, many Tamil politicians advocated for a separate Tamil state ("Tamil Eelam") in the northern and eastern sections of Sri Lanka. In the 1977 parliamentary elections, the Tamil United Liberation Front won all the seats in the traditional Tamil areas after a separatist campaign.

Other groups – including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or "Tamil Tigers") sought a separate state by force.[18] The LTTE cadre venerated its founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, as a demigod. American scholar Michael Radu compared Prabhakaran to a Jim Jones (leader of the Guyana cult who ordered a mass suicide), but with a navy (including small submarines), an air force, and up to 20,000 armed followers. To support his forces, Prabhakaran required each family in the territory he controlled to provide a son to his organization. He also limited movement of personnel within the territory he controlled.[19]



Terrorism and Civil War

In 1978, the Tamil Tigers initiated its first terrorist attack by bombing an Air Ceylon passenger jet while it sat on the tarmac.[20] No passengers were aboard, and the airline employees managed to depart prior to the aircraft's engulfment. In July 1983, in what the LTTE called "the First Eelam War," an ambush killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers on the Jaffna Peninsula, an area the LTTE declared as a Tamil homeland.[21]

Angry Sinhalese in the capital of Colombo rioted, attacking Tamils, their properties, and places of businesse. Sri Lanka security forces did not enforce curfews and did little to protect Tamil victims of mob violence. Officially, attacks caused 400 casualties and at least $150 million worth of damage. Fifty-three Tamil prisoners died under "questionable" circumstances.[22] The United States Government estimated several thousand Tamils died.[23]

Between 1981 and 1984, Sri Lanka forcibly repatriated 445,580 Tamils of Indian descent to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Tens of thousands of Tamil citizens fled to other parts of the world, including Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.[24] The Tamil diaspora, which numbers around 200,000 in the West,[25] provided LTTE up to $300 million annually through legitimate and illegal means.[26]

The Tamil Tigers became adept terrorists, pioneering the use of the suicide belt and female suicide bombers,[27] and dwarfing the suicide attacks conducted by Hamas and Hezbollah.[28] They used child soldiers, obtained military victories, and even developed a significant conventional force.[29] LTTE insurgents used human shields and quickly retreated to hide amongst the civilian Tamil population.[30]

India, in response to the 1983 riots and domestic pressures from its Tamil populace, helped support LTTE with weapons and training. LTTE allegedly received additional training, often in exchange for suicide bomber and suicide-belt manufacturing expertise, from a variety of terrorist organizations, including

Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Kurdistan Workers Party.[31] LTTE also engaged in "lessons learned" and teehnical exehanges with multiple terrorist organizations.[32]

In 1984 peaee talks between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil Tigers broke down, and fighting resumed. In the middle of 1987, India airlifted supplies to Tamil seetions of Sri Lanka to avert starvation and what it determined as unduly harsh treatment of Tamil eivilians.[33] On 29 July 1987, after India reeeived assuranees an aeeord met LTTE requirements, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement that included:

- Limited autonomy to Tamil and all provineial distriets and elevating Tamil to an offieial language.[34]

- Merging – subjeet to later referendum – of two provinces.[35]

- A eessation of hostilities, with Sri Lanka seeurity personnel eonfined to barraeks and a surrender of militant arms.[36]

- It also introdueed Indian peaeekeepers, to whieh Tamil groups agreed to surrender their weapons.[37]

Within weeks, LTTE reneged on its agreement to eooperate with the Indian Peaee Keeping Foree (IPKF). In September 1987, LTTE initiated eivil disobedience, launehed armed attaeks on eivilians, and killed 200 Sinhalese. Sri Lankan seeurity forees responded by launching armed attaeks against the LTTE.[38]

Soon, the IPKF also faeed attaeks from the LTTE (previously supported with weapons and training), who refused to disarm.[39] India deeided to forcibly remove weapons from the LTTE. Within weeks, India shifted its role from peaee keeper to peaee maker.[40] Eventually, the IPKF paeified part of the island, though it could not dislodge the LTTE from its eastern stronghold. After more than 1,000 soldiers died, and in the faee of inereasing Sri Lankan nationalism, India withdrew its forees in 1990.[41]

Figure 3: Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) Memorial [*The Sunday Times*]

The LTTE eontinued its terrorist aetivities after IPKF's departure. It assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991[42] in retaliation for his role in the 1987 aeeord.[43] In 1993, the Tamil Tigers assassinated Ranasinghe Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka,[44] making it the only terrorist organization to kill two national leaders.[45] They also assassinated a member of the Sri Lanka parliament and a eabinet minister, and killed 26 people in an attempt to assassinate another Sri Lankan president.[46]

A 1995 eease fire lasted only three months, after whieh the LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities. Both sides eommitted human rights violations,[47] and the US Department of State designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization.[48]

Hostilities eontinued through 2001, during whieh the Tamil Tigers bombed the island's holiest Buddhist site and destroyed half of the country's air fleet and Air Foree in a raid.[49] In Deeember 2001, a new government formed following parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Ranil Wiekremesinghe ineluded the Tamil National Allianee (viewed as elosely assoeiated with the LTTE) in his parliamentary eoalition. He sought to embark on ending the eonfliet with the Tamil Tigers, with eonstitutional revisions to follow.

LTTE signed a eease fire and indicated a willingness to aeeept extensive autonomy instead of independenee. The government of Sri Lanka lifted its ban on the LTTE,[50] whieh promptly opened offiees throughout Sri Lanka. However, it eontinued to kill moderate Tamils, and used many of its offiees as bases for extortion and protection raekets.[51]

Norwegian-sponsored peaee talks commenced in Deeember 2002.[52] Onee again, Prabhakaran (the LTTE leader and founder) made a statement indicating his willingness to aeeept less than an independent nation.[53] A small European Union (EU) monitoring foree of Nordie nations eame to Sri Lanka in an attempt to halt major attaeks.

Shortly thereafter, as in the cases of previous truces, the LTTE leader demanded full interim control of the Tamil area they occupied and pulled out of the peace talks. He also demanded that, no matter what happened with any future elections, his region would retain a separate judiciary and maintain a majority in the legislative assembly until elections. This proved too much for the government and the Muslim minority to accept. Neither side ever returned to formal negotiations.[54]

New campaigns of terror and confrontation ensued. President Chandrika Kumaratunga, dissatisfied with her prime minister's role in the truce negotiation, dissolved parliament, deployed troops in the capitol, and declared a state of emergency.[55]

Complacency helped facilitate LTTE's successful terrorist attacks. The government often assumed a lull in fighting meant a degraded Tamil Tiger will or capability, leading to a see-saw response. Minimal security gave way quickly to heavy-handed indiscriminate operations and arbitrary arrests. As a result, security forces experienced difficulty in recruiting intelligence assets. The government's actions helped drive Tamils to the LTTE or, at a minimum, led to ongoing distrust of government motives and apathy towards its success. Former insurgents noted government arrests, massive retaliations, and torture helped recruit candidates to the LTTE's banner.[56]

The year 2004 marked a turning point in the war against the LTTE. Rejected overtures and peace proposals to Tamil separatists, coupled with a bomb attack in the Sri Lankan capitol of Colombo,[57] weakened the Sinhalese politicians that supported negotiations. The eastern Tamil Tiger leader, known by the name of Colonel Karuna, broke from and started to battle the LTTE.[58] The LTTE now had two enemies – Colonel Karuna's 6,000 soldiers[59] and the Sri Lanka security forces.

Nature also worked against the Tamil Tigers. The 26 December 2004 tsunami killed over 30,000 Sri Lankans, devastated Tamil areas, and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. Sri Lanka and LTTE reached agreements to share approximately $3 billion in international aid.[60] Perhaps for the first time in many people's memory, the government took action to assist a suffering Tamil population. It also attempted to create a neutral, multi-ethnic organization — the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)[61] — to distribute assistance throughout the island.

The Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party viewed P-TOMS as an attempt to create a *de facto* Tamil state and withdrew from the governing coalition. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court eventually concurred with this reasoning. Politically, this permitted the Tamil Tigers to avoid the decision whether to join the government structure or continue with its already marginalized organization.

A weakened government became the issue in the 2005 election. The Tamil Tigers forced citizens living in the zones it controlled to boycott the 2005 presidential elections. They were also suspected in the assassination of the Sri Lankan foreign minister, giving the president an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.[62] The LTTE boycott helped elect Mahinda Rajapaksa by a slim majority, putting in office a person more beholden to Sinhalese national sentiment,[63] the JVP, and other nationalist parties.

Increased LTTE violence and suicide attacks against high profile military installations, navy ships, and cabinet ministers, and failure of February 2006 peace talks, created a harder-line attitude by the government. At times, this violence lead to Sinhalese riots against minority Tamil businesses and persons, with little response by government forces. In May 2006, the Tamil Tigers seized control of a water control point, cutting off water supplies to Sinhalese farmers.[64] The government responded with air strikes and a large ground offensive and beat back a counterattack. Other air strikes against Tamil Tiger positions continued, leading to increasing internal displacements.[65]

In June 2006, perhaps in response to the EU designating LTTE as a terrorist organization, the Tamil Tigers demanded the removal of the remaining EU truce monitors. Conventional and asymmetric warfare continued on land, the sea, and in the air, with the LTTE Air Force conducting its first bombing raid.[66] Later in 2006, for the first time in four years, the Sri Lankan government seized control of territory held by LTTE.[67]

Throughout these engagements, the fierce battles between Sri Lankan security forces and the Tamil Tigers displaced people within the nation and outside observers called attention to human rights violations by both parties.[68] Though the LTTE could continue to launch surprise attacks, the government began to believe in the possibility of a military solution.[69]

The Government Offensive

The Sri Lanka government continued to take and hold LTTE-controlled areas. Defense expenditures increased

by 30 percent, and soon its forces outnumbered LTTE by a ratio of 16:1.[70] The LTTE, constrained by reduced income due to its international status as a terrorist organization, and the devastation the tsunami caused in Tamil areas, saw its financial resources reduced by approximately 70 percent.[71] Sharing intelligence with the Indian Navy allowed Sri Lanka to destroy sea-based warehouse ships and prevented major arms supplies from reaching the insurgents.[72]



Figure 4: Areas controlled by LTTE (NOV 2005 – JAN 2009) [Wall Street Journal]

Faced with punishing Sri Lankan assaults, LTTE ceded large areas to the central government's control. In January 2007, LTTE lost its eastern stronghold. LTTE, despite its start as a guerilla organization, experienced difficulty in reverting to a similar posture.

Though some organizations decried the internal displacement of non-combatants, the government countered that it saved these people from becoming human shields. Military progress continued, despite occasional setbacks. The central government also started infrastructure projects in newly liberated territory and noted a willingness to resume negotiations even as it pressed its offensive.[73]

The president of Sri Lanka publicly stated his belief that continuing military victories offered the best chance of pushing the LTTE to seek a negotiated settlement.[74] On 16 January 2008, Sri Lanka announced it would unilaterally abrogate the 2002 cease fire agreement. With momentum on the government's side, this act proved popular amongst the domestic Sinhalese audience.

The LTTE called for instituting a revived cease fire, which the government rejected. Bringing to question the seriousness of the Tamil Tigers' desire for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and further demonstrating an inability to grasp the changing public view of their organization, on that very same day, the LTTE attacked a civilian bus killing 31 people.

Though he only had a narrow electoral victory, the coalition President Rajapaksa built included many Sinhalese nationalists who provided the backing for an increased military tempo. Flush with electoral success and with support of his political parties (and to the dismay of some who sought more negotiations), the Sri Lankan president intentionally risked cuts in foreign aid (including a $1.9 billion International Monetary Fund loan),[75] censures, and the loss of trade advantages to pursue a military solution.

Throughout this period, Sri Lanka engaged in targeting LTTE personnel. Security forces killed the leader of the Tamil Tigers' political wing (and Prabhakaran's deputy), and later the chief of its intelligence, leaving its forces in disarray.[76] Due to the cultic following by the cadre of LTTE founder Prabhakaran, the organization could not easily replace its lost leadership.

As the Sri Lanka government pursued a military option, it also established vigilance committees (VC). Each VC had a defined number of households for which it maintained responsibility. Much like neighborhood watches or community policing in the United States, the police units met with the local populace, reporting to a higher unit. VC problems included rudimentary training for its officers, but the members remained in the neighborhood, not rotating out for other assignments. The better the cooperation between VC and intelligence units, the more likely the government's ability to interdict LTTE operations.[77]

During this campaign, Sri Lanka maintained rigid media and international information controls to enforce an internal news blackout and prevent the international community from forcing peace negotiations on the country.[78] It stopped publishing casualty figures[79] and prohibited entry to human rights monitors from the United Nations. Journalists could not enter conflict zones.[80] Foreign reporters in the country were asked to leave, or had their visas revoked, when they filed unfavorable articles.

Though technically guaranteed a free press, local press organizations criticized the Defense Ministry's role in intimidating journalists. Editors were killed, journalists arrested, and media outlets destroyed by gangs, without any action against the accused.[81] However, these abuses paled in comparison to those the LTTE initiated. The government also harassed lawyers critical of its policies.

An all-out offensive commenced in September 2008, taking territory and driving Tamil insurgents to ever narrower areas. By January 2009, the government's security forces secured the last connection to the LTTE's stronghold, with reports that Indian naval patrols also intercepted supplies bound for the insurgency. Within a month, the LTTE had approximately 1,000 fighters, surrounded by 250,000 civilians in a 30 km^2 area.[82]

The government declared a "safe zone" around the LTTE-controlled zone, noting it would establish "welfare villages" to care for internally displaced persons (IDP). The Tigers accused the Sri Lankan forces of genocide,[83] though it "prevented civilians under its control from crossing over to government-held territory by shooting and killing those attempting to escape" and drew government fire on non-combatants by placing weapons in their encampments.[84]

Large pockets of civilians were trapped in the area of rebel control, without access to food, water, or medicine. Shelling this enclave commenced on 21 April 2009, with the only medical facility hit on 12 May 2009. The battle continued, preventing Red Cross relief efforts, though the government denied its responsibility for these acts.[85]

On 19 May 2009, with its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran killed and its forces destroyed, the LTTE ceased to exist as a fighting force.[86] The insurgency had ended. In August 2009, Interpol arrested Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the designated successor for the Tamil Tigers, and returned him to Sri Lanka.[87]

Transition to Peace

The civil war in Sri Lanka cost untold heartache, tearing apart the country for generations. Approximately 23,790 service members had died since 1981, with 29,551 wounded in the final three years of conflict.[88] LTTE "admitted" to losing more than 22,000 fighters from 1982 – 2008. Human Rights Watch estimates between 80,000 and 100,000 died on all sides of the conflict. The war also left approximately 580,000 internally displaced persons.[89]

The end of the LTTE marked a definite decrease in violence. From June 2009 through March 2010, the South Asia Terrorism Portal reports 11 terrorist killed, along with three civilians and three security force individuals.[90]

Though Sri Lanka offers free elections, the government party gained access to IDP camps, using government vehicles and resources, while campaign opponents could not enter these areas.[91] In January 2010, President Rajapaksa won a bitter, and sometimes violent, reelection bid against his Sinhalese rival, General Fonseka. General Fonseka, leader of the Sri Lankan forces that defeated the LTTE, entered the campaign after the president sought to remove him as Chief of Defense Staff. General Fonseka split the Sinhalese vote and sought support from Tamil and Muslim groups.[92]

Prior to the election, General Fonseka accused the Sri Lanka defense minister and a senior presidential advisor (both brothers of President Rajapaksa) of ordering the killing of three LTTE leaders and some of their family members who attempted to surrender. Though he later backtracked from these comments, and noted he would take responsibility for human rights violations during the final phases of the campaign he directed, his initial comments concurred with some contemporaneous reports in Western media.[93]

General Fonseka rejected the election's outcome. He was arrested, court-martialed, stripped of his rank and pension, and discharged.[94] Later, the president's party won a large parliamentary majority[95] and amended the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits, expand the president's power over elections and human rights commissions, and increase the executive's power over the judiciary.[96]

The government's concern for civil liberties did not return after the conflict's end. In July 2009, the president reactivated the Press Council Act of 1973, curtailing press freedoms. Journalists continued to receive threats and beatings from paramilitary forces. The emergency conditions from the civil war remain in place.[97]

Though all residents carry identity cards, only ethnic Tamils carry cards printed in both Sinhala and Tamil, making them easily identifiable by security forces. However, the government removed many of the restrictions on Tamil resident movements by the end of 2009, and it is working with various United Nations and non-governmental organizations to ease conditions in, and transition personnel from, IDP camps.[98]

Two bodies reviewed alleged human rights violations in Sri Lanka. The US Department of State deemed the first, called the "Group of Eminent Persons," as ineffective. Its report, originally due in December 2009, was subsequently delayed twice and now is overcome by the recently formed Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (LRRC).[99]

Serious concerns remain about the LRRC's independence and credibility. In one tirade, the minister of defense threatened to hang General Fonseka if he continued to suggest officials ordered war crimes during the final hours of the civil war.[100] Sri Lanka does not offer witness protection, and many citizens face legitimate fears of reprisal. The government also rejected any outside assistance from the United Nations Panel of Experts.[101]

Muslims, who form about one-third of the population in Tamil areas, fear the consequences of being a minority in a Tamil homeland. Many feel their political representation suffered in the fight between Tamil rebels and government forces.[102] Widely noted in the Islamic press, Sri Lankan authorities recently arrested a 1999 Buddhist convert to Islam (who returned from Bahrain) for anti-state activities under emergency powers. Her offense includes mailing books about her new religion.[103]

Lessons Learned, Re-learned, Validated, and Anticipated

The most important lesson from the experience in Sri Lanka has yet to occur – how to handle the transition to a multi-ethnic democratic country and external calls for investigations into human rights violations. Both major Sinhalese parties have strong attachments to caste and class politics. Many members elected to high office, from both political parties, come from a few ruling families "largely distant from the lives of ordinary citizens."[104] The President of Sri Lanka, the speaker of the parliament, and two cabinet ministers are siblings.[105]

How political parties appeal for votes and coalition partners — and conduct their campaigns and elections absent a large internal threat from a different ethnic group — will chart the future of Sri Lanka's democratic traditions. Current trends on how the country addresses preservation of minority rights and caste tensions within the ethnic majority and improves upon its human rights record remain mixed.

Many of Sri Lanka's experiences do not immediate translate to current struggles faced by coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sri Lanka fought an indigenous insurgency, with clear lines of authority, primarily with its own security forces. The Tamil Tigers represented an ethnic minority attempting to establish an independent nation from within a larger state, and not a minority or large plurality trying to force its will upon the general populace. Fighters could not find safe havens in surrounding nations, though they did have financial and moral supporters (albeit often unwilling) in the countryside and through an expatriate community.

Other events in Sri Lanka contain lessons for some of the challenges currently faced Coalition forces countries that face potential ethnic devolution and separation. These include:

- Successfully battling an insurgency takes at least a generation. Domestic political and military options require collaborative responses and the backing of the domestic population. Sri Lanka never lost the internal or external public relations campaign, despite a dubious human rights record. Domestic political support trumps international condemnation.
- Balancing majority rule and minority rights remains critical. This created difficulties in drafting the US Constitution with a relatively homogenous population. Ethnic, language, and religious differences exacerbate this situation. A representative government viewed with legitimacy by all its inhabitants in a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state requires delicate negotiations.
    - The adoption of Buddhism's primacy, coupled with an exclusive official language after years of using a multitude of languages in government, lead to feelings of disenfranchisement within the Tamil minority.
    - Forcing many Tamils from India to repatriate after living a generation or more in Sri Lanka, and the subsequent diaspora caused by the violence, fostered an expatriate funding and public affairs resource for the LTTE.
    - The unwillingness of the Tamil Tigers to grant equal rights to the Muslim minority in its region helped the Sri Lankan government in its prosecution of the insurgency.

- A successful counterinsurgency plan includes clearing the combatants from an area and holding the territory with credible forces.
- A lack of terrorist attacks does not mean the unwillingness or inability to conduct a large campaign of terror.
- Interrupting and criminalizing overseas funding hampers an insurgency's ability to operate.
- Targeted leadership killings proved effective.
- Incorporating former insurgents into the government's political apparatus adds legitimacy to the central authority and diminishes the resources and strategic narrative offered by the rebellion.
- Community involvement and relationships aid counterinsurgency operations. It is important to mentor and implement vetted host-nation police officers to build trust, deter insurgents, and foster the legitimacy of the rule of law.
- Truces provide an opportunity to regroup and rearm. Peace keepers will work as long as both sides want to keep the peace.
- The Tamil Tigers sought a separate state on the island of Sri Lanka. As such, it could not rely only on asymmetric warfare, but needed to capture and hold territory. The LTTE could not completely transition to a conventional army, nor could it establish the conditions to devolve back into a totally insurgent force during the latter stages of conflict. In open confrontation, it lost to the better equipped and organized government forces.

NOTE: Briefs are available from the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) on the SECRET Protocol Routing Network (SIPRnet) at http://kt.jfcom.smil.mil/JCOA under the Irregular Warfare tab.

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Chinese Expansion into the Russian Far East: Mythical Threat or Emerging Reality

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> "If . . . we do not undertake real efforts to develop the Russian Far East, then in a few decades, the Russian population will be speaking Japanese, Chinese and Korea." Vladimir Putin, 21 July 2000.

INTRODUCTION

The security posture of the Russian Federation in its far eastern federal district remains a serious open question. The Russian Far East (RFE) consisting of the extreme eastern Russia, between Lake Baikal in Eastern Siberia and the Pacific Ocean, has failed to prosper during the post-Soviet era.[1] Sharp declines in its social, economic, political, scientific, educational, and demographic sectors threaten to undermine the security posture of the Russian Federation. The most perilous shortcoming in the RFE appears to be its demographic situation. In itself, a declining demographic posture would be troubling but not intrinsically dangerous. Declining population opens Russia's far eastern flank to immersion from legal and illegal Chinese immigration into its far eastern districts. The issue to be discussed herein concerns the likelihood of a Chinese threat from legal and illegal immigration as a means for de-stabilizing Russian security in the RFE. The threat of Chinese immigration is magnified by the comparative weakness in the demographics of the Russian Federation.

The 2002 Russian Census noted that while "Russia had a total population of 145,166,731," her population had "declined to 142,008,838, according to the Russian State Statistics Service."[2] In other words, Russia's population in just five years had decreased by over three million. Extrapolating the trend forward to 2010, Russia's population would have declined an additional 1.9 million people. Although the 2010 Russian census has been delayed, making an accurate accounting of Russian demography incomplete, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book estimates Russia's population as of July 2010 at 139,390,205.[3]

The national demographic weakness is displayed most prominently in the RFE. The ethnic Russian population has been noticeably shriveling. Kazahiro Kumo documents the demographic shift occurring in the RFE in the past generation. RFE population data from 1991 showed a population of 8.6 million people. By 2009, the population had dropped to about 6.4 million.[4] The causes for this rapid drop in population require detailed analysis. The impact of this data of a declining population for the security of Russia must be considered in the light of an increasing pressure posed by Chinese migration into the RFE. As the native Russian population has decreased, other eastern population has migrated into the area. Chinese immigrants are the most prevalent population to settle within the RFE's Amur River region. They comprise both legal and illegal immigrants who may change the future of the RFE, shifting the balance in favor of an eventual Chinese majority.

This paper will analyze the importance of waning Russian population as Chinese immigration appears to be increasing in the RFE. Large scale Chinese immigration could be a wave of workers seeking employment in the Russian industry. This wave of emigration could be harmless. On the other hand, the Chinese workers could represent a specter of nationalist fear. A genuine wave of "Yellow Peril" or waves of migrants swamping Russia could represent a tool of Chinese state policy for reclaiming lands lost to the Tsarist and Soviet Russia. While the motives of the emigrants may be difficult to discern, this paper will analyze whether Chinese migration will create the conditions for shifting power and influence in the RFE favoring China. Section I will review the RFE's geographic and economic history. Section II will summarize the historical Sino-Russian controversy over the region. Section III will evaluate the meaning of Chinese migration. Section IV will explore Russia's reaction to its far eastern demographical situation. Section V will summarize implications of this problem.

SECTION I: A Wasteland and National Treasure

The RFE stretches from the farthest edge of the Russian territory and links its Pacific districts along the border with China to European Russia. It is a federal district

stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Chinese border on the north-south axis and from the Pacific Ocean to the border of eastern Siberia.[5]

The landmass represented by the RFE is massive; it is slightly smaller than the area of the lower 48 American States. According to the US Commercial Service "the Russian Far East (RFE) market has four time zones, 6.2 million square kilometers (two-thirds the size of the continental United States)."[6] This region is rich in natural resources which had been developed by Soviet Russia to support an extensive, though geographically shallow, industrial zone.

Russian Far Eastern Area

Russian strategic planners had traditionally looked fondly on the far east's economic potential. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy summarized this assessment: "The foundation of Russia's challenge lies in mastering the land, its temporal and spatial factors, with an adequate Russian footprint of cities, towns, and infrastructure linked to European Russia. For too long, the Far East had remained a strategic after-thought in the minds of Moscow's strategic planners. Russian eastward expansion is a legacy of the Tsarist desires for access to reach warm-water Pacific ports. Russian presence in the Far East dates back to the 17th Century, when the Cossacks inexorably extended Tsarist control into Asia. Tsarist forts and outposts sparsely dotted throughout the "Far North" which included Siberia's Arctic and sub-Arctic territories from Murmansk to Vladivostok.[7]

Russian expansion along the Shillka and Amur rivers to the Sea of Japan

Russian traders and soldiers conquered the vast open stretches of central Asia until Russian interests collided with Imperial China's loosely held spheres of influence in the Amur River valley and along the Pacific Coast. The Tsarist flag followed Russian traders winkling their way into contested areas not directly controlled by a weak Imperial China.

Imperial China negotiated its northern boundary with Russia along the Argun River with the 1689 Nerchinsk Treaty. China found itself increasingly unable to resist European imperialism. Following a series of so-called "unequal treaties," China ceded control to Russia of Chinese provinces: the Amur River valley and access to warm-water ports with the 1858 Aigun Treaty and Outer Manchuria with the 1860 Beijing Treaty. Russia finally reached the Pacific Ocean with the 1875 annexation of Sakhalin Island under the Treaty of St. Petersburg with Japan.[8]

Soviet planners envisioned development plans transforming Tsarist settlements into a series of cities and industrial zones linked to European Russia by the Trans-Siberian Railroad, built from 1891 to 1916. Mark Bassin summarized the Soviet characterization of Siberia's "New World," as "an energy colony" whose natural resources could support and save Russia.[9] Siberia and the Far East may have been considered the strategic rear area of the nation; for many Russians, they were both considered a "wasteland" and a "treasure."[10]

Soviet planners created a series of incentives to solidify Russian presence along the arterial highway of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Policy incentives bore similarities with Tsarist inducements: tax reductions; postponing military service; coverage of transportation costs; and direct loans as a means to encourage immigration from European Russia. Russian Jews were encouraged to settle in the east in a Jewish homeland along the Amur.

The military disasters of the Soviet's first year of World War II created the necessity to relocate factories in the face of the Nazi onslaught. The east represented the ultimate in strategic depth. The eastern provinces posed a "strategic redoubt" protected from attack from the West.[13] From this protected region, Soviet planners envisioned matching labor and industrial capacity with the available natural resources to eventually create an industrialized nation consistent with Marxist ideology.[14]



Chinese territory occupied by Tsarist Russia

Tsarist and Soviet policy initiatives were used to artificially boost the region's population. The military created security zones in the Amur region. Large numbers of soldiers and naval personnel were assigned to the east to counter Japanese expansion. Svetlana Soboleva, a Senior Researcher in the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Economics and Industry, described the policy of forcible migration of re-located populations.

"From the mid-1920s until the end of the 1930s, the region felt the impact of industrialization of forced collectivization, and ultimately the Second World War. It was at this time that there were mass deportations of people and the relocation of huge industrial enterprises from the front [Soviet-German confrontation zone in western part of the Soviet Union such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Western Part of the Russian Federation] to this region (Western Siberia)."[11] Re-locating penal institutions eastward included forced labor and political detention camps, known as GULAGs.[12]

During the post war era, Soviet dreams appeared tantalizingly close to being realized. Large scale investment appeared to create satisfactory conditions for creating a miraculous industrial base. Pavel Minakir described the "miracle": "In 1992, the Far East's population (8.2 million) which represented just 5.4 percent of the Soviet population had produced five percent of Soviet industrial and 4.7 percent of agricultural production and 58 percent of fishing and maritime production."[15] In 1985, Far East production had reached a high, with its industrial output representing 30 percent of the gross industrial product, including 40 percent of fish and seafood, 80 percent of tin, 50 percent of gold, and 100 percent of diamond production.[16] As the Soviet Union entered its death spiral, the Far East miracle sputtered and died.

The miracle began to unravel during the era of *perestroika*, as Premier Gorbachev attempted his political and economic reforms reversing central

planning.[17] The loss of the planned economy, and its support of the development of the RFE, created a crisis. The Russian Federation's emerging market economy undermined the support which had sustained industry in the east. Falling demand and production of goods created rising unemployment, which exacerbated its coming demographic problems. A demilitarized posture in the RFE de-stabilized Russian power in the Far East as the military population dwindled. Weather effects, production costs, and social and economic opportunities elsewhere in Russia created a dramatic economic and demographic shift, summarized below in The World Bank newsletter, "About Reforming Economics."

> "With price liberalization, decentralization of fiscal responsibility, and the removal of implicit and explicit subsidies for the region, migration patterns to the region began to reverse themselves in the 1990s . . . The rapid depopulation of the north is evident in the patterns of net migration over the past seven years. For example, two regions located in the far northeast of Russia, bordering on Alaska, lost significant shares of their populations: Magadan lost a third of its population to emigration in the 1990s, while Chukotka lost nearly half. Economic geographers point out that the Russian Far North was overpopulated by 20 to 30 percent compared with other northern latitude regions in the world, and development of the region was neither economically, nor environmentally sustainable. With the introduction of a market economy, Russia could no longer afford its northern periphery."[18]

The cost of maintaining the population base in the RFE became startlingly apparent. Common sense economies and the brutal environment could no longer be tamed by Moscow inducements, incentives, and investments. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy argue that Soviet-style labor functions in the late 1960s should have been considered uneconomical simply due to the need for a broader support base for individual workers: In cold regions, "for **each** permanent worker in the 'Soviet North' nearly **ten other people** were required to live there: the worker's family and the various categories of associated support personnel."[19] Victor Mote has studied the effect of Siberian weather on Soviet economic planning which effectively limited economic activity to four months a year. Economic activity in the Far East involved costs not experienced in warmer climates: Construction costs 2-3 times the country average near the Trans-Siberian Railroad; 4-8 times the norm in areas inaccessible to rail traffic; labor costs averaging 1.7 to seven times above the norm; repair costs running 25-30 times the equipment's total value. Equipment often failed in the extreme cold, costing the planned economy in the 1960s "30 percent of all Soviet trucks, 37 percent of bulldozers, 35 percent of the excavators, 33 percent of tower cranes, 62 percent of the drilling equipment, and 64 percent of the tracked prime movers."[20]

Russia's emerging market economy created inducements for workers to migrate from the RFE to softer lives in "warmer" economic climates. Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, from the Department of Migration Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted that internal migration patterns occurred from the north and the east to the southwest, where opportunities for jobs and affordable housing are abundant.[21] According to Zayonchkovskaya, Siberia may have lost more than ten percent of its 1989 population.[22] This loss in population weakened the RFE, and created vulnerabilities that were exasperated by structural weaknesses in the country's demographic posture.

Russia appears to be facing a cultural and demographic catastrophe which complicates her ability to sustain a presence in the RFE. The CIA World Fact Book summarizes the salient facts about a country with containing demographic time bombs. Although Russia is the world's ninth largest country, its median age is 38.5 years with a negative population growth. General life expectancy is 66 years. Male life expectancy is far lower at an estimated 59 years, with females faring better at 73 years, ranking Russia at 161 among the world's countries. Russia's fertility rate has fallen since the Soviet era to 1.41 per woman, a level far too low to sustain its Slavic composition. Russia rate ranks 176 among other countries with 11 live births for 10,000 people.[23] The US Census Bureau has estimated that contraceptive use and widespread reliance on abortion as a birth control method have made many women of child bearing age sterile. Infant mortality appears 6-7 times higher [in Russia] than the rates for the United States or Western Europe.[24] Maternal and infant mortality from pneumonia were ranked as second worst in the country in 1994, while its regional fertility remains third-worst during this period.[25]

The RFE's demographic posture appears equally grim. Kazahiro Kumo noted that the RFE population was 8.1 million in 1991; by 2009, the population was about 6.5 million.[26] The trends suggest the population is not

only shrinking in absolute terms (similar to national trends), it is also being pressured to immigrate to more attractive regions.[27] The allure of more satisfying work conditions for higher pay and with improved benefits has stimulated migration to both western Siberia and European Russia; such incentives do not bode well for Russian nationally or for the RFE. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies reported in 2003 the "burden of the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic plus tuberculosis and diphtheria divert forward resources from RFE economic investment. Russia's problems such as substance abuse, suicide, domestic violence, and homicide are on the rise."[28] These indicators suggest a culture and people in despair, lacking in hope, and seeking rescue from their plight. This is creating a negative population trend which is expected to continue.[29] The challenge for Moscow is startlingly clear. The current demographic trend must be reversed nationally, while promoting policies that stimulate births and anchor a growing Russian population in the Far East. Otherwise, an estimated 100 million Chinese appear ready to seek economic opportunities across the Sino-Russian border making the conditions ripe for Russia to lose control of the RFE.[30]

SECTION II: Broad Dimensions of Sino-Russian Conflict

The rise of Communist China created a powerful neighbor willing to regain territory extorted from a weakened Imperial China by unjust treaties. While China soft-pedaled her territorial claims for the sake of socialist solidarity between Soviet Russia and Maoist China, her longings for lost territories remained in the background. Frederick Stakelbeck, Jr. noted that "Chinese communist founder Mao Zedong and leader Deng Xiaoping both publicly asserted that the Russian cities of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk were Chinese. Some Chinese historians have claimed that the current China-Russia borders are unfair and that Russia 'stole' the Far East by force."[31] Mao discussed the burgeoning Sino-Russian dispute with Khrushchev and Bulganin: "we took up this question [Outer Mongolia] but they refused to talk to us."[32] According to Deng Xiaoping, the "Americans are closing ranks against us . . . but their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp, is inviolable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals."[33]

Despite open demonstrations of unity, Soviet meddling in domestic Chinese politics inflamed the Sino-Soviet border disputes. Soviet troops frequently crossed the border and occupied Chinese territory. More seriously, the Soviets flagrantly carried out large-scale subversive activities in frontier areas to sow discord among China's nationalities against Beijing.[34] This smoldering animosity was apparent in a Pravda commentary which referenced complaints about an official 1954 Chinese history textbook. The textbook recounts that prior to the First Opium War [of 1839-1842], the border with Tsarist Russia ran along the Stanovik Mountain Range, (cutting off the Maritime Provinces from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with parts of Kirghizia, Tadzhikstan, and Kazakhstan) up to Lake Balkash. This area and Sakhalin Island were extensions of Imperial China. The implication of this historical textbook is clear: Russia had taken these lands from China. Maps showing various parts of the Soviet Union and other countries neighboring China as Chinese territory continued to be published in the People's Republic of China (PRC).[35]

These two Communist giants eventually collided in a low-level but telling military clash. Chinese troops landed on Damansky Island, also known as Zhen Boa to the Chinese, on 2 March 1969. Vladimir Radyuhin, the author of A Chinese Invasion, noted that "Chinese troops occupied a Russian island on the Amur River and the Russians fired Grad multi-barrel missiles to wipe out the intruders."[36] Despite the post-clash rhetoric, Damansky Island might have sparked a nuclear exchange. Henry Kissinger noted the serious rift between these "allies," as armed "skirmishes" which "invariably took place near major Soviet supply bases and far from Chinese communication centers—a pattern one would expect only if the Soviet forces were the aggressors. Kissinger's analysis was supported by reports of a Soviet military buildup along the entire 4,000-miles of the Chinese border, which reached more than forty divisions."[37] Although the Russians and Chinese downplayed the problem by limiting the military build-up along the border, this incident suggested the potential flash point that could recur over territorial claims.

Analysts considered China's rising claims to world power status could ignite such a conflict. John J. Mearsheimer has argued that China might focus on regional hegemony by force of arms akin to America's rise to world power status through military power and

territorial conquest. As the stronger of the two powers, China now possesses the capacity to influence Russia to meet Chinese demands in becoming an unrivaled military power in Central Asia.

Mearsheimer argued that "great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power. Although that is a welcomed outcome, their ultimate aid is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system."[38] He argued that good will alone is inadequate for dealing with the dangerous and complicated nature of international politics.[39]

Four decades after Damansky island, the likelihood of armed clashes between the two giants would appear extremely remote. China and Russia appear to have resolved at least some of these territorial disputes in recent treaties. In 1999, Xiang Jemin publically acknowledged the validity of the transfer of over one million square kilometers of land from China to earlier Russian regimes. President Putin signed a 2004 treaty with then PRC President Hu Jintao, which legitimized the divided sovereignty over Heixiazi Island near Khaborovsk. These treaties appear to have legitimized the current Sino-Russian border, thereby ending official Chinese irredentist claims to lost territories from earlier unequal treaties.[40] Beijing may have calculated that the benefits of peaceful cooperation outweigh the costs of war or continuing confrontation.

SECTION III: Chinese Emigration or "Yellow Peril"

Despite relinquishing its claims for the lost territories, China might yet have plans for regaining her lost lands. Mearsheimer's claims about Chinese hegemony might yet be proven correct, although without a military confrontation. China might regain her lost territories by using a non-violent but cunning strategy of cultural assimilation. Massive Chinese immigration flooding into the RFE's open spaces might de-stabilize Russian control in the east. Increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants could tip the demographic balance in the RFE, shifting the balance from precarious Russian control to Chinese domination. Surreptitious Chinese strategy based on a strategy of cultural assimilation could enable China to reclaim what military and diplomatic policy could not achieve.

Russians have long feared that waves of Chinese immigrants could engulf European Russia. Russian nationalists echo the findings of Ekaterina Motrich, senior fellow at the Institute of Economic Research of the Khabarovsk branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. She has noted that the Yellow Peril threat has always been part of the Russian experience, "but it has become stronger in recent decades . . . due to the social-economic development of China, and its rise to the status of a world power, with its anticipated e-influence (economic, political, demographic, etc.) in the world."[41] The fear of the so-called Yellow Peril has resonated throughout Russian society in various forms since the 18th century. Poets like Vladimir Solov'ev considered China a threat to Russia's Christian and Western heritage.[42]

Security fears about the sparse Russian settlements in the RFE were complemented by racial assessments. Alexander Lukin summarized the notes of a 19th Century Tsarist official, Mr. Levitov wrote:

> "Look at the Amur, the Ussuriysk Kray and the Maritime oblast and observe generally at the territory between the Baikal and the border with Manchuria, we can easily observe there are very few Russians there....in that territory is an insignificant handful of people among the dominant mass of the yellow-skinned."[43]

Levitov feared that "the wave of the yellow race" would engulf and overwhelm Russia.[44] Lukin noted that by the 1960s, the fear of Chinese aggression was commonplace in Moscow's thinking and may have contributed to the concern for defending distant outposts like Damansky Island.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn argued that China posed a grave threat: "For the next half-century our only genuine military need will be to defend ourselves from China. No one else on earth threatens us, and no one is going to attack us."[45] Lukin argued that the RFE public sentiments echo the fear that China has adopted the policy of "moving to the north as an official but deliberate expansionist policy."[46] Lukin's research suggests that negative Russian opinions create genuine apprehension closer to home in the RFE.[47]

Nationalist leaders fear Beijing is conspiring to flood Siberia with Chinese workers, with its surplus population, into Russian territory. Chinese workers could work in the RFE to earn a living not attainable in China's less developed regions. More importantly, workers could develop technological competence from within

the Russian economy to share this knowledge later with Chinese economic planners. The Yellow Peril fear may have intensified in 1989 as Chinese migration or record keeping improved. Motrich states that the Chinese population in the RFE rose dramatically between 1989 and 1993 from 1,742 to 100,000. While the majority of Chinese immigrants lives in the RFE's Khabarovsk, Primorskiy, and Amurskaya regions, Motrich noted that the "official" number does not include an estimated 400,000 – 700,000 illegal Chinese immigrants living within the country's borders.[48] Motrich believed the Yellow Peril fear was "being intensified by the RFE's economic weaknesses: there is a contraction of our labor force, with the exodus of working-age adults, and the growing need to import laborers from abroad. And China is nearby, with its excess demographic capacity. To treat Chinese migration here with outright disapproval would run counter to economic imperatives intended to attract a working-age population into the region." The RFE's population was falling while China's northwestern population appeared to be exploding.[49] Galina Vitkovskaya, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, argued that the population in three border provinces is about 100 million with a population density on the Chinese frontier being 15 to 30 times higher than on the Russian side. The RFE's most densely populated Primorskiy Krai population density is 13.5 per square kilometer, while in the northeastern China it is 130 persons per square kilometer. Dmitry Shlapentokf has described Russians fears that "sheer numbers of Chinese immigrants will eventually overwhelm Russia . . . they will work behind the scenes to finally engulf Moscow and make it part of China." This foreboding has become a deep-seated fear in the RFE where Russians "see the Chinese as competitors for jobs and social services in a society aggravated by demographic and cultural pressures."[50]

Russian reaction to the migrants in the RFE appears mixed. Motrich noted that recent polling suggested an indifferent or even positive appreciation for the Chinese. Many Russians positively noted the Chinese contribution in reviving the local economy. Chinese workers are essential to man the production lines in the factories of the population-declining RFE. She notes that "the use of foreign labor in the national economy has become a necessary element in the formation of the regional labor market . . . the attraction of foreign labor, primarily from China, is becoming a normal and stable phenomenon."[51] Chinese virtues of diligence and hard work are noteworthy. On the other hand, many Russians have identified negative Chinese behaviors such as cleanliness and dishonest practices. The fear exists that the Chinese will take advantage of the imperfect Russia immigration policies and inadequate border security. The Chinese are feared to be a conduit of treasure from Russia to China. Polls show that 35 percent believe China is a threat and 18 percent believe it is an unreliable partner.[52]

A "Russian" Far East may be a dying dream. Frederick Stakelberg believes the RFE increasingly identifies itself with the east–South Korea, Japan and China–for matters of governance and culture. Its social and historical linkage to Moscow has become increasingly tenuous. As a result, the region has become less connected to Moscow and the ideals of "Euro Asia."[53] The RFE work force appears demoralized in the face of the political and economic disruptions imposed on the region. Chinese and American investments offer a rescue from the continuing economic decline that has produced unskilled and uncompetitive workers. A common complaint in an RFE district refers to the prior years when Chinese workers worked for the Russians; but now has increasingly reversed as Russians are working for the newcomers. This natural gravitation towards China seems to be a natural development, or perhaps a natural surrender to economic realities.[54] In this vacuum, Chinese workers provide not only the manpower, but also the means for maintaining Russia's economic viability in the RFE.

Chinese migration may be a natural response to economic conditions, rather than a deliberate strategy of cultural assimilation. China's spectacular economic growth might be running out of steam, thus stimulating additional waves of emigrants seeking work in the RFE.

Financial Times correspondent Martin Wolf believes China's economy should have done even better than it has performed given the political control afforded to it from the Communist system.[55] Gordon Chang believes Chinese leaders will not reform the political and economic systems to sustain China's recent economic prosperity.

> "After opening its doors to domestic entrepreneurs a half-decade ago, Chinese leaders have become fearful of their growing economic power and have increasingly discriminated against private domestic and in favor of foreign sources of capital. The party has also systematically inserted its operatives into

private businesses and claims three million private sector members."

In short, Chang argued that the flaw in the Chinese miracle lies in Beijing's inability to reform politics and economies, tackle vested interests, and force the structural change needed to sustain recent growth.[56]

Minxin Pei has presented a similar argument suggesting the movement to a free market economy is in flux – thanks to Beijing's lack of governmental cooperation and pattern of procrastination. China's economy will accordingly experience a significant slow-down. In his profile of Pei's new book, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Andrew Nathan summarizes Pei's argument that China's gradual reform has stalled in reforming deeply ingrained corruption. Chinese elites have recognized the need to enrich themselves, since the regime's long-term survival is linked with the current prosperity. Nathan disagrees with Chang and Pei's analyses. He believed that incremental reform has been the traditional Chinese way of doing business. The middle approach has provided solutions to economic and political challenges which have sustained China's emerging economy. Nonetheless, Chang and Pei suggest a growing cancer exists, oblivious to the West, which may be perceived by northeast Chinese entrepreneurs who may sense opportunities abroad in the RFE.[57] The nature of Chinese migration deserves scrutiny.

Paul Abelsky quotes from Andrei Zabiyako, a professor and the head of the Religious Studies department at the Amur State University in Blagoveshchensk, who has conducted detailed surveys of the migration process in the border areas. He writes:

> "What is Chinese migration? It's a coordinated and stable process which stems wholly from the region's economic circumstances . . . It does not involve a chaotic or spontaneous movement of people. The number of Chinese in any given place within the Russian Federation corresponds to the number that makes economic sense to the Chinese themselves. No more and no less . . . The arriving Chinese made a conscious choice by themselves to come here, unlike the refugees from Central Asia, for example, who are flung by acute socio-economic crises or military conflicts. Chinese entrepreneurs and traders react to a particular state of economic affairs, and they are interested in capitalizing on the opportunities that exist in Russia."[58]

Svetlana Soboleva believes the major reasons behind the Chinese immigration to Siberia are: "demographic" pressure[s]; the socio-economic imbalance between Russia and China; Chinese-government restrictions in regard to demographic policy; a surplus of Chinese labor; outsourcing job vacancies; a high level of unemployment in China; and finally, the China-Russia border is relatively easy to cross."[59] The level of Chinese investment and entrepreneurial interest may actually reflect its economic potential. More importantly, the nature of the Chinese migrant workers may be the kind of unskilled workers who need work in the manned Russian factories. Mikhail Alexseev seconds this view, noting that migrants are:

> "...mostly from the poorer regions of China's northeastern 'rust belt,' few of who can afford to pay tens of thousands of dollars to migration entrepreneurs (nicknamed "snakeheads") to be smuggled to the West. . . . the typical Chinese migrant is "poor, persevering, modest, hungry for earnings of any size, and brutally exploited by his own countrymen with the silent approval of the Russians)."[60]

Eugene Krassinets has analyzed these pressures on the Chinese economy suggested by Chang and Pei that could become "push" factors. A combination of unemployment, instability, or lack of opportunities in China could "pull" migrants across the border into the RFE. Russia's imperfectly enforced law enforcement offers opportunities for spurring illegal Chinese immigration and building criminal enterprises. Russian immigration controls appear inadequate for policing the border. The Federal Frontier Service has estimated that illegal immigration is currently exceeding the needs of the economy.[61] Krassinets highlights the potential for developing a shadow economy that could flourish in conditions in which law enforcement was inadequate or lax, bordering on non-existent.[62] A shadow economy provides opportunities for the migrants; urban areas provide factory jobs; and the rural areas provide agricultural jobs.[63]

The most telling indicator about the intent of the migrants in the RFE might just be the Chinese themselves. Chinese migration may be motivated to take advantage of the opportunity in the RFE. Chinese migrants often enter Russia illegally and do not become legally permitted guest workers. Migrants form "China villages" in agricultural areas where they farm plots of land, which facilitates Russian economic expansionism. This attitude suggests the willing-

ness to remain permanently in the RFE. On the other hand, these villages appear to stimulate illegal markets and cross-border shuttle criminal enterprises that undermine the prosecution of existing Russian law.[64] Paul Starobin reported that the "[Chinese are] flocking to the sparsely populated Far East, a vast stretch of land east of Lake Baikal in Siberia. Moscow demographer Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya [predicts] 10 million Chinese may eventually claim residence in Russia by 2050."[65] However, Andrei Zabiyako claims that Chinese migrants could sustain a large presence only if the conditions were abundant enough to support their livelihood. Competition among the migrants is quite severe. They are forced to compete for market space, scarce resources, and the limited number of Russian consumers.[66]

More important than this point may be the cultural attitudes of the Chinese migrants. Soboleva notes that the Chinese generally do not indicate an intense desire to remain in Siberia. Small numbers of Chinese-born migrants have chosen to become naturalized Russians, but their decision reflects mixed intentions. Some may have gained Russian citizenship, but they are not appearing committed to settling in Russia permanently. Political analyst Anatoly Karlin believes the majority of migrants originate from China's so-called northeastern "rust belt." While migrants may live for protracted periods on Russian soil, they choose not to assimilate into Russian culture. Many prefer to work for pay, or even commute from China. Their attitudes suggest a transient attitude reflecting desires for economic gain and supporting their family rather than responding to Chinese politics.[67] Rather, their motivation lies in maintaining family unity: they could earn their wages in Russia without boarding their children with relatives in China.[68]

Sino-Russian international trade has not yet developed the lucrative economy which could support long-term Chinese settlement in the RFE. Elizabeth Wishnick, a Fulbright Scholar at Hong Kong's Lingan University, has described the commerce as low-level, barter trade conducted by Chinese shuttle traders transiting between the Siberian border region and China's northeastern provinces; primarily the Heilonjianr province. It is not on the scale that a leading world economic power would desire.[69] David Wall, an associate member of the East Asia Institute of Cambridge University, has argued that "China has shown little interest in Russia beyond it being a hewer of wood, and a military equipment supplier."[70] While some Siberian cities are attempting to develop a tourist economy with resorts and casinos to entice visitors, China's interest in the area appears limited. According to Alexseev, Chinese tourists, "shuttle traders," and poachers display economic interests that are exclusively economic and transitory.[71] One Chinese trader in Vladivostok said, "As soon as I make any amount of rubles, I change them into dollars. I'm going to save the money and move my family to the United States." Alexseev noted the tendency to exchange rubles for foreign currency indicated that Chinese workers have little desire to permanently settle in Siberia.[72] Recent reforms in Russian immigration laws seem to substantiate these findings. Although large numbers of Chinese visitors enter Siberia, most depart after a limited stay.

SECTION V: Implications

The impending RFE's economic and security catastrophe illustrates several issues for the interested parties. The Chinese possibilities have been investigated. Designed policies or pure luck might achieve a deeply obscured but genuine territorial objective. For Russia, the situation is complex and perilous.

Moscow has recognized the dangers posed by Russia's national demographic situation could be a ticking time bomb. Time will judge the success of policies enacted by the Putin and Medvedev administrations. Vladimir Radyuhin has argued that a rapidly expanding Chinese population could make "the Chinese the fourth biggest ethnic group in this country after Russians (104.1 million), Tatars (7.2million), and Ukrainians (5.1 million)—all indigenous inhabitants of Russia. More than three-fourths of Chinese immigrants have settled down in Siberia and the Far East."[73] Over the coming decades, "Russian" could assume an entirely different ethnic meaning. The costs for inaction could be catastrophic as Russian analyst Willard Glen believed:

> "Russia may by 2015 have only about 130 million people, down from today's 148 million. Further, Russia's latest census indicates that within this time bomb, an increasing Chinese population threatens Russian demographic integrity. Sources from the Gateway to Russia report that *Chinese population [in Russia] has grown from just over 5,000 in the late 1980s to 3.26 million today."*[74]

Improving National Heath. Russia's national health situation should target several objectives. Improving male life expectancy may begin with curbing deaths from alcoholism and impure alcohol, which may increase male life expectancy from 59 years and closer to the European Union's rate of 75 years.[75] Moscow should target the national birth rate.

Boosting the Birth Rate. In May 2007, President Putin created the "Mothers' Fund" providing parents of two or more children with a total of 250,000 rubles in subsidies for housing, education, or pension contributions, and applies to children born or adopted between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2016. Kumo reported that in "the first six months following the policy, the Russian birth rate did increase by 6.5 percent (although some critics claim the hesitancy to have more children is related to a low standard of living that frustrates the desire to have more children."[76] Then Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev claimed the program had improved the infant mortality which now compares favorably with European levels. "The [infant mortality] rate stood at 10.5-11 per 1,000 last year, and now it is down to 9 per 1000. The infant death rate in some regions, including St. Petersburg and Bryansk, is close to the European average 4 per 1,000."[77]

Boosting Teen Fertility. Health Minister Tatyana Golikova introduced programs to improve teen fertility and identify reproductive problems. "More intense medical examinations of teenagers are planned to start from 2011 with the goal of examining their reproductive function and recommending individual medical courses, which would identify and treat reproduction problems."[78] Government posters presented an important message: "Love for your nation starts with love for family" have been widespread.[79]

Improved Immigration Control Policies. Eugene Krassinets has summarized an array of necessary improvements in Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) operations. Many illegal immigrants enter Russia on visitor visas from the Russian Commonwealth of Independent States nations. Improving resources for the Ministry of Internal Affairs would enable the reforms arrayed below.[80] Recent legislation appears to be enacting these reforms.[81]

- Establish set annual quotas of 500,000 foreign migrant workers similar to the American green card system. Time-stamped documents may cut down on official corruption.[82]
- Vigorous border control would need larger numbers of FMS agents, perhaps even actively augmented by military resources.
- Improving internal immigration controls would enforce visa entry procedures for visitors who enter the Commonwealth of States with intentions to remain illegally once their visas have expired.[83]
- Sanctioning employers who benefit from hiring illegal immigrants, which supports shadow and illegal economies.
- Improving border control with China would improve security along both sides of the border.
- Create policies which mobilize concerned citizens to oppose actively illegal immigrants. Incentivized programs can mobilize the ethnic Russian and what could be called a "blended Russian" population to make citizens stakeholders in combating illegal immigration that undermines new-found Russian prosperity.[84]

Decentralizing Economic Development. The economic response to the harsh environment may lie in human ingenuity and innovation. Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that Russia's "size and diversity, a decentralized political system and free-market economics would be the most likely means to unleash the creative potential of the Russian people and Russia's vast natural resources." Decentralizing political and economic control would allow the RFE "to tap its local creative potential, stifled for centuries by Moscow's heavy bureaucratic hand."[85]

Focusing on the Energy Extraction Industry. Julia Nany, a senior director at global consulting firm PFC Energy, has argued that "Russia's superpower status today comes from energy, not its military. The Kremlin determines what happens with oil...They want to maximize Russia's geopolitical relevance."[86] Build a thriving economy and the workers will come to Siberia and farther east to the RFE to build new lives and seek new hopes, even in harsh conditions.

Stimulating the Economy. Enabling personal and freedom initiatives, energized by the profit motive, can induce Russians with the motivation to work in the RFE. Paul Starobin has profiled the booming energy extraction industry in the Siberian city of Surgut, formerly a:

> "collection of hovels, in a place where temperatures can plunge to minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit... Today Surgut is one of western Siberia's largest

cities, with 300,000 people. The new arrivals are voting with their feet, a sign that Russia's new market economy is actually working."[87]

Starobin has suggested the impact of the profit motive and personal achievement in re-populating the RFE with motivated workers and without forced settlement or inadequate centralized planning.

The success or failure of these initiatives illustrates lessons for Washington to review. Implicit in the RFE decline lay spiritual failure. Marxist philosophy of a Dialectical Materialism Class conflict between storming opposites was believed to support a continuously evolving historical progression. The germinating seed within materialism was the primacy of matter, that matter preceded thought.[88] Brain and brawn may energize matter into motion, creating economic "miracles" of sorts; however, people are not machines who can be maintained with replaceable parts. The Spirit may have been denied by Marx perhaps because matter is easier to maintain than is human nature. The initiatives to develop the Siberian economy in Sugrut suggest the heartfelt need for accomplishment, satisfaction, and achievement. Businesses based on the profit motive rather than centralized planning reflect the personal striving and yearning for self-actualization recognized by Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. Rogers argued human beings are motivated by an underlying "actualizing tendency," which aims to develop all capacities in ways that maintain or enhance the organism and move it toward autonomy.[89]

Finally, protection of international borders need not be reserved only to Russia. John Lennon's song "Imagine" might have been laudable among certain elements decades ago but is quite wrongheaded. His idealism, about imagining "there's no countries" to die for, contradicts mankind's social sentiments noted over two millennia ago by Aristotle.[90] People associate themselves with their homelands, their countries, to identify who they are and who they want to be. Borders between nation-states are not simply lines on maps. They establish the frontiers between peoples, their ideas, cultures, and aspirations. Borders form membranes supporting national identity. Robert Zaretsky recently profiled French philosopher Regis Debray's view that "what made French identity was the result of 'seventeen centuries of sedimentation.' It is the lay of the land and the laying of a table; what never lies are the soil and *moeurs* cultivated by a people."[91] Defenses of borders, and the ideas and cultures linked with them, remain a natural impulse from which human beings will not lightly become detached.

CONCLUSION

The demographic implosion in the RFE has spurred national policy initiatives which may stabilize and retrieve the situation. Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky highlights the problem: "The main security issue today, and perhaps the key to Russia's survival in the first half of the 21st century, is whether Russia can hold on to its territory in Siberia and the Far East."[92] Former President Vladimir Putin has warned his countrymen that "if you do not take practical steps to advance the Far East soon, after a few decades the Russian population will be speaking Japanese, Chinese and Korean."[93] Yet, positive signs may be emerging. Ben Judah has noted that August 2009 was the first month that "live births outnumbered deaths in Russia for more than a decade, and the abortion rate has continued to decline."[94] The consequences of these policies will not be fully felt for another decade.

President Dimitri Medvedev

Russia is still a large country and may not have been awakened from its self-destructive slumbers but for fear of a wave of Chinese migration swamping the RFE. Nationalist fears of the so-called Yellow Peril might be real. Long-term plans may exist deep inside Beijing policy offices, but probably cannot be substantiated at this time. As with many fears, the emotions animating them in the imagination may appear real, even though reality suggests otherwise. Until more conclusive data can be determined, the fear of the Yellow Peril may remain just that: unsubstantiated fear.

Current president Dimitry Medvedev is confronting the RFE problem. During a speech in September 2008 on social-economic development in Kamchatka kray, Medvedev said that "if we do not step up the level of

activity of our work [in the Russian Far East], then in the final analysis we can lose everything."[95] Most recently in March 2010, he visited the RFE's Amur region. Medvedev stated, "In the last 20 years the population in the Far East has shrunk by a quarter," noting the area had been sparsely populated even before the start of the decline. He ominously noted that since 1 January 2010, 5,000 had left the RFE because of what Medvedev has described as "'extremely difficult' and complicating the work of social-economic systems"[96] Although the perfect solution may not have been found, Moscow is energized into saving the RFE. In the end, the survival of a Russian Far East lies more with Moscow than it does with Beijing.

Author's Note: The views of the authors are their own and do not reflect the views of Northrop Grumman Technical Services, Battle Command Training Program, or the US Army.

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Endnotes:

[1] "Russian Far East." "Russian Far East" will be used herein to describe Russia's groupings of federal districts organized in 2002 called the Far Eastern Federal District composed of the Amur Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Khabarovsk Krai, Magadan Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, and Sakhalin Oblast. Since 2000, the term "Far East" has been increasingly used in Russia to refer to the district, though it is often also used more loosely. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Far_East. Accessed 1 January 2011.

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[4] Kazahiro Kumo, "Demographic Situations and Development Programs in the Russian Far East and Zabaikalye," RRC Working Paper Series No. 24, Russian Research Center. The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubachi University, Tokyo, May 2010, p. 4. http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/rrc/RRC_WP_No24.pdf. Accessed 30 December 2010.

[5] Bobo Loo, "Ten Things Everyone Should Know About the Sino-Russian Relationship," Centre for European Reform Policy Brief. p. 2. http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_china_bl_dec08.pdf. Accessed 21 June 2010. The RFE districts' administrative and political district is separate from the rest of Siberia

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[10] Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Siberia Out in the Cold, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003, p. 73. A report from the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) wrote: "Siberian and the Far East are formative territories and resource-rich of modern Russia. From the time of M.V. Lomonosov it considered obvious that the eastern territories of Russia would 'increase her strength;' at the start of the new millennium it has become no less obvious that Siberia and the Far East are not only Russia's 'strength,' but her very destiny . . . For the European part of Russia, disintegration [the separation of Siberia from the Russian Federation] would mean not only the loss of markets, but, most important, an enormous loss of resource and territorial potential that has saved the European part from catastrophe more than once [for example, during World War II]," p. 73-74.

[11] Svetlana Soboleva, "Economic Migration to Western Siberia," Russian Regional Perspective, p. 45. http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/copyof-russian-regional-

perspectives-journal/copyof-rrp-volume-1-issue-2/economic-migration-to-western-siberia/. Accessed 28 June 2010.

[12] Hill and Gaddy, p. 81. According to GULAG, Soviet Forced Labor Camps and the struggle for Freedom, "The term "GULAG" is an acronym for the Soviet bureaucratic institution, Glavnoe Upravlenie ispravitel'no-trudovykh LAGerei (Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps) that operated the Soviet system of forced labor camps in the Stalin era." http://gulaghistory.org/nps/onlineexhibit/stalin/. Accessed 3 July 2010.

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[14] Hill and Gaddy, pp. 88-89. 88-89.

[15] Pavel A. Minakir, The Russian Far East: An Economic Handbook, trans. Gregory L. Freeze, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, pp. xxxviii – xxxix.

[16] Minakir, The Russian Far East: An Economic Handbook, p. 40.

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[19] Hill and Gaddy, p. 51.

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Chinese Dignitary in Khabarovsk

Senior Enlisted Leadership in the Joint Operating Environment—Enduring Best Practices

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> "The nature of the decentralized operations required by many [future] challenges ... will require that NCOs must also understand the fundamental nature of war as well as other cultures and peoples as they will undoubtedly confront challenges equivalent to those faced by today's midgrade officer." —*The Joint Operating Environment 2010*[1]

The 21st-century joint operating environment is constantly changing. How our noncommissioned officers (NCO) and petty officers respond to these changes will be critical in support of US military capacity and the broader comprehensive approach in years to come, particularly as the expectations of them transform and grow.

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, officer and enlisted corps of the Services have performed missions under the most efficient structures of joint organization than at any time in the nation's history. The scope and complexity of post-9/11 [11 September 2001] contingencies have further pushed the US military toward a more joint- and coalition-centric focus that increasingly includes the enlisted ranks. Future operations will require that all Service members be knowledgeable in areas of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.[2] Leaders will face many types of unconventional, irregular threats and be required to solve complex problems.

Consistent with the known and emerging roles of the enlisted force, US and coalition military organizations have given increased recognition to their enlisted forces. Based on a series of interviews with command senior enlisted leaders (CSEL) from 2005 to 2009,[3] this article serves as a resource and building block to better educate and enable our current and future enlisted leaders on the realities encountered in joint operating environment. It looks at the issues associated with stepping into the joint environment, leading enlisted members of all Services, and the partnering with foreign militaries, coalition, and interagency organizations. The issues and best practices of joint enlisted leadership emphasized within can help our senior enlisted leaders and others apply lasting principles for working in uncertain, complex, and changing joint operating environments.

Stepping into the Joint Operating Environment

Post-9/11 operational demands have expanded the responsibilities of the military's enlisted force, particularly those in joint commands, where multiple capabilities and experience collaborate to accomplish complex missions with broad strategic effect. The experience of staff- and command-level senior enlisted leaders (SEL) in joint organizations, coupled with their mobility among assigned areas of operations and interaction with multi-Service and multinational troops, affords commanders and other officers a more accurate, unfiltered picture of the joint operating environment; in return, SELs help to communicate and clarify their leadership's intent and direction to Service members at all echelons of operations.

Enlisted leaders assigned to a joint task force, Service or functional component, subunified command, or combatant command must step beyond their Service-centric experience—and perhaps their comfort zone—and perform tasks much farther beyond their legacy roles of focusing primarily on the health, morale, welfare, and training of their unit. Enlisted leaders of today and tomorrow have to look beyond US military culture and take into account the volatile political, economic, and cultural situations of the countries and people groups they work with; they must be connected and involved, as well as savvy and expeditionary focused in a rapidly changing joint operating environment.

With their various Service and career backgrounds, no two SELs approach an issue the same way. Furthermore, the joint environment, with geographic and mission differences of various commands, rarely lends itself to cookie-cutter solutions. Despite this diversity, there are still many common issues relative to senior NCOs and petty officers in their joint roles.

Service members have strong ties to their Service cultures—and understandably so. They have been trained with the particular skills needed to protect the nation and, if called upon, to fight its wars. Each Service shapes the worldview of its enlisted personnel through its unique doctrine and policies.

Because of the nature of their mission, some of the Services' enlisted personnel function more alike than others. Army and Marine Corps NCOs have shared experiences of conducting ground operations, with close, regular contact with their commanding officer at an early stage and at lower echelons of command. Navy petty officers and Air Force NCOs principally maintain fighting platforms for the sea and air, respectively, and support officers who employ those weapon systems. Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps share a unique camaraderie of being together under the Department of the Navy.

Moving from a Service-focused tactical environment to a joint operational environment requires a Service member to consider the larger picture of US military and coalition operations. Many unknowns can confront a joint enlisted leader, who has to remain adaptive and creative to learn and adjust to the changing environment both inside and outside the organization.

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines might experience some feelings of "leaving" everything behind to enter the joint world. It can be difficult to manage and maintain awareness of one's Service while focusing on the joint mission. If an enlisted member is young in his or her career, it can be especially challenging to venture to a new, unknown environment, not knowing in what capacity they will serve in the Service once the joint assignment ends.

Joint force commanders and other officers are well trained in the art and science of joint warfighting. Officers' expectations of what SELs can do for the command will be mostly shaped by their own Service experience, their past exposure to enlisted leadership, and their individual leadership personality and style.

Throughout a joint organization, there are ongoing meetings of boards, bureaus, cells, and groups, and SELs often have the opportunity to plug into the process and influence the decision cycles. The tactical knowledge gained by SELs from where they have been throughout their career—and even more recently from circulating in the joint operating environment—is helpful to those decisions being made that will in due course affect tactical-level troops both near and far from a headquarters. Enlisted leaders' knowledge of other Services also proves advantageous when feeding information into the right channels and when asking, "How will this affect our troops in all the Services?"

Leading Members of All Services

Senior enlisted leaders often influence others through coaching, mentoring, and teaching to shape the command climate and its personnel. Officers have traditionally relied on NCOs and petty officers for technical expertise and to gauge the morale of the troops. In joint commands, there are also many opportunities for SELs to practice the art of leadership. Using instinct, intuition, and insight, enlisted leaders can lead by example while continuing to keep their hands on the pulse of the enlisted force. Both officers and enlisted leaders have to balance a combination of activities and continually readjust for changes as time goes on.

Team-building helps form common ground among the Services and furthers the joint mission's unity of effort. Allowing input in decision-making gives many a stake in the process, which strengthens cohesion among personnel of different Services and allows a diversity of viewpoints and valuable experience.

The language used in a joint command is vital to communicating the right message. The military has no shortage of acronyms and Service-specific jargon, and a Soldier might not interpret the same thing heard as the Airman sitting next to him. That constant barrier is often humorously described by the differences in how each Service would "secure a building," ranging from checking locks to clearing the building room to room. This lexicon issue becomes even more of a challenge when working with coalition partners, who have obvious language differences and, oftentimes, diverse expectations of their enlisted force's roles when compared with the United States'.

Regardless of the "flavor" of joint environment they are in, NCOs and petty officers continue to identify with and take pride in their Service; they are Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines first. A joint command led by a particular Service does not exist to change the minority member into one of its own, but rather is able to fully benefit from and leverage the capacity and capability of that member's Service and personal experience. Enlisted members of different Services often realize how much they have in common, and they can then better use each other's expertise, knowledge, and capability to the fullest as a means to accomplish the mission.

In leading effectively, SELs understand what other Services value and what motivates each Service member. One Service might consider it challenging to do

intense physical training and compete with other team members; another might prefer a lighter training regimen with more problem-solving challenges. These motivations also differ based on career field and background expertise.

Each Service's strengths can help the team overcome weaknesses. One way to show the strength of the joint team is for leadership to highlight the different capabilities each Service provides, through regular education programs and information exchange. Any unhealthy rivalries or misunderstandings in the command can be brought to light and resolved quickly.

Enlisted leaders apply standards that make sense for their particular environment and mission. They find out what their sister Services can live with and what they can live without, and universal standards are set for the command without taking away elements from another Service's culture or tradition. Even still, it can be difficult when common ground on policies, procedures, customs, and courtesies have been established but a new augmentee or group does not know the history and therefore reverts to Service-specific standards. With all the various Services and coalition partners, the blended environment may never look completely "right" to what an enlisted member of one particular Service is used to seeing.

In the joint operating environment, encountering issues not addressed in a Service handbook or joint doctrine seems inevitable. Junior and midgrade NCOs and petty officers often grow up learning the benefit of explicit guidance on standards and discipline. But challenges arise if working in a "gray" area; for example, with a Service's regulations that may not be appropriate for a particular joint environment. Fully understanding the mission and practicing the commander's intent helps SELs remain flexible and make the best decisions when there may be no precedent for doing so.

Circulating through the joint operating environment allows some SELs to interact with those Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who might otherwise be overlooked in a large operation. While it might be important to go on "adventurous" missions by visiting a forward operating base, for example, SELs can also visit and talk with those who may not be considered the "pointy end of the spear," including cooks, supply sergeants, and radio operators. While visiting only those units that are related only to the SEL's Service and career field might seem natural, stepping outside one's comfort zone and talking with those who may be overlooked generally has an enormous impact on the force.

Inside and outside a headquarters, SELs can walk where other enlisted Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines walk; eat what they eat; wear what they wear; and experience the same conditions they experience. Visiting a unit with air conditioning cannot equate to standing watch in 120-degree weather or working in the belly of a ship. Being in the same environment, wearing the same uniforms, and using the same equipment not only lends the enlisted leader credibility among the troops, but also shows them that he or she is following the same correct standards that others have to follow.

Circulating the operating environment allows one to see various joint outposts and better know the conditions of roads, bridges, and other infrastructure. As well, being among the troops helps SELs determine whether important directives discussed in the headquarters have in fact reached the warfighters.

KABUL, Afghanistan - U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Marvin Hill, International Security Assistance Force Command Senior Enlisted Leader, second from left, and Sergeant Major of the Afghan National Army, Command Sgt. Maj. Safi Roshan talk Sept. 23 while walking at the ANA Sergeant Major Academy at the Kabul Military Training Center. The school has graduated two classes, and 26 ANA Sergeants Major are now enrolled in the six-month program. Afghan enlisted troops are on track to take over instruction of the course, with ISAF advisers, by January 2011.

Roles in Partnering

> "Both officers and enlisted leaders will find themselves participating in coalitions in which the United States may or may not be the leading actor, but in which partners will invariably play an important part."—*The Joint Operating Environment 2010*[4]

The United States sells weapon systems to friends and allies around the world. Often, the technical expertise of US enlisted Service members is needed to train others on those systems. One "weapon system" that has become even more significant in today's international relations is the US military model itself. Many countries see the strength of the officer-enlisted relationship and the capacity of the US enlisted corps and want similar efficiency and power for their own militaries. One of the most visible benefits of the US model is enlisted men and women shouldering responsibilities that would otherwise cut into the officers' much needed time for planning and decision-making. This is generally seen as positive, but it may be more difficult to implement in some cultures than others.



Mentoring Afghan Partners: Chief Master Sgt. Dave Staton talks to an Afghan Security Forces airman about his weapon on 1 Dec 2010 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Chief Staton is the 738th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group superintendent. As the senior enlisted member, he is also the direct mentor to the Kandahar Air Wing's enlisted leader, Command Sgt Maj Mohammad Hassan. (US Air Force photo/Senior Airman Melissa B. White)

While traditionally focusing its shaping and developing capabilities on the officer corps, the US military is currently engaging and helping many countries develop NCOs and petty officers as part of its overall strategic objectives. That assistance can be in the form of short-term training or longer-term institution-building (e.g., creating a command sergeants major program). Even junior enlisted personnel find themselves engaged in training foreign armies and police forces.

Coalition members can employ their enlisted corps much differently than the US military does—and each country has its own standards and practices. Issues such as national caveats commit foreign forces to different rules of engagement and restrict them from performing certain missions that US forces conduct, and sometimes vice versa. In addition, there can be intra-Service caveats even among US forces. It is therefore beneficial for SELs to interact regularly with one another and their coalition members to learn their systems, while at the same time coaching and mentoring them on the value of the US system.

The joint military is just one of several instruments of national policy, and the United States will likely not go it alone in its future operations. Scores of interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations—both US and multinational—will have a continued presence in the area of operations following conflict. When helping to rebuild a nation's infrastructure, rule of law, and other essential systems, links to such influential organizations as the US Agency for International Development and International Committee of the Red Cross become critical to building a "whole of government" or "whole of nation" approach. These organizations significantly enable commanders to accomplish their mission, and vice versa.

While increased capacity from other organizations adds efficiency, the absence of defined relationships, and a chain of command, can increase the risk of misunderstandings and disputes. Communications and continuous liaising are therefore essential for SELs who work with these outside organizations, which, based their nature, mission, and personnel, will integrate with the joint force more naturally than others.

Conclusion

Today's youngest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are having more and more opportunities to work alongside enlisted personnel and officers from other Services and nations. As time goes on and joint education and training increase, "jointness" has become a less unnatural state and more of an assumption. Although no two joint organizations are the same, many principles of—and challenges involved with—

leadership will be universal to any senior enlisted leader stepping into a joint command. Eaeh environment poses unique political and strategie eontexts and a eombination of aetivities.

Enlisted leaders are eontributing their experience and influenee to joint operations and, a quarter-eentury after the Goldwater-Nichols Aet, are beginning to reeeive the continuing edueation and training they need to be better focused on expeditionary requirements and prepared for the eurrent and future joint operating environment.[5] Enlisted personnel are taking the knowledge they have learned in the joint environment baek to their Serviee; in turn, the Serviee gets a better developed member who has been enlightened by the joint opportunity and experienee. Through this "eross-pollination," a new generation of enlisted personnel eomes into the joint world better edueated and prepared.

The enlisted foree will eontinue to produee those who ean profieiently ineorporate the sciences essential with new teehnologies, but they will also have to think more eritieally about the ehallenges related to less teehnieal areas sueh as the eulture, polities, and eeonomies of the environment they find themselves in. The future enlisted force will have to operate at full eapaeity and have the appropriate and proportionate edueation, training, and seasoning it needs to operate and lead in this environment. Enlisted leaders will be the primary implementers of new joint eoncepts and doetrine, as well as the "baekbone" of eontinuing foree transformation. Ultimately, the nation will benefit from the adaptability of these men and women as it strives to defend its homeland, defeat its global enemies, and establish long-term partnerships.

GRAFENWOEHR, Germany- Sgt. 1st Class Jason McMillen, platoon sergeant, A Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, teaches Sgt. 1st Class Ivan Milojkovic, counter-terrorist, Cobra Battalion, Special Operations, Serbian Armed Forces, how to use the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon during a range held here, June 15. (U.S. Army Photos by Spc. Bethany L. Little)

About the Author:

Mr. Phillip Wirtz serves as writer/editor and web eontent manager for the JCOA Engagement Division. From 2006 to 2009, he assisted the JCOA SEL in interviewing eommand senior enlisted leaders, developed and maintained an online forum for joint senior enlisted leaders, and ereated and distributed timely and relevant produets.

Endnotes:

[1] US Joint Forees Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, Suffolk, VA, 2010, p. 70.

[2] See US Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0*, Washington, DC, 15 January 2009.

[3] More than 30 CSELs from joint commands were interviewed as part of a leadership perspectives project created by JCOA SEL SGM Todd Priest. In addition, this article benefits from a draft paper on joint enlisted development written by former US Central Command CSEL CCMSgt Curt Brownhill, as well as many other related articles and papers on the development and evolving roles of Service and joint enlisted leaders.

[4] US Joint Force Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, p. 70.

[5] In December 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Gen Richard Myers directed the development of Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (EJPME) policy. Two years later, CJCS Gen Peter Pace signed the Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP). EPMEP provided guidance for three levels of EJPME: Basic (to be embedded in service introductory- and primary-level programs); Career (to be embedded in the service intermediate-, senior-, and executive-level programs); and Senior (comprising the SEJPME online course and the Keystone resident course for CSELs).

NOTES

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)

JCOA Products List

(1 April 2011)

The following are descriptions of JCOA studies and their products arranged by topic area. All products are, or soon will be, available on the SIPRNET at http://kt.jfcom.smil.mil/jeoa. Although some of the products listed below are classified, all of the descriptions herein are unclassified.

Afghanistan

Adaptive Learning for Afghanistan (2011)

Near the completion of the Joint Civilian Casualty Study, GEN Petraeus requested further study to understand how the US military can better institutionalize lessons learned and best praetiees so that forees are better prepared when they arrive in Afghanistan. From August 2010 through January 2011, JCOA analysts interviewed forecs deployed, in training, and in home station, and conducted an exhaustive review of joint and Service doctrine, regulations, policies, and other documentation on how lessons from theater were incorporated in the road to deployment. Using eivilian easualty lessons as the "test ease," the study shows where these lessons were suecessfully ineorporated into unit preparations for deployment and how units adapted to the ever-ehanging operating environment. It also addresscs ehallenges that exist within numerous pathways for knowledge sharing, equipping and manning shortfalls, and the vast expanse of information available to an individual and unit that often leads to information overload and lost synergy.

Joint Civilian Casualty Study (2010)

The Joint Civilian Casualty Study is a eomprehensive, multidisciplinary examination of eivilian easualties (CIVCAS) in ongoing US military operations. Its authors provide a picture of recent US military actions to reduee CIVCAS and identify future related ehallenges. The report eoncludes by listing key reeommendations for coalition forees in Afghanistan and sustainable institutional reeommendations for US Serviees. Sarah Sewall, Harvard Kennedy Sehool of Government and member of the Defense Policy Board, and analysts from JCOA led the study with support from the Army, Air Foree, Marine Corps, US Speeial Operations Command, and the Center for Naval Analyses. In addition, JCOA indepcndently dcveloped a brief based on thc study's findings. This study includes both classified and unelassified produets.

Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (2009–2010)

US Central Command eommissioned JCOA to eonduct a detailed study of civilian casualty (CIVCAS) ineidents in Afghanistan. This study was conducted in two phases: Phase I foeuses on causal factors in the CIVCAS incident in Farah on 4 May 2009; Phase II is a comprehensive study of US-eaused CIVCAS ineidents in Afghanistan between 2007 and mid-2009. Thcse produets identify trends and eausal faetors assoeiatcd with CIVCAS ineidents; they also inelude doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and eduea-tion, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) ehange recommendations for reducing coalition-caused CIVCAS ineidents and improving the coalition's response to those incidents. Issues addressed in these produets include ehallenges in positive identification, capturing CIVCAS battle damage assessments, improving escalation-of-force ineidents, exereising taetieal patienee, moving toward spccial operations–convcntional force eollaboration, and condueting the battle for the narrative. This study is classified.

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Police Reform Challenges (2008)

This study identifies and documents challenges associated with Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan's (CSTC-A's) organizing, training, and equipping of the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and captures lessons learned associated with transitioning security responsibilities from coalition forces to the Government of Afghanistan during a counterinsurgency. Starting in April 2005, CSTC-A was tasked to organize, train, and equip the ANP forces. CSTC-A's mission supports security sector reform of Afghanistan, to counter internal and external threats and ultimately ensure the long-term success of the Afghan government. This study is classified.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan (2006)

In October 2005, a team from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and JCOA assessed provincial reconstruction team (PRT) operations in Afghanistan as part of an effort to distill best practices. The goals of the assessment were to (1) generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination among various US government departments and agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings, (2) determine key lessons to inform the transition of PRTs to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and (3) analyze the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other current and future US peace and stability operations. This study is unclassified.

Iraq

Transition to Stability Operations (2010)

Transition to Stability Operations focuses on the best practices, successes, and challenges in Iraq during the period 1 January 2009 (implementation of the security agreement) through 31 August 2010 (end of combat operations). The JCOA study team observed in-depth how US forces and the civilian-military team in Iraq successfully transitioned from counterinsurgency operations to a stability operations–focused effort. This study identifies major findings in the areas of Iraqi Security Forces development, building civil capacity, partnered counterterrorism, non-lethal targeting, maintaining situational awareness, retaining necessary influence, mission preparation, and mastering transitions; it also looks at challenges that were overcome and/or mitigated during this critical transition period. The study highlights the significant lessons learned and the associated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) recommendations to improve future operations. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Iraq Information Activities (2009)

JCOA identified lessons from the planning and execution of various information activities in Iraq from April 2008 to June 2009. JCOA learned that when commanders discussed information operations (IO), they referred to an activity beyond the five IO capabilities defined in joint doctrine (military deception, operations security, psychological operations, computer network operations, and electronic warfare). They were talking instead about the integrated employment of these core IO capabilities, in concert with supporting and related capabilities including public affairs and defense support to public diplomacy, under the larger strategic communication umbrella. Our study, which used this broader concept of IO, focused on four key areas: the recognition of IO as "commanders' business" used to convey his intent through a purposeful set of ideas and actions intended to both influence and inform; the unity of effort required to synthesize IO policy, doctrine, and the realities on the ground; the operational principles of IO that emerged over time; and the practical and methodological challenges that made assessment of IO difficult. In summary, JCOA observed a growing understanding and appreciation for the decisive role that information and influence played in the Iraqi operational environment, where commanders identified IO as "the most important issue facing the warfighter today." We propose that the concept of the "battle for the narrative," which characterizes today's IO in Iraq and elsewhere, could provide the framework to align, coordinate, integrate, employ, and organize lethal and nonlethal capabilities for counterinsurgencies and other types of warfare. This study is classified.

Strategic Communication Best Practices (2009)

In April 2008, at the request of the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) Chief of Staff, the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication undertook a data collection effort to document MNF-I strategic communication best practices and their doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications. That effort culminated in a brief that was disseminated to appropriate customers within the Department of Defense. JCOA reviewed the brief and felt that the recent successes in MNF-I strategic

communication needed to be further documented and shared with other combatant commands and joint task forces. This JCOA paper therefore builds upon the foundation laid by the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and presents a further look at the key elements of this good-news story. This study is unclassified.

Comprehensive Approach–Iraq (2009)

GEN David Petraeus requested that JCOA capture successes in the coalition's integrated counterinsurgency efforts against Al Qaeda in Iraq during 2007–2008 ("Anaconda Strategy"). GEN Ray Odierno and AMB Ryan Crocker added that the study should emphasize civil-military cooperation from strategic to tactical levels. This study focused on four main themes: unifying efforts, attacking insurgent networks, separating the population from the insurgents, and building Government of Iraq capabilities. The study began in September 2008 and continued into 2009. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Joint Tactical Environment (2008)

The Joint Tactical Environment (JTE) study originated from a request by Multi-National Force–Iraq to USJFCOM to document the innovation in Iraq between air-weapons teams and unmanned aerial vehicles during operations in Sadr City. That task expanded to include other urban areas in Iraq and the critical command and control and airspace operations in those urban environments. Ultimately, the JTE mission documented innovation and best practices involving the integration of joint capabilities in urban operations. Specifically, the study was tasked to address four main pillars: command and control; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and airspace from the joint perspective in an effort to better understand how units in environments such as Sadr City, Basrah, Mosul, and others employed joint or nonorganic capabilities for their specific operational environment. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (2008)

Multi-National Force–Iraq requested this study to capture, document, and validate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) best practices and lessons to improve ISR employment in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) targeting in Iraq. JCOA collected data from almost all brigades, some battalions, and selected companies, in addition to higher-echelon headquarters. Team members observed operations, conducted interviews, and collected data to document best practices important to success or failure in COIN targeting. While conducting this study, it became clear that ISR support to COIN targeting had to be understood in relation to ISR support to the broader spectrum of COIN missions. This study is classified.

Counterinsurgency Operations (2007)

The counterinsurgency (COIN) study examines the shift in focus from reconstruction operations in 2003 to COIN operations (supported by a "surge" of US troops) in 2007. It focuses on the following areas: (1) evolution of US coalition strategy in Iraq, (2) elements of the latest strategy, and (3) impact of implementation of the latest strategy. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Task Force Freedom, Mosul, Iraq (2007)

This is the story of Task Force Freedom and how teamwork between those conducting operations and those providing intelligence led to success. Task Force Freedom adapted to a severely degraded security situation by developing a streamlined targeting cycle, lowering the threshold of actionable intelligence, and enabling distributed execution—underpinned by shared awareness and purpose. This study is classified.

Al Anbar Best Practice Study (2007)

This study examines how Al Anbar changed dramatically between fall 2006 and spring 2007, from one of the most violent, anti-coalition insurgent strongholds to one in which local tribal leaders partnered with coalition forces in an effort to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Violence dropped significantly, reconstruction projects began, the economy resurged, and normalcy returned. This study is classified.

Transition to Sovereignty (2007)

This study examines Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from June 2004 to December 2005. This period began when the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the newly elected Iraq government. During this time frame, the insurgency gained momentum, as it became apparent that the capabilities of other elements of US government could not be brought to bear on the situation because of the deteriorating security situation. This study is classified.

Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (2006)

The Joint Staff and JCOA collected lessons during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Each evaluated stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations from the end of joint combined combat operations in

May 2003 until the transition to Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004. This study combines the two efforts to allow the reader to review them in a single document, if desired. This study is classified.

Joint Health Service Operations (2005)

The Department of Defense (DOD) medical community has had great sueeess in the treatment of combat easualties in Iraq. Combat mortality, defined as a measurement of the pereentage of all battle easualties that result in death (Killed in Aetion + Died of Wounds/Total Battle Casualties), is the lowest level in reeorded warfare. Despite the sueeess in the reduetion of eombat mortality among eoalition eombat easualties, DOD medical treatment faeilities still face many diffieult ehallenges. These medieal support ehallenges are examined in the JCOA medieal study. The study is elassified.

Synchronizing Counter-IED Efforts in Iraq (2005)

This study examines the ehallenges of synehronizing and eoordination the aetivities of multiple entities working to eounter adversaries' use of improvised explosive deviees (IEDs). This study is elassified.

Joint Combined Combat Operations (2004)

This study compiles operational insights gathered during major eombat operations and assesses their impact on future joint warfighting at the operational level. It catalogs important findings, puts those findings in eontext, and outlines the nature of the aetions needed to address them. This study is classified.

Irregular Warfare

Al-Shabaab (2011)

In 2006, members from the militant wing of the Somalia Couneil of the Islamie Courts took control over most of southern Somalia. Two years later, the US State Department would deelare this group, al-Shabaab ("The Youth"), a foreign terrorist organization. In the beginning of the movement, most of the rank-and-file members were interested in aehieving nationalistie goals; however, over time, senior leaders within al-Shabaab moved toward an affiliation with al-Qa'ida and adopted its mission of global jihad. JCOA analyzed how al-Shabaab's ideology, strategy, taeties, reeruitment, and other eharaeteristies evolved. The study's analysts eonsidered the means and meehanisms by whieh terrorist organizations adapt as they work to aehieve their goals and objeetives. This study shows how insurgencies like al-Shabaab can have broad influenee outside their area of operations. This study is classified.

Sri Lanka (2009)

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan military concluded a three-year sustained offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), completely overwhelming the Tamil Tiger organization and killing its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran. In the wake of this military victory, the Government of Sri Lanka announced its final triumph over Sri Lanka's Tamil insurgeney following twenty-six years of bloody civil war and centuries of ethnic conflict between Sri Lanka's Buddhist Sinhalese majority and its Hindu Tamil minority. Sri Lanka's self-proclaimed triumph over the LTTE has left some in the international community wondering whether the Sri Lankan approaeh represents a viable, aggressive alternative to less confrontational methods of resolving ethno-religious insurgeneies. This study examines the approaehes of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in exeeuting their respective counterinsurgent and insurgent eampaigns, and presents eonclusions and implications applicable to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. This study ineludes both classified and unclassified products.

2nd Lebanon War (2008)

In 2006 the world watched as Israel responded to the 12 July killing of three Israeli Defense Forees (IDF) soldiers and the kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers by fighters of the Islamie Resistance, the military arm of Hizballah. Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to use military force and diplomaey to aehieve the goals set out by Prime Minister Olmert. When Israel did not aehieve these goals through an aggressive air eampaign and subsequent ground invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began to question Israel's military eapabilities. As one offieer stated, "Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a reputation of invineibility among its Arab neighbors, until last year." What happened? Why? And what are the implieations for future conflicts? Many institutions, government agencies, and military serviees have studied the 2nd Lebanon War. None, however, have reported all the major findings in one holistie account. Using those previous studies as primary data sourees, this JCOA study seeks to identify, synthesize, and present the lessons learned about the hybrid threat that seemed to emerge in the 2nd Lebanon War. This study is classified.

Super Empowered Threat (2008)

A follow-on to the JCOA *Techno-Guerilla* (TG) and *National Response to Biological Contagion* (NRBC), *Super-Empowered Threat* (SET) examines the development of modern terrorist groups and the changes in the asymmetric threat. Work in *TG* and *NRBC* demonstrated the exponential increase in the operational and destructive capabilities of small terrorist groups. The threat continues to evolve. Alliances between state sponsors, terrorists groups, organized crime, and transnational gangs are expanding. Terrorists groups are becoming more sophisticated in their use of commercially available electronic and modern telecommunications networks. Their influence is spreading across the globe while our focus is on the Middle East. The study evaluates the emerging terrorist threat using a law enforcement model analyzing behavioral resolve, operational practicality, and technical feasibility. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Georgia-Russia Conflict (2008)

This study, tasked by the Joint Staff and conducted in coordination with EUCOM and several USG agencies, examines the summer 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict in terms of background, conduct of the conflict, and the resulting regional/strategic implications. The analysis highlights direct military action in conventional approaches that at the same time used irregular approaches which shaped this conflict for well over a decade. The study offers an opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of a re-emergent Russia, as well as the impact of the evolving nature of hybrid warfare with its impact on policy, plans, and preparations for future conflict. This study is classified.

Techno-Guerrilla (2007)

This study explores the evolution of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The techno-guerrilla is an asymmetric force with conventional techniques and capabilities that utilizes open source warfare ("wiki warfare") and systems disruption, as it seeks to create a transnational insurgency. The study examines the phenomenon of super-empowerment—which is defined as the point at which a small group of individuals can create social-network disruption to an entire society with global effect, also known as the "9/11 effect." This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Modern Irregular Warfare (2005)

This study provides an executive-level lessons learned overview of modern irregular warfare operations. It focuses on the nature of insurgencies and countering insurgencies, while recognizing that terrorism and intimidation are popular tools for insurgents. This study is unclassified.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

Haiti Earthquake Response (2010)

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. The earthquake, centered 10 miles west of Port-au-Prince, was the worst to hit the region since 1770. The earthquake killed more than 200,000 and affected more than 3 million people. Haitian capacity was completely overwhelmed, triggering a large international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (IHADR) effort. At the request of US Southern Command, JCOA deployed a team to collect lessons learned on the IHADR response in Haiti. The initial objective of JCOA's mission was to provide leaders with insights from studies of US government involvement in recent IHADR operations to support planning and informed decisions. A complementary objective was to observe Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE to capture enduring lessons and best practices of combatant commander and joint task force collaborative efforts with the US interagency, United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations. This study is unclassified.

International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (2007)

This study analyzes four major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) events: the Haiti peacekeeping mission (2004), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), the Pakistan earthquake (2005), and the Guatemala mudslides (2005). Analysis of these events revealed a number of common enabling capabilities that were critical for success in a HADR response. This study is unclassified.

Guatemala Disaster Relief (2006)

In October 2005, a team of JCOA observers, in conjunction with US Southern Command, conducted a study of Joint Task Force–Bravo's quick response in the initial phase of helping the Guatemalan government deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Stan. This study is unclassified.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief in Pakistan (2006)

In October 2005, a devastating earthquake caused widespread destruction in northern Pakistan and adjacent areas. In response, US Central Command designated Expeditionary Support Group One as the

Combined Disaster Assistance Command—Pakistan to assist the Pakistani government in recovery efforts. A team from JCOA observed and detailed the effectiveness of US forces in accomplishing the mission and strengthening the strategic ties that bind Pakistan and the United States in the Global War on Terror. This study is unclassified.

Operation SECURE TOMORROW (Haiti) (2005)

This study focuses on issues that concerned US Southern Command, Combined Joint Task Force–Haiti, and their staffs as US-led multinational forces conducted a transition of military responsibility to the United Nations. The report describes these issues along with others developed through follow-on analyses of data and observations. It catalogs the team's important findings, places those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address shortcomings. This study is classified.

Homeland Defense

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2007)

As a follow-on to the Hurricane Katrina report, this study develops a framework for analyzing incident management and highlights challenges that affect the level of unmet requirements in a catastrophe. It illustrates ways in which post-Katrina improvements can close the response gap. This study is unclassified.

National Response to Catastrophic Event (2006)

The report and briefing focus on the national response to Hurricane Katrina by local, state, and federal agencies during the month between the storm's formation in the Atlantic Ocean and the post-hurricane stabilization of conditions in the Gulf Coast region. The report concentrates on response—as opposed to disaster mitigation or recovery—because the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in coping with domestic disasters lies primarily in providing civil authorities with response capabilities, not in providing assets for long-term recovery. This study is unclassified.

National Response to Biological Contagion (2006)

Future biotechnology advancements will make it easier for a wide range of adversaries—including terrorist organizations—to launch a biological attack. This product studies biological incidents and examines USNORTHCOM's role as the Global Synchronizer for Pandemic Influenza planning. The study goes beyond the example of Pandemic Influenza to inform decision makers and planners to help mitigate the effects of pandemic or similar biological threats. It identifies gaps and shortfalls in DOD's participation in the nation's preparation and response to a significant pandemic. This study is unclassified.

Other Products

Haiti Stabilization Initiative (2009)

Originating in response to a request from the US Ambassador to Haiti through United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the Haiti study's purpose is to assess, document lessons learned, and capture best practices of the "comprehensive approach" implementation of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). The HSI was a pilot project designed to test and demonstrate a highly integrated civilian stabilization program, funded by DOD Section 1207, and designed and implemented by elements of the US State Department and USAID. The HSI effort focused on Cite Soleil, an area of metropolitan Port-au-Prince that was completely lost to Government of Haiti control until reclaimed by United Nations Stabilization Mission–Haiti (MINUSTAH) military operations at the beginning of 2007. The study provides insights into whether this approach supported both the USSOUTHCOM Theater Security Strategy and the US Embassy's Mission Strategic Plans and has potential wider application in other stability operations. This study is unclassified.

USJFCOM 2009 Lessons Learned Conference (2009)

Today's operations require that military forces work with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational partners as part of a comprehensive approach. This report summarizes the findings and recommendations from the United States Joint Forces Command 2009 Lessons Learned Conference, hosted by JCOA, held on 17–20 March 2009 in Newport News, Virginia. The conference welcomed participants from the United States and eight partner nations, and its working groups were divided into four focus areas derived from the US National Defense Strategy: Joint Warfighting, Joint Adaptation to Irregular Warfare, Theater Security Cooperation, and Homeland Defense. This study is unclassified.

9-11 Commission Report/Global War on Terrorism (2005)
This briefing compares the purposes, approaches, and results of the 9-11 Commission Report to JCOA observations. This study is classified.

Kosovo (2004)
This is a combined study by NATO JALLC and USJFCOM Joint Center for Lessons Learned on operations in Kosovo and surrounding regions. This study is classified.

JCOA-Supported Products

Iraqi Perspectives Project

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) was a Secretary of Defense directed research project, sponsored by JCOA, and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP). This project examined the perspective of the former Iraqi regime's civilian and military leadership on issues of interest to the US military, using information gathered through interviews and reviews of captured documents. The goal of this project was to determine how US operations were viewed and understood by the enemy. The following products emerged from this project:

Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (2008). Events in this report on the "Mother of All Battles," as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, videos, audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders eyes. The report is part of a JCOA research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, this balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of unique access to material. This product is unclassified.

Saddam and the Tribes: Regime Adaptation to Internal Challenges (2007). This study explores the complex relationship between Saddam's regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. This product explores the dynamics between tribe and state in dictatorial societies, and the ways in which tribal leadership can impact success or failure of central governance. This product is unclassified.

Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents (2007). This study uses captured former regime documents to examine the links and motivations behind Saddam Hussein's interactions with regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. This product is classified.

Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from Saddam's Senior Leadership (2006). This book presents a historical analysis of the forces and motivation that drove our opponent's decisions during Phase III (March 2003–May 2003) of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders, and by making extensive us of thousands of official Iraqi documents, it substantively examines Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process, revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' points of view. This product is unclassified.

Toward an Operational-Level Understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2005). This report is the classified report associated with the *Iraqi Perspectives Project* book. In addition to providing the Iraqi view of combat operations from early preparation through the collapse of the regime during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it also presents the Iraqi understanding of our capabilities and their efforts to exploit that understanding. A classified briefing and audio narrative slide show version is also available for this product. This product is classified.

Terrorist Perspectives Project

The Terrorist Perspectives Project (TPP) examines the perspectives of the members of Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups which share its theology and world view, on issues of interest to the US military, using primary source information principally gathered through open source and captured enemy documents. The goal of the project was to better "know the enemy" and to

develop insights into enemy weaknesses and potential "blue" strategies.

The Call to Global Islamic Jihad: The Jihad Manifesto (2008). US intelligence has identified Abu Musab Al-Suri as the most important theorist of the global Islamic jihad, and considers his manifesto to be the definitive strategic document produced by al Qaida or any jihadi organization in more than a decade. But to Americans, his 1,600-page manuscript largely consists of incomprehensible, impenetrable Islamic scholarship. This publication is a distillation of Al-Suri's Call to Global Islamic Resistance. This product is unclassified.

The Terrorist Perspective Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated Movements (2008). This book synthesizes the perspectives of Osama bin Laden and his fellow Salafi jihadists on how to wage war on their enemies. This product is unclassified.

The Canons of Jihad: A Terrorists' Perspective of Warfare and Defeating America (2008). Noting that the best way to understand Salafi jihadists is to ignore statements they release to the West in favor of examining what they say to each other, this book provides a definitive collection of the writings that intellectually underpin the jihadi movement. This product is unclassified.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 1 (2007). This project approaches Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) as a movement rather than as a network, and tries to understand whether and in what ways its members think above the tactical level. Drawing on the enemy's own words both from open source materials and captured documents, it identifies seams and subjects of concern within the AQAM community. It explores the dichotomy between those members of AQAM who think instrumentally about their war and those who do not, and discuss topics such as the evolution of the enemy's political and military thought, enemy assessments of the United States, their comparative views of their media and our media, and their concerns about attracting people to the movement. This product is unclassified.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 2 (2007). This study draws upon words of AQAM found in captured documents and open-source pronouncements to describe a revolutionary movement which does not think of itself as a network. Intellectual leaders of AQAM are very concerned about the status of this movement, believing that the uncoordinated actions of its members repel the very Muslims that they need to attract. They are also concerned that they are losing the war of ideas and are isolated in an overwhelming hostile media environment. In response, the movement's intellectual leadership engages in a vigorous process of analysis, self-criticism, and adaptation. Unfortunately for them, their ability to implement their adaptive policies is imperfect. This product is classified.

Voices of the Enemy Quotations from Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) (2007). AQAM have been living in a state of war for more than four decades. Salafi jihadist leaders have developed a powerful narrative of history that appeals to and mobilizes their membership, though this narrative is based on questionable historical interpretations and future assumptions. Their strategists have learned that they will need to have a sound strategy and leaders who will ensure that such strategy is followed. The IDA study team used the enemy's own words from more than 250,000 documents from open and classified sources, including documents captured during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, to illustrate the enemy message for the reader. This product is unclassified.

Other Supported Products

Achieving Unity of Effort: A Case Study of US Government Operations in the Horn of Africa (2007). This paper was prepared under the task order Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP), subtask Global War on Terrorism–Africa, for USJFCOM. It helps address two objectives: (1) identify lessons from interagency efforts in the Horn of Africa; and (2) explore national security challenges and interagency collaboration processes and their results. This product is unclassified.

UK and US Friendly Fire in Recent Combat Operations (2006). The Technical Cooperation Programme—a cooperative venture between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—Joint Systems and Analysis Group established Action Group 13 on Fratricide Mitigation

with an objective, among others, of collaborative sharing of records, analyses and findings on friendly fire and fratricide. This report presents the results of an event-by-event collaborative comparison of friendly fire records between the UK and the US, covering three recent Coalition warfighting operations: Operation DESERT STORM/GRANBY, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM/HERRICK, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/TELIC. This study is unclassified.

Communications Architecture and Bandwidth Analyses (2005). The study characterizes the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM communications architecture and bandwidth used by US Central Command in theatre, including: joint command centers; service component operational and tactical centers; and the last tactical mile, including global reach back. The study covered Joint Combined Combat Operations. It expresses bandwidths in terms of allocated data rate equivalent capacity and performance based on actual usage derived from historical logs. This product is classified.

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We will respond to your request as soon as possible. Please indicate the type of information you require and the context of how the information will be used. If there is an urgent time requirement, please include that information as well.

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